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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

“IT’S NOT RAINBOWS AND UNICORNS”: REGULATED COMMODITY AND WASTE
PRODUCTION IN THE ALBERTA OILSANDS
This dissertation examines the regulated oilsands mining industry of Alberta, Canada,
widely considered the world’s largest surface mining project. The industrial processes of
oilsands mining produce well over one million barrels of petroleum commodities daily,
plus even larger quantities of airborne and semisolid waste. The project argues for a
critical account of production concretized in the co-constitutional relations of obdurate
materiality and labor activity within a framework of regulated petro-capitalism. This
pursuit requires multiple methods that combine archives, participant observation, and
semi-structured interviews to understand workers’ shift-to-shift relations inside the
“black box” of regulated oilsands mining production where materiality co-constitutes
the processes and outcomes of resource development and waste-intensive production.
Here, the central contradiction pits the industry’s colossal environmental impact and its
regulated environmental relations, which – despite chronic exceedances – are held
under some control by provincial and federal environmental agents, further attenuated
by firms’ selective voluntary compliance with global quality standards as well as
whistleblowers and otherwise “troublesome” employees. ‘It’s not rainbows and
unicorns,’ explains one informant, distilling workers’ views of the safety and
environmental hazards they simultaneously produce and endure as wage laborers
despite pervasive regulation. In addition to buttressing geographical conceptualizations
of socionatural resource production, contributions arise in the sympathetic engagement
with workers, which may hold useful insights for activism against the industry’s
environmental outcomes.
KEYWORDS: Oil Sands, Tar Sands, Regulation, Labor, Waste
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INTRODUCTION
Widely considered the world’s largest surface mining project, the oilsands1 mining
industry of Alberta, Canada, produces approximately 1.5 million barrels of diluted
bitumen and “synthetic crude oil” per day, along with even greater volumes of toxic
airborne and sluiced solid waste. Social science involving this industry primarily
investigates the political contestation of its ecological outcomes, indigenous resistance
to disenfranchisement, and hegemonic reproduction. Indeed, the evidence of
postcolonial unevenness is indisputable, as is the extent of ecological impact including
the imperative to reduce carbon-intensive capitalism. Meanwhile, in response to
increasing activist pressures, provincial and federal governments forestall dramatic
reform. This same social science literature, however, offers far less investigation – either
theoretical or on the ground – within the geographical tradition of inquiry into the
socio-material relations of production workers.
In response to these lacunae, my dissertation argues for a deeper understanding
of how oilsands materiality shapes its capitalist extraction and how shift-to-shift
workers/consumers navigate inside the “black box”2 of environmentally regulated
commodity and waste production in the oilsands mining industry, which despite its
obstacles, contradictions, and outcomes, still manages to “work” on some level. In this
vein, one tension becomes immediately clear and serves as a central motivation. This is
the contradiction between the industry’s colossal environmental degradation and its
regulated environmental relations, which – despite chronic exceedances – are held
under some control by provincial and federal environmental agents, further attenuated
by firms’ selective voluntary compliance with global quality standards as well as
whistleblowers and otherwise “troublesome” employees. ‘It’s not rainbows and
unicorns,’ explains one informant, distilling workers’ views of the safety and
1

Also, variously oil sands, tar sands, tarsands, bituminous sands, or Athabasca sands, located in northeast
Alberta, Canada. I use “oilsands” by default in line with my informants; yet nevertheless, adhere to terms
various references adopt. The dissertation involves the legacy and still vital oil mining segment of the
industry, expressed generically as the oilsands industry.
2
cf. Carter and Zalik 2016, 64; Zalik 2012
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environmental hazards they simultaneously produce and endure as wage laborers
despite pervasive regulation.
The approach problematizes oilsands materiality critically in terms of social coconstitutionality, and locates oilsands mining within the wider global petroleum
industry, particularly vis-à-vis historical anxieties and strategies related to material
abundance, limits, and conservation, visible for instance in recent debates over “peak
oil” and “unconventional” resources. This prompts my first research question:
RQ1: How does oilsands materiality contribute to an understanding of
“socionatural” resources?
Two additional research questions guide the inquiry into workers’ experiences:
RQ2: How do oilsands production workers’ shift-to-shift activities
manifest their “socionatural” relations?
RQ3: How do environmental regulation and firms’ imperatives mediate
workers’ “socionatural” relations?
Understanding the tensions on the ground inside the industry’s regulated pillage
necessitates adaptive iterative multiple methods that put archival sources in
conversation with the partial stories of laborers, tradespeople, equipment operators,
engineers, managers, and regulators gleaned through multiple seasons of participant
observation and building relationships. Archives span libraries, archives, museums, and
tradeshows, among others. When interpreted in a theoretical framework drawn from
regulation approaches to wage labor production, nature-society, and petroleum
geographies, as well as oil historiography, my empirical investigation answers these
research questions by cracking open discrete – yet also, co-constitutive – windows into
the oilsands mining industry: obdurate materiality, environmental regulation,
production imperatives, and workers’ activities interplay on the ground in the material
outcomes of historically situated, regulated commodity and waste production, and its
reproduction.
The dissertation proceeds in six chapters. The literature review of Chapter 1
laces together closely-related geographical criticisms of economism and naturalism that
2

cross paths with the expansive problem of oil, which together contribute to a
framework for interpreting my empirical findings. Broadly speaking, these literatures
draw from three categories: régulation approaches to wage labor production; from the
production of nature to co-production of socionature; and geographical petroleum
studies. Together, these three lines contribute to what I denote as socionatural
régulation approach to production.
Chapter 2 explains my adaptive multiple methods. Repeated encounters across
multiple research seasons penetrate what I refer to as the “siege mentality” prevalent
among industry workers and a wider cross-section of Fort McMurray, Alberta,
inhabitants – indeed, also in federal agencies as my archival findings and border
experiences make clear. In short, a combination of participant observation in group
living quarters and at public events and venues captures opportunity interview data,
serves as my primary tool to recruit semi-structured interviews and cultivate key
informants. Despite limited success of a snowball approach, extensive participant
observation over successive encounters eventually acquires key informants who, in
turn, open some doors. However, I must stress, keen insights also derive from chance
interactions, whereas key informants often offer no further leads, due to their
colleagues’ fears of employer retribution. Additional data are obtained from a wide
range of archives described below. Important is that archival and informant data are
acquired and analyzed in a process of iterative triangulation in which useful interview
data becomes increasingly efficient to collect.
Chapter 3 historicizes the Alberta oilsands mining industry vis-à-vis Canadian
petroleum geography and Alberta colonial settlement, which includes an overview of
the company town Fort McMurray and contemporary industry dynamics.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the substantive data, largely in narratives that
weave together archival research and informants’ fragmented anecdotes. Chapter 4
maps oilsands mining production processes and their material relations. This chapter
encompasses relations of production in the first two legs of the industry’s three-leg
mantra: production, safety, environment. Chapter 5 takes on the environment leg in
3

relation to production and safety. While I provide some background on regulation and
self-regulation of the wider petroleum industry, the emphasis is the labor practices on
the ground, both within the oilsands mining industry and its environmental regulator,
that effectively materialize firms’ non/compliance with their permitted – copious –
pollution limits. Chapter 6 centers on one crucial stream of waste, namely the sluiced
solids known as “tailings” produced at a rate of 1.5 barrels for every barrel of finished
commodity. In many ways, this chapter is a culmination of my triangulation among and
between archival and informant sources. The Conclusion interprets empirical findings
within the framework drawn from theoretical and historical literatures. Four appendices
supplement these chapters. Appendix I enumerates abbreviations and acronyms used in
the dissertation. Appendix II provides maps of Alberta and the oilsands mines. Appendix
III diagrams the oilsands mining production process. Appendix IV compiles interview
informants, their occupations, my interaction type, and dates of contact.
The dissertation neither disputes the growing documentation of alarming
environmental outcomes in the oilsands, nor questions normative democracy and social
resistance to capital-state power. Indeed, by shining light on several unmistakable
moments when Alberta and the firms sidestep the full implications of oilsands waste
tailings, the dissertation offers new empirical evidence of ‘willful blindness,’ in the
words of one informant within the provincial environmental regulator. My chief aim is
to animate the particular historical and contemporary relations of materiality, work
practices, and the provincial state in oilsands mining production, waste production, and
environmental compliance activities.

4

CHAPTER 1. AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, SOCIONATURE, AND PETROCAPITALISM
To build a framework for interpreting field data, this chapter draws together theoretical
foundations and selected empirical findings in political economy, nature-society, and
petroleum geography. The breadth of the subject of oil production and its crises
necessitates a high-level review. Organized into three broad parts, the first overviews
dimensions of political economy relevant to the American experience. The second part
presents facets of critical nature-society geography pertinent to oil studies. The third
part reviews petroleum geography across a range of concerns, including petroleum
space and its production networks; the uneven, violent, environmentally degrading
“curses” known to associate with oil producers; fears of limits; and lastly, the relations
of oil and hegemonic American consumer culture.
1.1 American Capitalism
1.1.1 Marxian approach to political economy
Marx’s 1857 introduction to the Grundrisse précises his critique of political economy, an
‘unmasking’ of the latter’s ideological explanations of the Individual and the classical
syllogism Production – Distribution – Exchange – Consumption (Hall 1973). This dense
analysis of capitalism’s pillars provides an historically-situated tonic to classical political
economy’s findings that, in Marx’s words, ‘prove the eternity and harmony of existing
social relations’ (2). To begin, human life under capitalism remains indisputably social.
Although the isolated Individual arises in fiction, it utterly fails as the basis of scientific
explanation. The independent individual is thus a conceptual product of bourgeois
society – not its cause. As Hall (1973) amplifies, ‘That the capitalist mode of production
depends on social connection assuming the “ideological” form of an individual
disconnection is one of the great substantive themes of the Grundrisse as a whole’ (6).
So too, production is a social process across economic epochs. Extraordinary exceptions
aside, production by the lone individual, Marx (1971) writes, ‘is just as preposterous as
the development of speech without individuals who live together and talk to one
another’ (2, original emphasis). The classical framing of production in terms of its
5

natural laws is one in which Marx writes: ‘Bourgeois relations are clandestinely passed
off as irrefutable natural laws of society in abstracto. This is the more or less conscious
purpose of the whole procedure’ (3-4, original italics). While factors such as
appropriation of natural materials, labor, and tools are common to production across
the ages, Marx insists that the important object of study is capitalism’s distinguishing
features, not its timeless similarities to slavery, feudalism. Crucially, production wage
labor serves as the wellspring of capitalism’s paramount objective, accumulation of
surplus value. Additionally, although one may speak of the totality of production, it
proceeds in distinctive branches such as agriculture and manufacturing.
Classical political economy recognizes that production contains within itself the
consumption of materials and labor. Marx holds that consumption is also production,
discernable in complementary dimensions. Consumption closes the cycle of production;
it is not the commodity itself, but rather, the consumption of the commodity that marks
this completion. And at the same time, consumption predisposes the producer to
produce. This in turn recreates the need for new production. In this way, production and
consumption are distinctive but bound together. Production produces both the material
as well as the mode of consumption; and also crucially, the desire for consumption. As
Marx (1971) encapsulates, ‘Production… produces not only an object for the subject, but
also a subject for the object’ (7). These needs and desires to consume are not essential
human qualities, but rather, reflect historically produced conditions. For this reason,
Hall (1973) summarizes, ‘Production, not consumption, initiates the circuit’ (25).
The primary object of study within classical political economy is the seemingly
natural laws of distribution of rent, wages, and profit. Marx demonstrates each of these
pertains merely to the distribution of the products of capitalism, the patterns of which
were largely determined by the historical distribution of the means of production. Thus,
rent depends upon the founding distribution of land; wages presume extensive
proletarianization; and, profit is the outcome of capitalization. As such, these originary
distributions demand recognition as the opening moments of capitalist production;
whereas, distribution in the present day-to-day is a subordinate effect. Notably
6

concurring with the significance of capitalism’s formative distribution, Polanyi (1944)
dwells upon the fraught emergence of its crucial ‘fictional commodities’ of wage labor
and capitalized nature. Tightly associated with distribution, Marx assigns exchange to a
similarly subordinate role as an effect of the mode of capitalist production.
Marx (1971) discerns generalizable implications in the American experience,
which illustrate his contention that, ‘A nation is at the height of its industrial
development so long as, not the gain, but gaining remains its principal aim. In this
respect,’ he writes, ‘the Yankees are superior to the English’ (3). Most salient is the
pervasiveness of American wage labor: ‘Labor, not only as a category but in reality, has
become a means to create wealth in general, and has ceased to be tied as an attribute
to a particular individual’ (15). As such, by the mid-nineteenth century – at the dawn of
the petroleum age, coincidentally – Marx deems America the world’s most bourgeois
society.
1.1.2 Coercion and consent of American labor
Out of early twentieth century America, Henry Ford’s two autobiographies are
translated into dozens of languages to promote his role in the revolutionary labor
management and manufacturing techniques of the day (Ford and Crowther 1926, 1922).
Imprisoned socialist Antonio Gramsci possesses both French-language volumes among
few possessions (Buttigieg 1992, v1, 468, n6). Indeed, Gramsci (1971) coins the term
“Fordism” in his famous prison writings to denote ‘an ultra-modern form of production
and of working methods’ (280-81). Vertical-integration and moving assembly of the
behemoth Ford River Rouge Complex commissioned in 1928 is the apotheosis of an age
reshaped by advancements in electro-mechanical automation combined with pervasive
control of laborers (Allen 1952, 1931, Cochran and Miller 1942). With scant recourse to
ravaged disjointed unions, Ford’s wage workers experience “coercion” on the job under
relentless automation and biased violent foremen, and also at home under the prying
gaze of the company Sociology Department (Davis 1986, Gartman 1986).
Yet, at the same time while under this intensive subjugation, some laborers
receive a high-wage and credit to entice “consent” to their treatment in return for
7

access to mass consumption. Notwithstanding violent resistances, slowdowns, and
turnover, Gramsci perceives a potential historical transformation through the ‘biggest
collective effort [ever made] to create, with unprecedented speed and a consciousness
of purpose unique in history, a new type of worker and of man’ (Gramsci 1996, 215).
Whether this would indeed come to pass remains uncertain in Gramsci’s eyes (Ives
2004). Nevertheless, the inescapable implication is American disruption of Marxian
eschatology (Nowell-Smith and Hoare 1971, 277-78). These coercion and consent
dynamics play out in social relations known widely as “hegemony,” which Williams
(1983) distinguishes from ideology for its everyday “normalcy” perceived by
subordinated classes, whom thereby consent to their own domination.
On the ground underneath this conceptualization of coercion, consent, and
hegemony, it remains to be understood why contemporary American wage laborers
work so hard and how do they cope. In the eyes of Burawoy (1979), the key lies in
successfully cloaking the mechanisms of surplus value accumulation, accomplished in
two complementary dimensions. First is alignment of wage laborers’ individuallyperceived interests with – not against – the capitalist interest: ‘To the degree that
workers come to regard their future livelihood as contingent on the survival and
expansion of their capitalist employer,’ Burawoy contends, ‘they will also come to
accept theories of profit that reflect the experiences of the capitalist seeking profit
through the sale of commodities’ (29). Second is working conditions under which wage
laborers perceive sufficient retention of agency. So long as coercion is meted out
sparingly and specifically, wide consent to work rules can be secured as wage laborers
concentrate attention upon the individual challenge of ‘making out,’ that is balancing
personally bearable work activities and wage income. Making out necessitates ‘games’
such as “banking” production activity presently to claim later for wages, and navigating
day-to-day social relations that range from cooperative to confrontational. Any worker
who remains in a single workplace, runs the chief argument, will experience production
of consent at the plant-level as a result. ‘The very activity of playing the game generates
consent with respect to its rules,’ Burawoy insists. ‘One cannot both play the game and
8

at the same time question the rules’ (81). These attitudes and activities self-reinforce
with the result being the internal production of consent, Burawoy concludes, opposed
to its importation from outside social spheres of family, school, church, and so forth.
For Weeks (2011) the central question is Americans’ consent to living a ‘working
life’ which is exceedingly favorable for surplus accumulation, yet suppresses pursuits of
alternative rewarding activities. Undeniably poor wages, inhospitable conditions, and
race and gender bias count among the many inequities in need of resolution. However,
Weeks argues, the problem of working life also reaches into middle and upper echelons
of wage labor. Alternative paths are explored as a political problem in terms of ‘refusal,’
not of work, but of working life and its valorization. As tall an order as this may seem,
Weeks’ feminist analysis underscores the more challenging barriers to this refusal in the
realm of unpaid – particularly domestic – work.
1.1.3 Régulation
Marx recognizes capitalism’s striking appearance of natural equilibrium, which fosters
its idealization in classical political economy. In the eyes of Hall (1973), Marx’s
‘absolutely crucial pivot is that this equilibrating movement has no eternal, no ethereal
guarantees.’ Nor does Marx accept equilibrium as a gravitational norm, finding rather
that it indicates a partial success in the struggle against centrifugal tendencies (25-26
original emphasis). Indeed, the central argument of Polanyi (1944) is that although the
precedent conditions for capitalism emerged unplanned, to hold these together for
centuries has necessitated capitalists themselves to clamor for state intervention.
Returning to these questions more recently, the Parisian régulation3 school prioritizes
3

It is important to disambiguate the connotations of English translation, such as Regulation School or
Regulation Theory. To be clear, the Parisian word régulation denotes regularization or normalization in
English, not the false cognate regulation, which translates best into the French règlementation (Jessop
1995). The subject in other words is hegemony, where administrative rules and regulations are the state’s
most obvious, yet non-singular, relation with capital (Gramsci 1971). There is never a lack of social
regularization within capitalism, rather, only variant manifestations (cf. Boyer 1990, 21). Although
régulation shares striking parallels with conceptualizations of governance, clear differences can be drawn.
Régulation opposes neoclassical economics whereas governance opposes classical concern with
government alone (Jessop 1995). In this dissertation, “régulation” refers to the wider conceptualization of
regularization while “regulation” refers to the narrower category of political-juridical rule. “Selfregulation” refers to voluntary actions of firms. Quotations from English-language sources retain the
ambiguous “regulation.”
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how it comes to be that – despite structural crises – capitalist regimes manage to
“work” on some levels to survive and reproduce (Lipietz 1987).
A treatise of this school, Michel Aglietta’s (1979) A Theory of Capitalist
Regulation: The US Experience analyzes twentieth century American economic history
through the lens of federal policy and automobile production. The central historical
claim locates a transformative American regime of intensive accumulation made
possible by federal diversion of unaccumulated “excess surplus value” into the
supplemental social welfare needed to propel two decades of post-World War II
‘consumer society’ characterized by rapid expansion of suburban housing economized
for the nuclear family (155-61). Together, this new home and the automobile become
the two chief – financed – capital acquisitions of households, along with rafts of goods
such that in Aglietta’s words, ‘production of these complex commodities itself became
the central process in the development of the mode of consumption’ (160). This statefacilitated mass consumerism marks a new stage of capitalism in which, avers Aglietta:
‘The accumulation of capital finds its content no longer simply in a transformation of the
reproduction of the labour process, but above all in a transformation of the
reproduction of labour-power’ (80).
Not at all an instrumental outcome, but rather emergent from economic and
labor crisis, this new social class détente institutionalizes contestation over American
capitalism’s contradictions sufficiently to cradle a new “accumulation regime,” in a
combination denoted Fordism. Paradigmatic here is the 1950 “Treaty of Detroit”
between the automakers’ union and General Motors that begins to quell nearly two
decades of organized resistance to the automobile manufacturing industry’s labor
practices (Davis 1986, 55-104). Although continued social stratification riddles Fordism
with contradictions, the combination of Keynesian state interventions and the postwar
Bretton Woods system ameliorate tensions up until its implosion in the 1970s fiscal
crises (cf. O'Connor 1973).
As Painter and Goodwin (1995) summarize it, understanding capitalist political
economy in terms of a ‘mode of regulation is more concrete than a mode of production’
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(350, emphasis added). The critical-realist English-language régulation approach seeks
to make sense of capitalism’s continual contradictions and crises and the
nondeterministic, contested – and notably incomplete – social responses to postFordism (Amin 1994, Hay and Jessop 1995, Jessop and Sum 2006, Jessop 2005, Jessop
1990). This takes up the challenge of emergent neoliberalism which erupts out of Fordist
crises in the ‘jungle law’ of Thatcher and Reagan, particularly in abrupt acts of
privatization and marketization facilitated by the ideological “rollback” of state rules and
regulations (Peck and Tickell 1994).
These drastic rollbacks subsequently give way to deepening entrenchment made
possible by what Peck and Tickell (2002) later discern as neoliberalism’s ‘perpetual
reanimation of restless terrains of regulatory restructuring’ (392), which emerge in the
mushrooming rollout of new governing rules and regulations. Earlier notions of the
“hollowed out” state oversimplify how the neoliberal state retains – even expands – its
regulatory reach in these rollout initiatives (Braithwaite 2005, Bridge 2014). What
becomes obvious is that neoliberalism does not rollback and rollout mechanistically, but
rather continually: ‘it generates a complex reconstitution of state-economy relations’
(Brenner and Theodore 2005, 102). Regulatory rollout must be understood, in other
words, not as a discrete transition from an antecedent rollback, but rather the relational
heart of neoliberalization itself (Peck et al. 2010).
In a typology subsequently influential in the neoliberal environments geography
described below, Jessop (2002) delineates a heuristic schema of this emergent capitalist
project: At its heart, neoliberalism advances neoconservative ideologies that treat
Keynesian social welfare – so crucial in Fordist régulation – as a social cost to justify
sweeping programs of deregulation and liberalization of economic transactions. These
initiatives feature privatization of state-owned assets and services and the closelyrelated use of market proxies in the implementation of residual regulation. These tactics
unfold in local, national, and transnational networks where state regulations make room
for public-private involvements of both supranational and ‘flanking’ identity-driven
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nongovernmental organizations. Primary moments of primitive ‘accumulation by
dispossession’ remain implicit in this typology (cf. Harvey 2003).
1.2 Socionature and Régulation
The nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no
longer exists anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coralislands of recent origin) and which, therefore, does not exist for
Feuerbach. (Marx and Engels 1970, 63)
It’s fair to say, the nature of geography as a subject is intimately linked
to the nature that geographers study. (Castree 2005 front matter)
1.2.1 From social construction of nature to socionature
The heart of geographic inquiry beats in the interplay of human and nonhuman realms
where the social production of nature is one familiar problem, distilled famously by
Erich W. Zimmermann: ‘Resources are not, they become; they are not static but expand
and contract in response to human wants and human actions’ (Zimmermann 1951, 15,
original italics). Notwithstanding its uncritical implication of tractable materiality,
Zimmermann’s famous expression propels geography’s enduring trajectory. Schmidt
(1971) is the first to apply Marxian rigor to the social production of nature, yet does so
with nature still passively objectified without explanation of how this socialization
occurs (Smith 1984, 87, see also, Foster 2000, 45).
In response to this shortfall, Neil Smiths’ (1984) treatise Uneven Development
argues that the cumulative magnitude of survey, territorialization, and development –
pointedly governed by exchange-value rubrics – wholly produces global nature qua
resource to the specifications of capital logics and its uneven outcomes. Thus, Smith
elucidates, more than merely relational, capital and its nature constitute a singular
political dialectic. At least four propositions make this insight of the ‘utmost
importance’: moving past romantic conceptualizations of primal nature; showing how
any specific social project is both ecologically constitutive and constituted;
demonstrating the crucial sweeping extent of capitalism’s production of nature in the
formation of exchange-value; and, historicizing nature-society, thereby inviting its
critique (Castree and Braun 1998, 8).
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Yet Smith (1984) leaves space for refinement. Heightened concern with material
production understates the cultural transformations necessary for nature to take the
commodity form (O'Connor 1994). ‘The idea of nature as a social product,’ amplifies
Harvey (2010, 188), ‘has to be paralleled by the recognition that natural resources are
cultural, economic and technological appraisals.’ Crucially, theoretical fixation with the
social production of nature elides the very material consequences of its produced
nature. ‘In short,’ insists Castree (1995, 21), ‘we can, indeed we must, recognize the fact
that capitalism produces nature, but we must simultaneously recognize the materiality –
and consequentiality – of the particular natures capitalism produces.’ In other words,
production is a crucial material transformation that feeds back into the constitution of
economic processes (Bridge 2008a). Moreover, over-valorizing capital instrumentality in
the production of nature risks under-theorizing productivity of ‘obdurate’ materiality
and noneconomic social influences (cf. Bakker 2010, 2005, 2003, Bridge 2011). Fully
articulated then, longstanding “production of nature” recasts into the ‘co-production of
socio-nature’ (Bakker and Bridge 2006, 19). Resource geography’s greatest critical
achievement is profoundly destabilizing the apparent naturalness of nature in favor of a
relational socionatural political economy that gives fuller consideration to the
productivity (and disruptiveness) of materiality in capital accumulation (Bridge 2008a).
While this co-constitutional nature-society dialectic animates continued debate,
the deftly unhyphenated socionature (Swyngedouw 1999) expresses a consensus view
of capitalist modes of accumulation and nonhuman nature as mutually constitutive, yet
riddled unevenly by contingencies and disparate outcomes. The important questions
move from this co-constitutionality to the question of how these socionatural relations
work. A key agenda for research becomes how social responses to socionatural
contingencies line up with what we claim to manage to achieve (Bakker 2010, 2009). I
return below to socionature geography; first however, the next two sections sketch a
geographical approach to capitalist political economy.
1.2.2 Socionatural régulation
In a commentary about his famous work, Aglietta (1998) notably recognizes the 1973
Arab oil embargo as a catalyst of Fordism’s crisis. As a market event, the embargo
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rearranges global supply lines with little impact to overall output. Nevertheless, oil
companies during this time fan angst over the “environment” and “energy,” primarily to
justify sharply higher oil prices and new reserve developments (Mitchell 2011, cf. Zalik
2010). These discursive campaigns leverage preexisting social anxiety. Already a decade
prior, Silent Spring (Carson 1962) inspires environmental sensibilities, while the 1969
Santa Barbara oil spill bolsters these across popular and corporate culture alike
(Hoffman 2001, LeMenager 2013, Yergin 1991). Embargo alarmism reinforces not only
popular neo-Malthusianism, but also, new environmentalism’s concerns over natural
limits and energy shortages (Bini et al. 2016, Black 2016, Mitchell 2011).
Caught up in the fervor of these attitudes and policy initiatives, social science
begins to view limits of nonrenewable resources and the “sustenance base” as material
inevitabilities independent of their social construction (Schnaiberg 1980). New fields
organize around this emergent axiom: environmental sociology (Dunlap and Catton
1979), ecological economics (Costanza 1991, 1989), and energy-balance economics (Hall
et al. 1981, Odum 1970).
Critical and poststructural geography emerges out of these same historical
circumstances. One key object of study is development projects as oil producers’
deposit their burgeoning “petro-dollars” into western banks, which subsequently
recycle into leveraged development schemes in the global South (Gray 2016),
characteristically conservation-minded in their justification (Zimmerer 2006, 1998).
Three of these literatures are summarized next. Political ecology aims at development in
the global South; environmental régulation and neoliberal environments turn these
approaches upon the developed North.
Political Ecology
Influential investigations of development-driven land and forest degradation in
the global South put an end to traditional Nature-Society geography that registers
human relations with and degradation of the environment, yet fails to consider relations
with political economy, ideology, and scientific ecology (e.g., Blaikie 1985, Blaikie and
Brookfield 1987, Hecht and Cockburn 1989, Susman et al. 1983, Waddell 1977, Watts
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1983; cf. Mitchell 1996). Watts (2001a) explains in retrospect that the impulse behind
his groundbreaking Silent Violence (1983), is to apply cultural ecology’s methodology –
historiography, ethnography, and process mapping – in direct rejection of its
bourgeoise-leaning models of homeostatic autarky (cf. Rappaport 1967, Vayda and
McCay 1975) and cultural maladaptation, whether to environmental hazards (cf. White
1974, White and Haas 1975), or to colonialism (cf. Nietschmann 1979). Crucially, in my
mind, Silent Violence insists on the indeterminate attraction of capitalism’s
encroachment: It would be an ‘absurdity’ to suggest all were impoverished (Watts
1983b, 267). Although this work can veer toward teleology, it marks a key transition
from apolitical hazards-type understandings to those of contemporary political ecology,
which prioritizes the class aspects of postcolonial environmental outcomes (Giordano
and Matzke 2001). Armed with this new critique, geography finally absolves
development’s marginalized subjects of culpability for their degraded circumstances (cf.
Susman et al. 1983, 277-79). Pushing this emergent discipline, contributors to Peet and
Watts (1996, see also, Rocheleau et al. 1996) key in on the uneven outcomes of
gendered discursive power relations animating postcolonial agriculture and forestry.
Of central relevance is what political ecology has to say about régulation and the
processes and outcomes of resource extraction. Concentrating on shifting post-Fordist
state-market relations, Peet and Watts (1996) are struck by, ‘how political ecology has,
from its inception, wrestled with the way management questions – whether in the form
of regulatory apparatuses, local knowledge systems, new community or resource-user
groups – must occupy an important space in civil society…’ (9). The main emphasis is
how neoliberalism intensifies indigenous and peasant dispossession of their customary
resources under the aegis of the “sustainable development” discourses that
supranational and nongovernmental organizations promulgate, crucially in the 1987
Brundtland commission report and subsequent Rio 1992 conference (cf. Escobar 1995,
Hajer 1995).
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Environmental Régulation
Whereas political ecology generally investigates uneven development in the
global South, one controversial issue in recent discussions has been how to leverage the
insights of the régulation approach to conceive socionatural political economy in the
global North. One the one hand, some argue that the explicit institutional category of
Nature sharpens régulation approaches, which emphasize capitalism’s endemic crises
but with little regard to ecology. Régulation, in this view, is too abstract by itself,
pointedly undertheorizing the biophysical co-constitution of political economy (e.g.,
Bridge 2000, Drummond 1996, Gandy 1997, Jonas and Bridge 2002, Krueger 2002,
Robertson 2004). On the other hand, others argue an ecological perspective is better
understood as already latent within régulation; and so, to cobble-on ontological
fixations often ironically understates the degree to which nonhuman nature always coconstitutes the social institutions studied by Parisian régulation. In the words of one of
this latter view’s chief proponents, ‘rather than positing nature as an unexamined
“extra-economic” dimension, the case of oil reveals how ecology can be integrated into
a foundational concept of the regulation approach – the wage relation’ (Huber 2013a,
171, cf. Watts 1983, 244).
Ad hoc treatments of régulation with thin linkages to the processes of its
national modes, argues Huber (2013a), run the risk of merely reporting events while
failing to situate evidence within meaningful explanatory frameworks. The most
substantive contribution of the environmental régulation approach may be as a political
economic framework to understand “sustainability” (Gibbs 2006, 1996), which can be
underplayed in “post-political” compromise (e.g., Beck 1992, Blühdorn 2007). Much of
this work puts the emphasis on drilling down to the ‘messiness’ of fragmented
institutional responses to socioecological crises, particularly contradictions between
“greenwashing” capital/state discourses and inescapably uneven material outcomes (cf.
Bridge and McManus 2000).
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Neoliberal Environments
Echoing geographical efforts to locate nature in régulation approaches,
McCarthy and Prudham (2004) declare, ‘What is largely absent in the neoliberalization
literature is a recognition that neoliberalism is also an environmental project, and that is
necessarily so’ (277, original italics). Taking up this challenge, burgeoning literature
known widely as neoliberal environments investigates socionatural unevenness, typically
within the heuristic typology of neoliberalization introduced above (cf. Jessop 2002).
Aiming at emergent strategies of resource commodification, representative case study
research clarifies implications of privatization (including deregulation and re-regulation)
of municipal water provision (Bakker 2005, Prudham 2007, Swyngedouw 2005, Young
and Keil 2007) and wild game (Snijders 2012); marketization with market proxies in
marine fisheries management (Mansfield 2004, St Martin 2005) and in artificialwetlands for offset credits (Robertson 2006, 2004); flanking stakeholders taking the
leads in regulatory activities (Holifield 2007); and, supersedure of sovereignty through
supranational accords that delimit environmental accountability of multinational capital
(McCarthy 2004). As a rule, these studies of nature’s neoliberalization rely upon the
methodological approaches of political ecology, namely: intensive grounded subject
interaction as an alternative to ideological institutional claims; poststructural emphasis
on power and discourses; and, untangling the role of techno-science with respect to
economy, nature and society (Heynen et al. 2007b).
Castree (2008a, 2008b, see also, 2011, 2010a, 2010b) ambitiously catalogs this
proliferating ‘sometimes brilliant’ literature, distinguished by three conceptual
strengths; namely, close attention to the agency of biophysical materiality; intense
scrutiny of local activities in fluid multi-scale networks; and, sufficient breadth of
locations and circumstances to suggest some generalizability is possible.
Four compatible theoretical foundations inspire these studies. Smith (1984) was
discussed above in terms of socionature. Benton (1989) underscores how degradation
of the ecological sustenance base is a concrete function of the social relations that
produce them. Along a similar tack, James O’Connor politicizes material limits to refute
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the naturalized claims of neo-Malthusianism. On the crucial question of nature and
capitalism, O'Connor (1996) famously claims, ‘Marx was not so much wrong as he was
half-right’ (211). Where Marx is half-wrong is that capitalism produces not only social
barriers and constraints, but also – crucially – how capitalism produces its own
impairments to material factors, thereby hindering and even preventing further
production and expansion. This is the ‘second contradiction’ of capitalism, and examples
include ‘warming of the atmosphere… acid rain… salinization… toxic wastes… soil
erosion’ (O’Connor 1996, 207). Like capitalism’s better-known social contradictions,
these natural limits result in increasing social contradiction, thereby, argues O’Connor,
cracking open an opportunity for new social movements to lead to socialist-leaning
restructuring and restoration. Last is the influential vision of Karl Polanyi (1944). This
begins with the irreducible ‘embeddedness’ of humans within the natural world, which
capitalism nevertheless rends asunder in its ideological ‘disembedded’ economy,
wherein capitalism circumscribes land and wage labor into exploitable ‘fictional
commodities.’ The crisis-riddled challenge of sustaining these patent contradictions
arouses capitalists to cry out for stabilizing state regulation. The resulting arrangement
in always-regulated socio-economy unfolds in a ‘double movement’ in the polar tension
of laissez faire and socialism.
Using these foundations and informing them in return , neoliberal environments
literature prioritizes four firm and state ‘fixes’ according to Castree (2008b): Marketdriven environmentalism, especially assertions that corporate social responsibility will
result in normatively sought outcomes; Globally-expanding accumulation through
exploitative trade and bio-prospecting agreements; Expansion of rights to degrade the
environment, such as the use of NAFTA to undercut efforts to block deleterious
pollution (cf. McCarthy 2004); and, Elimination of regulation via streamlining coupled
with new social forms such as NGO oversight – with attendant non-prosecutorial
powers.
The most salient criticism of these conclusions is the relations of neoliberalism
and nature’s irreducible non-passivity is ‘surprisingly absent’ (Bakker (2009).
18

Surprisingly, because Castree’s (1995) review of the production of nature thesis
emphasizes how excessive social constructivism can go too far in masking nature’s
materiality, a basic insight of critical socionature (cf. Bakker and Bridge 2006). However,
I suggest, this arises less from a shortcoming of Castree’s analysis and rather more from
the tendency of neoliberal nature literature to set aside the question of material coconstitutionality; although, see Robertson (2004) aforementioned.
Finally, a brewing tension in this literature demands notice. On the one
hand, unsparing definitions of environmental neoliberalization emphasize its
non-redemption: ‘Instead of resolving the political-economic crisis tendencies of
contemporary capitalism, neoliberalism exacerbates them by engendering
various forms of market failure, state failure and governance failure’ (Brenner
and Theodore 2007, following Jessop 1998). On the other hand, there is
recognition that neoliberalization projects can result in improved environmental
outcomes – notwithstanding implications of privatized public goods (Bakker
2003). Evidence includes the notoriously destructive mining industry where
neoliberal environmental interventions yield a modicum of abatement and
competitive advantage simultaneously (Emel et al. 1995, Warhurst and Bridge
1996). In other words, the need for some political pragmatism has produced
fractures in erstwhile steadfast anti-neoliberalism.
As Castree (2007) explains, ‘We [geographers] are, perhaps, still saddled
with our own shibboleths – at least at the normative level – and have some way
to go before we abandon them for the more supple understandings geographical
inquiry can deliver’ (283). Or, put another way:
Admittedly, a focus on critiquing the excesses of neoliberalism may point
toward a more reformist politics than a direct critique of necessary
features of capitalism (i.e., you can keep your wage labor, just let us have
some sort of environmentalism and social safety net and some public
spaces), but inasmuch as the latter would be a stunning political victory
at the moment, we can live with it for the time being. (Heynen et al.
2007a, 289)
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In summary, investigations of post-Fordist and neoliberal environmental
regulation pursued by neoliberal environments, environmental régulation, and
political ecology literatures share theoretical foundations in what we might
designate as a socionatural régulation approach.
1.3 Geographical Petroleum
At the centre of the analysis of capitalism’s relation to nature is its
inherent and unavoidable dependence on fossil fuels, and particularly on
oil. (Altvater 2007)
The study of oil removes any doubt that pervasive materiality enables the
hydrocarbon-fueled contemporary accumulation regime, which persists
despite profound socio-environmental contradictions. (Huber 2013a)
Geographic investigation of petroleum builds on the theoretical foundations of
capitalism, socionature, and régulation explained above, albeit implicitly at times. The
following subsections describe petroleum geography particularly relevant to the
dissertation research. Broadly speaking, these involve the historical spatial relations and
processes of global oil production, related violence, consumption, abundance, “peak”
oil, and uneven environmental protection.
1.3.1 Geographical petroleum: Twentieth century oil
Oil supplants coal as the predominant energy-dense fuel in the twentieth century
(Altvater 2007, Huber 2009a, Smil 1994). Resulting oil geography stems from the
structural tendency of petroleum overproduction, the compulsion behind ongoing
competition among global capitalist blocs, including states, and by the extraordinary
profitability of the petroleum industry itself. Labban (2008) argues persuasively the main
risk to petro-capital is underproduction; which when prolonged, entices marginal
producers into the competitive landscape, anathema to oligopoly. These dynamics are
at the heart of a century of increasing capital centralization, from the apex of
nineteenth century European imperialism and the Great War, through supranational
structures that operationalize in the Cold War, and in contemporary neoliberalization.
Capital, oil, arms, and state relations – all entwined – intensify throughout this period.
At every economic downturn, petro-capital expands spatially through opportunistic
20

state relations and oil reserve acquisitions, a phenomenon that demonstrates investor
strategy to acquire productive capacity for control, rather than to expand output.
Should there be “resource wars” over oil, the object will be not to control resources, but
rather more precisely, to gain inter-capitalist advantage (Labban 2008). Oil is
capitalism’s crucial necessity, concurs Moore (2015, 102), not for growth per se, but
rather for competitive appropriation of natural conditions and labor.
This oil competition plays out in the historical machinations of Euro-American
imperialism in the Middle East. Since the early twentieth century, competitive statecapital interests seek always to control supply and – runs the argument (Mitchell 2011)
– to constrain democracy in potential large producing regions, particularly in the Middle
East. The pattern becomes clear: in the (primarily) Anglo-Parisian carve-up of the
Ottoman empire in the 1920s and eventual inclusion of Standard (New Jersey) and
Standard (New York) within the Red Line and Achnacarry “As Is” agreements for Middle
East oil revenue-sharing; in the Bretton Woods terms, underappreciated as a scheme to
govern not only finance capital, but also petroleum flows in a global ‘fuel economy’; in
the Cold War birthed in American competitive strategy to exclude the Soviet Union from
northern Iran; in the 1970’s ‘energy crisis’; and, in the continuing political and military
violence promulgated by the US in the Middle East (Mitchell 2011). Mitchell has
company in this prognosis of recent history as the latest invasion of Iraq clearly ‘[had]
everything to do with oil’ in the eyes of Harvey (2003, 23; see also Luke 2007).
Without disputing this historical capitalist-state preoccupation with petroleum –
indeed, pointing out elite American solicitude towards the oil companies – Smith (2004)
emphasizes it remains one facet of the wider imperial enterprise, seen both in Isaiah
Bowman’s project to establish ethnic-based postwar borders and the Bush-Cheney “war
on terror” (see also, Don Mitchell (2014)). At the same time, it is also important to
appreciate the historical messiness of oil contestation. Whereas Mitchell (2011) spells
out the 1920s inter-capitalist scramble to secure pipeline, rail, and ship transport for
Middle East oil exports to Europe, we can forget how, for a half-decade after the 1918
Paris armistice, conflict rages between Turkey and first France, followed by Britain over
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the question of Syria and Iraq territorialization; and also in that day, how the “natural”
alliance of the US and UK simmers in a “war” of position to corner world supply (Mohr
1926).
1.3.2 Geographical petroleum: Contemporary oil space
In the aftermath of World War II, United States hegemony expands together with
Middle East crude production to ensure oil supplies for recovering Europe and Japan, a
relatively stable arrangement that alters only after high prices in the 1970s impel nonOPEC development in the North Sea, US, and Russia, as well as Alberta. Contemporary
petroleum producer and consumer patterns reflect Asian automobile demand, EuroAmerican conservation, and again-resurgent Russian and American production, which
combine in geographical diversification away from the Gulf States (Bridge and Le Billon
2013).
Oil development enlists surprising relations. In some conflict regions, territorial
control supersedes state claims as multinational oil companies contract directly with
militarized non-state actors (Le Billon 2001). The Turkish state and Kurdish Regional
Government jointly partner in a northern Iraq development (Paasche and Mansurbeg
2014). Rural northwest Kenya inhabitants, long marginalized by Nairobi, bypass illtrusted state channels to directly petition multinational oil firms for abatement and
remediation guarantees prior to development (Enns and Bersaglio 2015); and, western
environmental NGOs collaborate with Putin’s Russian Federation, which revokes Shell’s
environmental approval for the giant Sakhalin II project, and subsequently spurns the
NGOs in order to place the majority stake with Gazprom (Bradshaw 2007).
Additional contradictions arise in the relative spatial fixity of nonrenewable
petro-resources while borders of state territoriality remain contested (Bridge 2008b,
Bunker 1992). For instance, enticements of petroleum threaten to undermine a transborder ecological zone established jointly by Nicaragua and Costa Rica in an initiative to
deescalate their tensions (Barquet 2015). Postcolonial maneuvers over oil in Africa pit
the US against China (Ferguson 2005, Pannell 2008, Thomson and Horii 2009, Watts
2008).
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Neoliberalization unleashes particularly intensive foreign direct investment as
petro-capital presses globally into states weakened by structural adjustments,
essentialized in neocolonial ‘resource triumphalism’ narratives of the new millennium
(Bridge 2004, 2002, 2001). Take one small $5 billion oil play in this trend: formerly lowincome Equatorial Guinea transforms into a petro-state in a single decade (Frynas 2004).
Commonly in these developments, agents of capital such as the World Bank invoke the
red herring of risk to cajole resource-licensing states into accepting low-royalty
contracts to balance risk/reward calculations (Emel and Huber 2008). Spatial
displacement of communities and livelihoods runs part-and-parcel with these new
petro-developments, seen recently in Peru and Ghana where agricultural land is lost to
oil development (Slack 2014). Indeed, more widely, intensification of petroleum and
other natural resource development runs roughshod over traditional water access in
state planning in the Andes (Cuba et al. 2014). Fishermen in Nigeria and Mexico are
excluded from offshore facilities and the fish attracted to their artificial reefs (Quist and
Nygren 2015, Zalik 2009). Economic vulnerability in the US shale region predicts
household collocation with “fracking clusters” (Ogneva-Himmelberger and Huang 2015),
which local elites endorse (Sica 2015).
Historically, petroleum development operates out of enclaves and their
attendant limited integration with local economies (Watts 2004b); however, these
enclaves depopulate in the technologically-enabled spatial consolidation of the industry,
for instance by outsourcing activities to the Houston, Texas, ‘super-node’ of industry
knowledge and remote control. While of course the local terrain of extraction never can
fully eliminate labor, decision power increasingly resides in far-flung networks (Bridge
and Wood 2005).
1.3.3 Geographical petroleum: Production networks
Let us turn to the narrower issue of raw crude oil production. Michael Watts’s (2005,
2004a) ‘oil complex’ illuminates two interconnected frames: the postcolonial national
organization of the Nigerian petro-state and the globalized multinational oil company,
with additional linkages to weapons and security apparatuses as well as OPEC. The
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petro-state controls legal structures including title over the resource and provides
security to enable its exploitation via the multinational firm in return for a portion of
production output and taxes. This reinforces the crucial role of the state in the
facilitation of extraction (Bridge 2014, 2002). The absorption and distribution of oil rents
in Nigeria (including theft of ten percent of output) and provision of military and
security to sustain the cycle become the overriding concerns of this rentier state. These
institutions just as quickly become overwhelmed by patronage and corruption which delegitimate the federal petro-state and fracture social cohesion into possibly irreversible
anomic petro-violence (Watts 2005, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2001b, 1994, 1984). These
conclusions reverse the cautious optimism of Silent Violence (1983), wherein petroleum
rents enable fragile post-Independence institutions to rapidly centralize national
authority.
Gavin Bridge’s Global Production Network (GPN) approach to petroleum
visualizes global material flows and related social relations across the complete interfirm process of exploration, reserve development and extraction; to transportation and
refining of crude and its distribution; to consumption as feedstock or combustible fuel;
and finally, to emerging carbon capture via technical sequestration or securitized
schemes (2008b, see also, Dicken 2011, 243-69). Additionally, every step of this broad
process co-constitutes environmental, financial, and governmental relations. In
comparison with the GPNs of assembly industries, petro-extraction is differentiated by
crucial state activities in territorialization of the petro-resource, regulation of its
development, and management of royalty and tax income. Additionally, national oil
companies have emerged among the leading global integrated firms.
One key interest is, ‘the influence of the materiality of oil on the structure of the
production network’ (Bridge 2008b, 394). This extensive network begins with the
geological reserve structure and potential, territorial stability, market proximity, and
resource heterogeneity—light (high-gravity, low-viscosity) sweet (low-sulfur) out-values
heavy sour, etc.—and the implications of these for marketable production, and
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continues to the far end of the GPN where combustion often finalizes the emissionintensive process of consumption and production.
The GPN incorporates imperatives of petroleum futures markets with daily trade
volumes in excess of material consumption, which not only shape global pricing but also
set in motion very material activities including oil production and storage capacity
development (Labban 2010, Zalik 2010).
Especially notable with respect to the oilsands, the GPN and wider critical
economic geography tend to frame industrial waste as the inadvertent outcome of
production (Bridge 2008b, Bridge and Le Billon 2013, Dicken 2011, Smith 1984).
1.3.4 Geographical petroleum: Violence
The GPN has less to say about violence borne by indigenous inhabitants associated with
petroleum territorialization and production. Closer inspection reveals that the process
of localized violence runs hand-in-hand with petro-development, which remains
decoupled from oil prices and scarcity (Le Billon and Cervantes 2009). Indeed,
determines Le Billon (2001), sustained low-level local conflict in oil-producing regions
generates profit for its perpetrators. Gendered violence of oil development is not
merely a side-effect, but rather a constitutive condition (Turcotte 2011). In Nigeria,
initial optimism over the potential of oil income to congeal a new national identity
(Watts 1983), soon gives way to an oil complex of enclaves and state corruption to
produce authoritarianism, environmental devastation, and destruction of traditional
economies that results in violent social fragmentation (Watts 2004a, 2004b, 2004c,
2001b, 1996, 1984). Violence besets oil development across the African continent
(Basedau and Pierskalla 2014), in Ecuador (Sawyer 2004), US-occupied Iraq (Le Billon
2005), and – further discussed below – Canada (e.g., Simpson 2019).
1.3.5 Geographical petroleum: Consumption
When geography theorizes the petro-consumer, it is typically as the tailpipe of petrocapital’s production networks. As Bridge and Le Billon (2013) summarize, consumers are
‘hooked on lifestyles and locked into infrastructures that demand a strong will and some
sacrifices to opt out of’ (138). In this conceptualization, ‘addicted’ languorous
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consumers usefully reproduce demand and pose little resistance to the $3 trillion
industry (Bridge and Le Billon 2013, 155; see also Suranovic 2013). Indeed, American
consumers see access to cheap gasoline as an entitlement (Huber 2009b). Reinforced by
design and advertising, what Bourdieu (1984) later calls ‘distinction,’ becomes a
secondary motive force of political economy, although still subordinate in the Fordist
structures of production/consumption (Aglietta 1979, 155-161).
Selected petroleum histories take pains to contextualize automobility. In
California, oil and automobile interests emerge hand-in-hand to transform political,
physical, and aesthetic landscapes (Sabin 2005). The lure of mobility and triumph of
internal combustion over electric and steam fundamentally alter American culture
(Black 2014, Wells 2012). Moreover, while it is difficult to overstate the impact of the
gasoline-powered automobile and petro-fueled transportation more widely, they also
provide new wedges for oil to penetrate American family life (Johnson 2014). We see
articulations of capital accumulation and mundane consumption of fossil fuel foodstuffs
(Pfeiffer 2013, Pimentel and Pimentel 2007, Romero 2016), “toxic love” of plastic
(Freinkel 2011) and wanton broadcast of household petro-toxins (Robbins 2012,
Robbins and Sharp 2003).
Meanwhile, notable studies of the automobile touch lightly, if at all, upon
relations with petroleum (Batchelor 1994, Featherstone 2004, Flink 1975, Paterson
2007, Seiler 2009). In this group also, Aglietta’s (1979) study of American Fordism details
the automobile manufacturing industry and consumerism, yet brackets petroleum.
Sustained Marxian engagement of both oil and petroleum thus distinguishes Matthew
Huber’s Lifeblood (2013b) in which the ‘American way of life’ sediments in the twentieth
century as petroleum, automobiles and suburban households become inseparable.
Opposed to consumption as a default, Huber’s monograph injects material and
ideological consumer pull into the calculus of political economy. This is an essential
understanding, given that automobile consumption in Muncie, Indiana, displaces both
household expenditures and labor activism by the 1920s, that is prior to Sloan’s
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introduction of automobile fashion (Lynd and Lynd 1929; see also, Ise 1926, 164-72).4
The essential challenge in understanding the contemporary work-home-automobile
petro-triad insists Huber (2013b), is to comprehend its spatial materiality, and then
pointedly distinguish the political attitudes that derive therefrom. So powerful are the
latter, ‘the biggest barrier to energy change is not the technical but the cultural and
political structures of feelings that have been produced through regimes of energy
consumption’ (169 added italics; see also 187 n. 106). No longer is this sort of lifestyle
strictly American. Sprawling urbanized petro-capitals manifest the continuing allure of
automobile-centric intensive consumerism in Venezuela (Coronil 1997), China (Gallagher
2006) and Nigeria (Gandy 2006).
1.3.6 Geographical petroleum: Abundance
Under neoclassical theory, marginal supply equilibrates with market demand. American
petroleum supply, however, operates under a different set of logics. The historical allure
of petro-riches and relatively low start-up costs, argues Lucier (2008), combine to entice
market entry by petit capitalists, such as engineers and shop-owners, who thereby
democratize oil discovery. Three hundred thousand dry oil wells across the US by the
1959 centenary of the Pennsylvania Drake well testify to the wildcat compulsion to
discover new oil, independent of market conditions (Knowles 1959). The result is a
persistent condition known as “over-production,” that is production of supply in excess
of market demand. Indeed, since the industry’s modern roots, observes Harvarddegreed economist John Ise (1926), ‘Over-production has been chronic. There has
hardly been a time since 1860 when too much oil was not being produced…’ (123).
Even with today’s directional drilling technology, dry holes continue to confound
oil exploration (Valdivia 2015). Across the industry overall, nevertheless, the challenge
of petroleum extraction lies less in new strikes, and rather more in economic
development of any particular reserve (Bridge and Wood 2005, Zimmermann 1957).

4

One observation of many: ‘“The Ford car has done an awful lot of harm to the unions here and
everywhere else,” growled one man prominent in [Muncie] labor circles. “As long as men have enough
money to buy a second-hand Ford and tires and gasoline, they'll be out on the road and paying no
attention to union meetings”’ (Lynd and Lynd 1929, 254 n. 6).
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Regardless of these challenges, reserves expand. Labban (2008, 2) puts it bluntly: ‘The
problem of oil is not its scarcity but its abundance;’ and thus, since the early twentieth
century runs the central argument, the containment of supply – not its expansion – has
been a crucial engine in capitalism’s globalizing competition. Especially the postcolonial
geographies of Iran and the Gulf States reflect imperial-capital initiatives to delimit
production of oil bounty (Mitchell 2011).
These counterintuitive understandings of petroleum supply distinguish critical
geography from neoclassical interpretations (cf. McNally 2017), and substantiate
Harvey’s (1974) observation that only via ‘carefully managed’ scarcity does capitalism
cling to the tenuous ‘self-regulating aspect’ of its price mechanism. Indeed, postwar
wage consumerism, the ‘American way of life,’ utterly depends upon state-regulated oil
infrastructure and markets (Huber 2013b). Instrumental literature notably concurs that
the industry enjoys matchless historical success at inducing government intervention to
supplement its porous cartels (Blair 1976).
1.3.7 Geographical petroleum: Peak oil
‘The end of cheap oil,’ blares the Scientific American cover March 1998, ‘It’s coming
fast.’ Backed up by proprietary datasets and decades of petroleum industry experience,
authors Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrère conclude, ‘world oil production of
conventional oil will peak during the first decade of the 21st century’ (1998, 81). Global
reserve estimates are notoriously inflated, particularly OPEC’s, the authors argue, such
that reserve depletion stubbornly outstrips replacement. Published during an extended
period of declining oil prices, this starkly contrarian argument proves prescient – at least
in terms of market prices. Within eight months of publication, petroleum benchmarks
hit a cyclical market bottom and then begin a decade-long run-up to the July 2008 alltime nominal high of $147 per barrel. In signs of the times, multinational Shell pushes
peak oil discourses to fan this oil price frenzy and thereby hastens the decoupling of
material supply and futures markets (Zalik 2010). Peak oil anxiety prompts communitywide anti-consumption initiatives to dramatically reduce oil dependency; although,
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these stop far short of autarky, which arguably forestalls more transformational
interventions (Bailey et al. 2010, Bettini and Karaliotas 2013, North 2010).
The concept of peak oil has undergone increasing critical scrutiny. Bridge (2010)
stresses that this decontextualized notion only gains traction in the first place through
historical erasures. The material argument of Campbell and Laherrère (1998) falls short,
beginning with its alarm over excess depletion attributable more soberly to an historical
ebb of exploration and development as multinational petro-capital adjusts to a new
global regime of largely-nationalized reserves (Bridge and Le Billon 2013, Bridge and
Wood 2010). Estimates of petroleum reserves in the Gulf States rely on outdated
techniques. Were new surveys to be conducted there – the first in generations – they
likely would increase the total reserve (Labban 2010). Perhaps the greatest recent
disruption is the rapid emergence of US fracking, which reasserts national dominance as
the world’s top producer. This depresses global prices and deeply impacts Saudi
fortunes (Kilian 2017). Overall, worldwide oil reserves increase from 1.1 trillion barrels in
1995 to 1.7 trillion barrels in 2014 (BP Statistical Review 2016). Not peak supply, but
rather peak access to profit due to increasingly nationalized global petro-territory
troubles multinational oil companies, which forces smaller participations,
capital/technology-heavy projects globally, and aforementioned upstream development
in North America. In addition, the issue of potential supply limits will become
increasingly moot as peak consumption shrinks in response to increasing carbon
taxation and rising alternatives to private internal combustion (Bridge and Wood 2010).
Critical geography is not immune to the seduction of peak oil. The engrained idea
is hard to shake. Peck and Tickell (1994) express certainty, ‘…the end is in sight for oil
(the commodity which both literally and metaphorically fuelled Fordism)’ (307). ‘Oil is
slowly becoming increasingly scarce,’ declares Harvey (2003, 23), an inadvertent
concession to the logic behind American neo-imperialism. Similarly, in the eyes of
Mitchell (2013), ‘…it appears we are about to enter an era of declining supplies’ (6).
Arguments put forth by Colin Campbell’s Association for the Study of Peak Oil compel
Altvater (2007) to the ‘inescapable material fact’ of the imminent end of low-cost
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petroleum outside the Gulf States, which would thus soon reclaim dominance –
decidedly, not the outcome as explained just above. And although Bridge and Le Billon
(2013) project that “unconventional” petroleum supplies will make up any slack in the
market, they too agree, ‘the end of cheap oil’ has arrived (82, see also 182-3).
“Unconventional” sources include heavy oil, shale oil, and the Alberta oilsands, all of
which demand higher energy inputs in production compared to “conventional” liquid
crude, leading scholars, journalists, and NGOs to characterize them – in Ricardian terms
– as “scraping the bottom of the barrel” of remaining oil resources (Bordetsky et al.
2007, Brandt and Farrell 2007, Strahan 2009, Zalik 2015). In the same vein, Harvey
(2010) classifies the Alberta oilsands as a marginal resource only enticed into production
by the high prices of socially constructed oil scarcity; nevertheless, he invokes the oil
engineer Hubbert in associating oil’s inescapable limits as a contributing factor in the
2008 crisis (see also Zalik 2010).
1.3.8 Geographical petroleum: Uneven environmental protection
When it comes to contemporary environmental regulation of petroleum projects,
ceaseless urgency for new development rams fast approvals through review processes
with mere fig leaves of compromise in Canada (Zalik 2015) and Norway (Kristoffersen
and Young 2010, Cumbers 2012). That said, gross disparities in environmental
abatement exist project to project within individual firms, weighed in favor of the global
North compared to South (Maiangwa and Agbiboa 2013). For example, only in the 1990s
does Nigeria begin to require oil developments to submit environmental impact
assessments in connection with new oil developments (Anifowose et al. 2014).
Foundational research of Michael Watts (2004b, 2004c, 2001) bares environmental
impacts of Nigerian oil production: Shell spills 1.6 million gallons in the decade between
1982 and 1992, an improvement over the 200 million gallons it spills in the 1970s.
Hydrocarbon pollution of streams in oil-producing districts exceed European standards
by factors of 300 to over 600 times allowable limits. Natural gas flaring constitutes a
source of carbon dioxide emissions significant at global scale. Life expectancy in these
locales is merely fifty years.
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1.3.9 Geographic petroleum: Worker-consumer attitudes
These attitudes of Alberta oilsands workers share some commonality with oil workers
studied by researchers around the world. Azerbaijanis retain optimism that the oil
industry’s benefits outweigh undeniable costs (O'Lear 2007). Similar attitudes have been
observed in South American populaces. Indigenous and labor identity politics in Bolivia
and Ecuador, respectively, resist oil and gas privatization; yet crucially, this is to
maintain or enhance labor opportunities and distribution of rents, not to curtail
production (Perreault and Valdivia 2010, Valdivia 2015, 2008). Long beleaguered
residents of Nigerian oil producing regions concede the industry’s embeddedness, so
primarily seek mere participation in the prosperity (Zalik 2010). This is despite the
disparity of ecological protection compared to the affluent global North (Maiangwa and
Agbiboa 2013). Similarly, wage interests dominate social concern in the ‘ruined
environments’ of Veracruz where most inhabitants are inured to risk and associate the
landscape with consequent consumerism. In this case nuisance odors dominate political
activism, which the industry abates marginally to defuse protest (Landa 2016).
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
This dissertation relies on data gleaned from production workers during nonwork hours
to penetrate inside the “black box” of oilsands production by detailing moments the
production strategy is shaped in the relations of shift-to-shift work activities, provincial
environmental regulation, and co-constitutional obdurate materiality; and, to interpret
these findings within the socionatural régulation framework assembled in the Chapter 1
literature review.
2.1 Research Questions
RQ1: How does oilsands materiality contribute to an understanding of socionatural
resources?
RQ2: How do oilsands production workers’ shift-to-shift activities manifest their
socionatural relations?
RQ3: How do environmental regulation and firms’ imperatives mediate workers’
socionatural relations?
2.2 Multiple Methods
To answer these questions in the geographical tradition of grounded study, the
dissertation revolves around fieldwork in Fort McMurray, Alberta, Canada, (“Fort Mac”),
the urban center of the oilsands mining industry.5 Exorbitant living costs during the
production boom underway at the time constrain fieldwork to the summer months
2010, 2011, and 2012. Activities in 2010 are limited to preliminary research without
interviews. A fourth sojourn to Edmonton in 2017 concentrates on archival sources.
With oil prices firmly above $90/barrel, the Canadian “Loony” exchanges above the US
dollar during most of the fieldwork, while in 2021 the same Loony exchanges for 79 US
cents.
Archive locations include: Alberta Environment public reading room, Alberta
Government Library, Barr Colony Heritage Cultural Centre, Energy Resources
Conservation Board public reading room, Fort McMurray Heritage Village, Fort
McMurray historical and memorial markers, Glenbow Archive and Library, Keyano
5

The government entity, the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, incorporates Fort McMurray, as well
as smaller Anzac, Conklin, Fort Chipewyan, Fort McKay, and Janvier, among other communities and
settlements, and also the mineable area of the oilsands.
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College Library, Oil Sands Discovery Centre, Provincial Archives of Alberta, University of
Alberta Library, University of Kentucky Library, and Wood Buffalo Regional Library.
In petroleum studies, ‘If you announce your presence to the oil companies, you’ll
be routed to corporate PR,’ explains feminist resource geographer Anna Zalik. 6 This
observation informs my methodological strategy not to approach the companies
directly, but rather rely upon individual contacts. The stories I seek to bring to light exist
only within the community of workers who live them. They cannot be gleaned from
institutional voices and are disclosed only after establishing trust over a period of time
in casual settings. ‘That’s a wise design,’ agrees senior municipal employee Buddy Mac,
who concurs direct approaches to the firms would yield little new information.
The multiple methods research combines semi-structured interviews, participant
observation, and archival investigations, which together enroll a range of informants:
industry managers, engineers, tradespeople, equipment operators, and laborers, as well
as politicians and municipal employees, environmental regulators, and community
members. Most live and work in Fort Mac, although several are in Edmonton and
Calgary. The dissertation triangulates patterns within the data to identify moments of
clarity in otherwise obscure oilsands processes (cf. Dixon and Jones III 1998, 249). The
strength of my qualitative methods shines brightest when holding institutional claims
about production activities up to individual experiences and archival disclosures (cf. Ellis
et al. 2008, 276).
As detailed below, the majority of potential informants are skittish about
participating, which fortunately, I partially accommodated with an exemption to the
interviewee signature requirement of the Institutional Review Board. More than one of
my semi-structured interviewees stated if I had required their signature, they would
have not participated in the study. Even with this exemption, a few informants decline
to speak their names to mark the start of recorded interviews. My broader effort to
maintain confidentiality masks genders of individual informants and in most instances
their specific firms. Thus, all informants have been anonymized as “Buddy” plus an
6

Feminist Extraction panel of the Association of American Geographers 2013 Annual Meeting
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appellation to keep track of different characters. For instance, B. Chicken, B. Rabbit, and
B. Bang count among key informants. Anyone who has spent time in the oilsands will
appreciate this convention as a tip-of-the-hat to the influence of workers with roots in
the Maritime Provinces, whose distinctive idiom peppers quotidian discourse by using
“Buddy” to refer to friends, coworkers, and strangers, alike: “Buddy and me were at
Show-G’s”; “So, then Buddy comes on the radio”; “Buddy boy, that’s cold!”. Appendix IV
catalogs these informants, together with primary occupation, type(s) of interaction, and
date(s) of interaction.
The remainder of this chapter details my process of obtaining informants. In the
final tally, fifty-seven named informants participated in the study, including eighteen
who consented to semi-structured interviews. Demographically, five percent of these
informants were First Nations members. Nearly one-quarter (23%) were females, who
filled positions in trades, equipment operation, engineering, and management, among
others. Although I made no effort to record informants’ origins, the subject arose in
conversation. Canadians hailed from nearly every province, but with the majority from
Alberta, British Columbia, the Maritimes, and Newfoundland. At least one was a foreign
national.
2.3 Position as a Researcher
The subjectivity of the researcher shapes the process of understanding across multiple
dimensions (Dixon and Jones III 1998). I am an American Midwesterner of Ashkenazi,
Bavarian, and Scandinavian descent. A full beard and pattern baldness mark me as male.
I am raised “white,” yet as a young adult begin to learn others distinguish my olive skin
and brown eyes. In Fort McMurray my appearance is distinctive from ruddier
Newfoundlanders and Anglo Canadians. I am uncertain how these dynamics shaped my
fieldwork encounters. What seems most important to my informants is that I present as
a “college boy,” whose life experience and archival research make me familiar with the
concerns and lexicons of the oilsands firms’ engineers and managers.
Numerous interactions in Alberta are deeply shaded by what I characterize as a
siege mentality common among people who identify with the oilsands companies and
government alike. I experience this first in 2010, stopping into the then-Heavy Oil
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Museum in Lloydminster, Canada, where in response to disclosing I am in transit to Fort
Mac to study the oilsands industry, the docent blurts defensibly out of the blue, ‘They
didn’t tell the other side of the story about those ducks,’ which I later learn refers to the
1,601 misfortunate ducks that perished in an oilsands company tailings pond two years
prior – the focus of Chapter 6 below. At the Canada border crossing on my drive to 2011
fieldwork, as the section below details, my car is emptied of its contents by agents
acting under federal intelligence directives to intercept anti-oilsands activists arriving
from the United States.
I run into more prickliness during my first scouting visit to the public reading
room of the chief environmental regulator at that time, Alberta Environment. After a
clerk summarizes the types of documents available, I ask to review files containing
“incidence reports” which seem like an obvious place to begin to understand production
and its variances. I am provided with several boxes containing just a portion of what
becomes clear are blizzards of filings. My request also prompts the appearance of a
senior regulator who has been alerted to my presence. The subsequent opportunity
interview (B. Reg) proves to be the greater prize. The agency is on edge about
researchers, Buddy explains, as scholars recently had been pressing demands for
comprehensive access. Only two years later did I appreciate that my foray had occurred
in the midst of the research of Timoney and Lee (2013), an ambitious study that catalogs
a 17-year record of the industry’s incident reports submitted to Alberta Environment at
a rate well over 500 annually (detailed in Chapter 5). In a notable exception to the
challenge of snowball sampling – discussed below – B. Reg opens doors to B. Reg2 and
B. Reg3, who with B. Reg allow me peer into perspectives of provincial environmental
officials who work within the compliance division of Alberta Environment.
2.4 Border Crossing into Canada in 2011
Driving from Kentucky to Fort McMurray for my first full summer of fieldwork, I reach
the border crossing at Portal, North Dakota/North Portal, Saskatchewan, around 3:15
pm Thursday, 16 June 2011, where on the Canada side I pull up and stop at the
guardhouse protruding from the single-story office wall, much like a drive-up bank teller
window. Through my rolled-down window I hand over my US passport, confident I will
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be passed through straightaway as there are no visa requirements between the US and
Canada.
‘Hello,’ says a uniformed officer from the booth.
‘Good afternoon.’
‘What brings you to Canada?’
‘I’m driving up to Fort Mac where I’m spending the summer doing research for
my PhD.’
‘I see. Where are you from?’
‘Kentucky, the University of Kentucky.’
‘Your car says Minnesota.’
‘I grew up in Minnesota. Dad loaned me his car for the trip.’
‘Got it. Okay.’
I am instructed to park and go to the immigration desk inside. There, I tell the officer
that I should be familiar to their agency as I traveled through the same port of entry the
previous summer in July for my preliminary fieldwork. It is apparent they have little
interest in this background. Inside a private interview booth, I am told the yellow record
indicates I never was in Canada.
After an hour or so of waiting, the agent informs me that they and another agent
will search my car and I overhear this Agent #1 relate to Agent #2 that my face flushes
when I hear their plan. (I recall a flash of annoyance at being delayed from my goal of
finding food, a motel, and ATM with Canadian currency.) I am directed to drive my car
to Garage 8 and pull in. It is big enough to hold a bus and they roll down the door after I
pull in. The floor is clean polished concrete, appearing unstained by oil and fluids. At the
side, there are enough large round tables and folding chairs to accommodate a bus full
of passengers, but in my case I sit alone. My parked car sits approximately 30 feet away,
all doors and the trunk open with two gloved agents beginning to look through it. They
speak with their backs to me and although I try to eavesdrop on their conversation, I
cannot hear a word they say due to amplified white noise filling the room. At one point
Agent #1 apologizes to me for its volume and incessance, explaining that they do not
know its origin or how to disable it. I do not share my personal experience with the use
of white noise on subjects, gained in a research lab with rhesus macaques. The thought
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crosses my mind they must have other sensors in this enclosed chamber, filming and
more.
The agents empty most of the contents of my car onto long tables where they
pick through each box and bag, overlooking few individual objects. For instance, at one
point Agent #2 approaches me close enough to converse. In an outstretched forefinger
and thumb is a miniature glass jar that had at one time contained a single-serving of jelly
for breakfast toast, yet is now filled with white powder. This had been buried deep
within a stuff sack in my backpack. Without speaking a word, it is apparent they wish to
know the nature of the contents.
‘Salt,’ I say.
‘That’s what I thought,’ turning on heel to continue the search.
Agent #1 approaches me to explain my guitar has been removed (my banjo, but I offer
no correction) and placed carefully on the table, but without opening it because they
recognize that people are ‘sensitive’ about their instruments. After a while, they motion
me to join them beside my car, which was three-fourths unpacked.
‘You have a lot of organic food,’ says Agent #1.
‘I told you I’m living in the Keyano College dorms and you have to supply your
own kitchen,’ which also explains my pots and pans. Later, I snicker to myself when I
notice a crumpled empty bag of Old Dutch potato chips on the passenger side floor –
some health food nut!
It is the turn of Agent #2, ‘What’s with the camping gear?’
‘I’m going to be in Canada all summer and I like to be prepared. I might meet a
friend in the Rockies my last week up here, so want to be ready.’
Similar to the salt, one of the agents pulls from a milk crate in the trunk an
unmarked glass jar filled with brown liquid. I explain it is tamari. In neither case do they
unscrew the jar lids. Agent #2 reaches into a milk crate in the back seat and pulls out a
ream of paper typed double spaced on one side. It is scrap paper to use with a printer in
the trunk. Producing it with a one-handed flourish like a magician pulling a rabbit from a
hat, the agent asks:
‘Is this your dissertation?’ The word is drawn out as if to mean the more
menacing manifesto.
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Even if it were, how could that possibly be incriminating, I think. ‘No, it’s just
scrap paper for printing. I told you, I haven’t even done my field research yet.’ To be fair,
the scrap paper is an extra copy of the dissertation of a colleague, whom I had assisted
in the final administrative steps of formal submission.
In the end, the two agents require little deliberation to reach a decision. Agent
#1 tells me I am free to repack my car, the second agent will assist, and then I must
return to the immigration counter inside. After Agent #1 leaves, Agent #2 confides that I
meet a lot of the criteria they are looking for: traveling alone, a car full of stuff, and
peculiarity in the mismatch between state tags and driver license.
I tell the agent, ‘My beard, I suppose. I’ve always worn one.’
‘There’s that too.’
As it happens, I am told I am crossing the border during a period of high alert:
‘Intelligence’ warns of protesters bent on crossing the border for a “political summer” in
the tar sands. Having shared this clarifying background, the agent feels the need to
distinguish personal and official attitude, stressing the legitimacy of ‘peaceful’ protest
and condemning violence, the latter of which it is implied, environmental activists
threaten.
Later, I view myself as the perfect plant from the head office in Ottawa to test its
systems in the field, replete with all the trappings. Funny that neither agent asks about
my crate of books in the backseat – set there to keep the weight low between the car’s
wheels – with Marx’s Capital prominently displayed on top.
Back inside the office after more waiting, I receive an elaborate folded visa
stapled into my passport. Two and a half hours after arriving, I am allowed to enter
Canada. (In the end I am glad Agent #1 gives me until August 15, which is after my
original departure plan yet lets me fit in one last interview in Calgary before I return to
the States.) This deadline stands in stark contrast with the typical restrictions on visiting
Americans, who are allowed to enter Canada without a visa and stay for up to six
months.
Agent #1 informs me there will be no record of our episode together; however,
in 2012 the Canadian border agent (at a Montana crossing) lets me know they do have
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me in their records, which combined with my Canadian Studies grant, facilitates my
entry and obviates any need for a visa.
A few years later, activists obtain and publicize a January 2014 Critical
Infrastructure Intelligence Assessment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police titled
“Criminal Threats to the Canadian Petroleum Industry.” Spurred by then recent antishale gas demonstrations in New Brunswick province, which see numerous police
vehicles set ablaze, the investigation devotes substantial attention to oilsands activists
such as Bill McKibben, Greenpeace, and the Tar Sands Solutions Network, which it
deems part of ‘…a growing, highly organized and well-financed, anti-Canadian
petroleum movement, that consists of peaceful activists, militants and violent
extremists, who are opposed to society’s reliance on fossil fuels,’ from whose ranks the
most violent ‘pose a realistic criminal threat to Canada’s petroleum industry, its workers
and assets, and to first responders.’ Notably buried within these inflammatory
paragraphs, the assessment concedes: ‘Criminal actions mounted by environmental
activists are often planned and executed with the intention of NOT inflicting casualties.
Activists are focused on delivering a message, while not inflicting physical harm to living
entities, or the natural environment’ (original emphasis).
2.5 Rolling Ball Gathers Little Snow
Whereas snowball sampling is a well-established approach to acquiring interview data in
human geography (e.g., Parker et al. 2019), this proves challenging when the subject of
interest is the oilsands industry in Fort McMurray. During my first day of 2011 fieldwork,
B. Circle cautions, ‘Fort McMurray is a culture of silence in which to speak is to risk one’s
job.’ I took little note of this insight at the time as my 2010 fieldwork had already
established several snowball sample “seeds” Fieldwork in Fort Mac during 2011 begins
with surprising revelations of the prospective difficulty of obtaining interview data when
the I have known since 2010 are hesitant to speak with me on record without their
boss’s advance approval. These are people who gave me tours of operations, candidly
shared insights into the daily tradeoffs they make, and whose initial openness helped to
establish my fieldwork strategy – even let me stay in their home for several days and
introduced me to several friends in the oilsands industry. Nevertheless, the specter of a
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formal interview threatens them. Although these informants finally agree to
unconditional semi-structured interviews, and their introductions lead to one additional
semi-structured and one opportunity interview, the experience portends the challenges
I face over the next two seasons of fieldwork.
Numerous additional examples illustrate this challenge of interviewing in the
oilsands as even those semi-structured interviews I do manage to arrange lead to little
or no snowballing. Manager B. Miner is surprised to be unable to convince their firm’s
tailings manager to speak with me. Buddy Sharp at first expresses certainty that they
can recruit multiple informants, including their supervisor, to speak with me. However,
after weeks of my gentle cajoling for updates, B. Sharp finally concedes that none would
participate. Semi-structured interviewee Buddy Doggy asks their housemate to
contribute to my project, but they decline, explaining, ‘I have a mortgage to worry
about.’ Three additional close friends of B. Doggy also decline. Among key informants, I
focus specifically on the industry in ten hours of interactions with B. Cousin, who
declines to be recorded. Another potential source, an acquaintance of one of my key
informants, contacts me to offer to be interviewed, however after my repeated
attempts to schedule a time, declines to meet and talk. Key informant B. Rabbit
encourages three close colleagues to provide me with interviews, but they turn me
down, ‘in good humor, but reverential fear’ of their company in B. Rabbit’s words.
Despite these experiences with colleagues, B. Rabbit initially scoffs at the notion
that I and a second PhD candidate, whose fieldwork in Fort Mac overlaps with mine,
face difficulty in securing interview subjects, until a week later when Buddy says ‘you
were right.’ A memorandum has been emailed across their firm warning against
infiltration by persons interested in operations and a warning not to disclose proprietary
information. Secrets kept at the firm level are not about the processes, but rather about
what they’re doing wrong, charges B. Boom: ‘If it wasn’t so important, they wouldn’t
have so much security,’ before adding, ‘You’re pretty brave,’ referring to my choice of
research subject. In further confirmation of the challenge, a third PhD candidate reaches

40

out in support of my effort; in two years of fieldwork, they had found continuing
difficulty in securing interviews.
2.6 Refining Approaches to Opportunity Interviews
The research plan always calls for participant observation, a method that gains urgency
in light of the challenge of snowball sampling. My sensitivity to the concerns of potential
informants is a learned approach. Overeager in the first couple weeks of 2011 fieldwork
to convert a casual contact into a recorded semi-structured interview, at the community
swimming pool I very publicly hand my business card to a prospect who is visibly shaken,
glancing over each shoulder to be sure this unwanted exchange is unwitnessed. I also
learn quickly, if you tell an oilsands worker you are interested in the relations of workers
with the environment, a frequent terse response is: “Fuck Greenpeace!” The challenge
of connecting with oilsands workers has been noted by other researchers: ‘Street
interviews were particularly difficult in Alberta…’ as prospective informants, ‘would
rather keep quiet in order to avoid the negative reactions from employers, colleagues,
or offended family members’ (Davidsen 2016, 255).
With these harsh lessons learned, I refine an approach to the point where
numerous prospective informants express curiosity rather than reticence. My earliest
participant observation with sustained success occurs in the Syncrude Aquatic Centre
within the Suncor Community Leisure Centre in Fort McMurray, funded by the two
oldest and most venerable oilsands mining firms. Following my daily swim I retreat into
the large coed sauna on the pool deck, which easily holds twenty users. It is warm
enough to enjoy and yet cool enough to enable extended sessions, which provide
numerous opportunities for relaxed interactions. Men and women both readily discuss
their work, as well as more personal affairs. This daily swimming routine – several hours
sometime between early and late afternoon – crosses paths with other regular patrons,
whom once befriended, sustain casual conversations over multiple days, say during a
week off before going back to three weeks on. The compilation of informants in
Appendix IV names three B. Sauna, B. Sauna2, and B. Sauna3; to be clear however,
additional named opportunity interview informants result from this time in the sauna. I
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seek to duplicate this approach in various settings, but mostly in other parts of the
Community Centre, restaurant/bars, community events, and private social gatherings.
The following dialog suggests how seemingly mundane interactions can disarm
otherwise potentially defensive informants. It is taken verbatim from field notes
recorded shortly following the interaction. This sort of approach was so second nature
during fieldwork that – only in retrospect – is it clear to me how unlikely this scene must
appear to readers:
‘They’re slightly better over here,’ I say. I'm in the male-designated showers
inside the locker room adjacent to the pool where, above I described, I swim daily. My
remark is directed to an obvious newcomer, who is struggling with the weak nozzles,
which spray water in such a dispersed pattern it is difficult to fully rinse. Thanking me,
the stranger takes my advice. (We stand in our swimming suits; the modest decorum of
the locker room offers private changing stalls.)
Sensing an opportunity to develop an informant, I continue, ‘What a waste of
water.’
‘I'll show you a real waste of water,’ he replies.
‘Oh, yeah? Where's that?’
‘Coker drill.’
‘Ah, you mean at Suncor?’ I confirm.
‘Yes.’
The informant later designated B. Shower continues: Suncor deploys a high-pressure
water drill to chip away the hardened carbon-dense bottoms, “coke,” that accumulate
inside its refining vessels, known as “delayed cokers.” In the case of Suncor, coke is the
waste product from the batch process of super-heating extracted bitumen in order to
produce lighter oils and vapors for further "secondary upgrading" into synthetic crude
oil. I know that already, but this newest informant floods me with details: the coker drill
consumes 800 gallons of water per minute; the discarded coke is so hot and volatile it
outgases for a week; the coke dump dimensions are immense – 90 meters high by 1,500
meters wide by 5,000 meters long. Envision a 20-story building, 1 mile wide and 3 miles
long. As a result of this interaction, I am able to fit one more piece into the big puzzle.
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2.7 Fort McMurray’s Laborer-Consumers
Fort McMurray is Canada’s highest-income community during the study period, with
median household earnings of $228,000 in 2012.7 Consumerism was a matter of culture
and had been for a long time. One key informant (B. Chicken) labored for years driving
haul trucks and machinery in the mines and recalls for a period of time keeping track of
the conversations around, which with few exceptions consisted of ‘I just bought, I’m
going to buy, or I’m going to order.’ Buddy Bang who has left the industry, says oilsands
workers are driven by ‘keeping up with the Joneses.’ Buddy Dream, a young unskilled
laborer, who was in the 4 off days phase of a cycle that begins with 24 days of 12 hours
each, bluntly shares aspirations: ‘A year from now I’ll be driving a huge F350, and people
will be saying “that’s too big, what a cunt,” and I’ll be fuck you, it’s what I want.’ A
financial counselor describes acquisitive couples unable to stay afloat on annual
incomes exceeding one-half million dollars. To be sure, costs are high. An unremarkable
five-bedroom suburban home was just under $1 million. Mortgage payments often rely
on extra rent income from itinerant workers boarding in basements. Tight labor in 2011
left the 24-hour McDonalds able to serve only coffee on a Saturday night; new
lifeguards at the community center made $21/hour plus a $275/week housing
allowance. I obtain opportunity interviews with several female haul truck drivers, at
least one divorced, who are financially stable for the first time. Common discussions
recorded in my field notes concern purchases or upgrades of gasoline-powered “toys,”
while for many Las Vegas and Disney vacations are annual affairs.
The prosperity of oilsands workers, coupled with relentless work hours, spurs a
vibrant services sector. One successful entrepreneur runs a brokerage placing Filipina
housekeepers and nannies. A First Nations investment company prefers the financial
returns on Fort McMurray industrial and consumer services over direct participation in
oilsands resource production. First Nations member/informant B. Pickup expresses one
view: ‘I used to be angry. Now I’m worth three million. Not many people can say that.’
Advice from an immigrant father to his son encouraging entrepreneurial spirit –
7

http://regionaldashboard.alberta.ca/region/wood-buffalo/median-familyincome/#/?from=2009&to=2013
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overheard in the community coed sauna: ‘Albertans don’t do anything for themselves,
mow their lawns, clean their carpets.’
2.8 This Community has been Good to Us
Loyalty to the industry clearly contributes to workers’ hesitancy to discuss their
activities and their firms. The words of an early informant capture what I learn is a
widely-shared sentiment, ‘Fort McMurray has given our family so many opportunities
we wouldn’t have had.’ As one person explains, the pay is extraordinary and due to the
lack of competition for jobs the companies willingly retain mediocre performers and
allow for substantial on-the-job training. Projects are huge, so it is not unusual to be
asked whether you’re planning to stay, because if so, “I have a three to five-year task for
you.” Typical sentiments include a mix of elements, such as: “There are no other jobs in
Canada”; “We had to do something and thank goodness for this place”; “We moved
here from _____” (Frequently, this is the maritime provinces, but includes most of the
country, not to mention foreign workers.); “We only intended to stay here for _____”
(Whether the plan was six months or two years, it typically turns out to be a decade or
more.); “Our kids would not have had these opportunities had we not moved here”.
Notably, similarly positive attitudes prevail across Alberta with respect to the
oilsands. During fieldwork, four-of-five Albertans surveyed (and two-thirds of Canadians)
believe that the oilsands can expand production without sacrificing environmental
protection (Ipsos 2012).
2.9 Local Malcontents
A few discontented voices disrupt the general unanimity. A local chatroom8 thread titled
“Get out” is locked by moderators. The subject is moving away from Fort McMurray
started by someone who had just left, which raised the hackles of local boosters. The
new (unidentified) place had a weekly farmers’ market, bicycle paths, and status
conscious drivers in BMWs and Audis with normal exhausts who drove civilly, not F250
and F350 trucks. Fort McMurray in this view was a “shithole” and “blue collar Shangri
la” that offers no amenities other than the nice new pool, limited shopping, bad traffic,
extraordinary murder rate per capita, expensive housing, geographic isolation, a city
8

www.mymcmurray.com no longer hosts chatrooms, summary compiled from 2011 field notes
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with all the problems of a place much bigger combined with all the limitations of a place
much smaller. Boosters pointed to nice weather (better than Edmonton) and a place
made enjoyable because ‘we make $300,000 per year,’ our friends are here, and it helps
us buy property elsewhere. This thread quickly escalated into personal invective.
Complainers were effectively told good riddance, while the defenders were called stupid
and worse for denying the reality around them. Another person had recently moved to
British Columbia. One critic was asked why they still bother posting after moving away,
and it turned out attachments remained as they continued to fly-in for seven and fly-out
for seven.
2.10 Final Analysis: Key to Success
In the final analysis, the dissertation’s empirical data derives from archives, fifty-seven
designated informants in semi-structured and opportunity interviews, and scores more
interactions with oilsands workers and the wider community. Successful acquisition of
informants results in no small part from an empathetic stance that keeps in mind
informants’ structural positionalities as oilsands wage workers. Community activist
Harsha Walia offers a similar, less common, perspective on oilsands workers:
Many within the mainstream environmental movement simply portray
workers as “apathetic” or “greedy,” happy to make money off the
destruction their work involves them in, in the tar sands and elsewhere.
At the same time, many environmentalists pay little attention to the fact
that it is CEOs and other executives, who do not work in the most toxic
sites in operations. The failure to understand the intersection of the
state, colonialism, labour, capital, and impoverishment contributes to a
massive gap in concrete data about the toxic conditions these workers
face, and further perpetuates structural divisions between movements
and communities. (Walia 2014, 87; see also, Haluza-DeLay and Carter
2016)
Tradespersons, equipment operators, and field technicians in particular navigate the
pitfalls and rewards of high wage labor in the oilsands, as B. Curling puts it, between
exhausting dangerous jobs, fast food, beer, smokes, and disrupted sleep on the one
hand, while on the other, the vehicles and “toys,” second homes, Disney and golf
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vacations, sporting events, family visits, and opportunities for their children that loyalty
to the company lets them buy.
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CHAPTER 3. PLACING THE OILSANDS IN THE CANADA RESOURCE ECONOMY
They took our furs and fish. We missed out on the gold, timber, and
uranium. We’re not going to miss out on the oil. (2012 fieldnotes
summarize an oilsands region chief interviewed on television)
3.1 Resource Colonialism of Fur, Fish, Gold, Timber, and Oil
Harold Innis (1962 [1930]) famously explains that contemporary Canada reflects
historical westward colonial settlement revolving around the production of staple
commodities of fish, fur, agriculture, timber, and mineral extraction (see also Barnes
1999). The fur trade is well-established in northwest Canada by the mid-eighteenth
century followed by nineteenth century settler agriculture across the southern prairies,
encouraged in part by the federal government to bolster colonial claims against
American encroachment. Outside of its role in the fur trade, the oilsands region of the
future-Alberta garners little official interest. As such, aboriginal inhabitants of this
region remained outside of the regime of treaties under sway to the south and east.
Then in the late nineteenth century, two particular contingencies force change.
Small pox epidemics and the abuses of prospectors in transit to the Klondike gold fields
push aboriginal inhabitants of the region into the 1899 Treaty 8, an accord catalyzed by
trusted missionaries and to which the state failed to ever fulfill its full obligations
(Fumoleau 2004). Notably by this time, as detailed below, the region is known for signs
of vast oil resources with several exploratory wells underway.
3.2 Industrial Fuel: Canada’s Coal Bust Widens Search for Mineral Fuel
Provision of coal and iron for steelmaking was the sine qua non of liberal industrial
development in the mid-nineteenth century. British Canada9 trailed the United States
and Europe in developing these strategic resources, and to redress these shortcomings,
Parliament authorizes the Geological Survey of Canada (“GSC”) in 1842. Already in the
1830s New Brunswick and northern US states Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania among others begin geological surveys, always with the discovery of
coal first in mind (Lucier 2008). The US Geological Survey is established in 1879.
9

Lower Canada (southern Quebec) and Upper Canada (southern Ontario) united in 1840. New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia confederated with Canada under the British North America Act 1867. Rupert’s Land, the
vast interior north and west was a 17th century crown grant to the Hudson’s Bay Company until 1870
when reassigned to the new Dominion of Canada (all imposed over myriad Indigenous claims).
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The GSC founding director, physician-turned-geologist William Logan, advances
imperial British interest in resource exploitation through scientific classification and
territorialization of resources. In so doing, it also maps a fabric of utilitarian nationalist
space (Braun 2000, Burr 2006, Zeller 2009). The preoccupation with coal leaves Logan
with little initial interest in petroleum. In the Gaspé region of Canada during the 1843
survey for instance, he emphasizes the clear stratigraphy of the local thin oily shale
certainly is not Carboniferous coal. A ‘petroleum spring’ in that region thus raised only
desultory interest, without regard to its potential as fusible hydrocarbon (Harrington
1883, 159-60).
Logan is an acolyte of his famous contemporary, Charles Lyell, whose geology of
ancient eons he validates persuasively in the description of Canada’s pre-Cambrian
Laurentian formation, which beginning with the Gaspé region, maps out over the first
decade of the GSC. The scientific achievement garners accolades at the 1851 London
and 1855 Paris world expositions which leads to knighthood in 1856. Back home,
however, this same discovery disappoints as it declares Upper and Lower Canada largely
devoid of coal. In quirky misfortune, North American subsurface geology largely
corresponds with the (not fully settled) political border, Logan explains; bountiful
eastern American coal, if it extends into subsurface Canada, sinks beyond reach.
Logan the messenger endures public and political opprobrium, and in response –
an act of institutional self-justification – the GSC broadens surveys for alternative fossil
resources and alternative economic minerals. The period 1863-84, for instance,
dedicates efforts to coal and petroleum, and also lignite, peat, and shale (Dowling 1900).
Geologist Robert Bell of the Survey is particularly keen on the potential of petroleum as
an industrial substitute for coal (Zeller 2009).
3.3 Oil in Upper Canada: Boom Fades Quickly
The hunt for oil finally bears fruit in Upper Canada. American chemist Thomas Sterry
Hunt had studied under Benjamin Silliman Jr., whom he served as Yale laboratory
assistant prior to joining the GSC a few years later in 1847. Hunt’s GSC report of 1849-50
contains a study of the Enniskillen petroleum in southwest Ontario. Hunt declares the
material described as ‘asphaltum or mineral pitch’ or ‘mineral caoutchouc” suitable as
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pavement, waterproof, or gasified illuminant (Burr 2006, 62). A follow-up GSC
investigation by Alexander Murray in 1850 likely spurs speculators into first attempts to
extract the Enniskillen petroleum (Burr 2006, 64; although, Gray 1970 contends first
practical efforts at Enniskillen begin in the 1840s). Hunt goes on to serve as a juror in the
1855 Exposition Universelle in Paris, from which he dispatches: “The distillation of
bituminous shales and mineral bitumens is carried on to a great extent both in England
and on the continent” (Hunt 1857, 428). Upon reconsideration of the Enniskillen
petroleum, it was better suited for illuminant and lubricant than pavement he decided.
The 1859 Pennsylvania oil rush etches the name “Colonel” Edwin Drake into the
historical canon, and eclipses into obscurity Canadian James Miller Williams, who
advocates assert is the rightful “father of the North American oil industry.” Indeed, a
year prior to Drake in August 1858, Williams strikes petroleum in a cribbed excavation
about fifty feet deep in the “gum beds” of Enniskillen, Ontario; moreover, Williams
already operates a fully-integrated illuminant firm (production, refinery, and sales)
about the time of Drake’s strike (Gray 1970).
Without adjudicating Williams’ claims to fame, the larger point is that by 1861 an
“oil mania” grips southwest Ontario, Canada, contemporaneous with the Drake-inspired
rush of Pennsylvania (Burr 2006, 66). The J.M. Williams Company likely engages
Abraham Gesner to design its refinery relocated to Hamilton in the late 1850s (Burr
2006, Gray 1970, also Lucier 2008 on the broader trend of petroleum consultancy).
Although the plant produced at high capacity, lingering sulfurous odor left Williams’
Enniskillen illuminant severely disadvantaged against products of Downer and other
American firms. Given this defect, the Enniskillen oil production industry grew in the
early 1860s, but stagnated compared with Pennsylvania (Burr 2006, 51). Then
precipitously in 1863, well pressures failed and flows stopped. Shortly thereafter panic
ensued. Nevertheless, exploration soon renewed in Upper Canada at the tail-end of the
US Civil War with an injection of American capital and technology. However just as
quickly, this Yankee influx retreated after US-based Fenian Raids made Americans
persona non grata (Taylor 2010). By 1866 the first Enniskillen rush had ended for good
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(Burr 2006). George Gesner (1865) took little note of Canadian petroleum beyond its
sulfurous disadvantage. ‘The petroleum wells of the United States claim from their
number and productiveness at the present time’” he wrote, “the chief place in a work
devoted to the history and chemical treatment of petroleum and coal oils” (16).
Recalling the geological fates of Canada’s paltry reserves of eastern coal
compared to the resource bounty of American Appalachia, much the same occurred
with petroleum. Production by US firms mushroomed, first in Pennsylvania and quickly
Ohio, Indiana, and California, and then on to the giant fields of Oklahoma and Texas
which fueled the opening half of the American century. Results in Canada stayed dim by
contrast. Despite tantalizing geological evidence — including in the Alberta oilsands—
western Canada remained parsimonious until “a century too late” at Le Duc, Alberta in
1947. This crucial “barren” period in Canadian oil development provided an
overwhelming advantage to American and Anglo-Dutch petro-capital accumulation
(Gray 1970, 280). In 1898 Rockefeller’s Standard acquired Imperial Oil, itself the largest
wrap-up of Canada’s refining industry, while each of Gulf, Texaco, and Royal Dutch Shell
gobbled up last scraps of homegrown Canadian integrated oil companies, which were
comparable in size to other subsidiaries of their transnational buyers. Not until the twin
oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79 did US policymakers begin to reconsider the potential
of the western hemisphere to produce a strategically sufficient volume of oil (Randall
2005).
3.4 Alberta’s Oilsands Becomes a Resource
Alberta’s dominant ideological outlook is characterized by an upbeat
emphasis on change and the future, a pronounced tendency toward
intervention in the economy, expanding bureaucracy and budgets, and a
fixed belief in the absolute necessity for industrialization. (Pratt 1976, 98)
Cajoled and willed for a century into relevance, the oilsands substantiate Erich
Zimmermann’s (1951) emphasis on the social fabrication of natural resources. Besides
the remote harsh climate, the oilsands are neither liquid crude nor tractable and onesixth as munificent as solid asphaltenes and cannel coals distilled in the nineteenth
century into “coal oil” illuminant. Rather, this materialization of petroleum retains
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indomitability both in the ground and in the industrial plant, as well as in the waste
produced by its commoditization. The oilsands industry’s geological survey, extraction,
refinery, and markets recapitulate earlier petroleum pioneering in the US and Canada to
some degree – yet at a crawl. Nearly a century elapses between the earliest geological
survey of the oilsands and the launch of the first industrial plant to survive in
commercial markets. Still then, prior to the new millennium the industry remains
obscure in narratives of global petroleum.10
3.4.1 Geological Survey of Canada: Quantifying the oilsands resource
The GSC territorial mandate expands in 1870 when the newly-unified Dominion of
Canada (1867) gains jurisdiction over 2.5 million square miles of the continental interior
deeded since the seventeenth century to the Hudson’s Bay Company. Echoing its
historical flurry in the Enniskillen region, the GSC launches a series of surveys of the
Alberta oilsands (Chastko 2004, Ferguson 1986, Gray 1970, Hunt 2012).
John Macoun (1875) begins the campaign with a sweeping sojourn of the interior
continent. His description of ‘oozing… oil shales’ and ‘tar sands’ in the Alberta region
(Ferguson 1986, 14), which repeats the mischaracterization of flowing oilsands left by
late-eighteenth century Alexander Mackenzie, who records ‘bituminous fountains’ in
the vicinity of today’s Suncor Energy plant (Lamb 1970, 129). Macoun’s optimism
inspires a GSC survey aimed specifically at the oilsands, mounted in 1882 by agency
stalwart Robert Bell. Supplementing Macoun’s description, Bell widens the lexicon
(‘asphaltic sands,’ ‘sandy pitch’), and describes the Alberta oilsands geological formation
– accurately in some aspects – as a massive deposit of non-liquid petroleum. Fatefully
and erroneously, however, like his predecessors Bell concludes also that an extant
resource lay in vast subsurface pools of liquid crude. Robert McConnell of the GSC
follows in 1890 to survey the full extent of the resource he knew as ‘tar sands,’ which
becomes standard nomenclature. Based on his recommendation three costly deep wells
are bored 1894-98. These produce copious gas and evidence of thick ‘tar sands’ layers,
but no trace of liquid petroleum, which troubles the Bell hypothesis. Interest in further

10

E.g., unremarked in Yergin (1991)

51

exploration wanes by the end of the nineteenth century. Alberta and the federal
government enter a period of indifference at best, or, obstructive at worst towards
oilsands development. For instance, federal government agents appear solicitous
toward promoters of the resurgent liquid petroleum industry of the old Enniskillen
region who lobby to head-off potential competition from the oilsands (Ferguson 1986,
Hunt 2012).
Regardless of the political climate, one conclusion of the early GSC surveys is
inescapable; the Alberta oilsands is an immense prospect. Despite lack of clear success
in the first three GSC test bores, abundant signposts stoke the passions of wildcatters,
and this unquenched optimism contributes to Alberta’s 1905 confederation (Chastko
2004, Gray 1970). The ensuing development of the oilsands resource rests on a
foundation of dispossessed indigenous inhabitants of the mining region codified under
Treaty 8, introduced above (Longley 2020).
3.4.2 Federal Mines Branch: State-sponsored research & development of the oilsands
In the lead-up to the Great War, a mandate to bolster petroleum development within
the British realm pushes the oilsands back into federal affairs, encouraged further by
local boosters (Chastko 2004, Ferguson 1986).11 Here enters Sidney C. Ells charged by
the new Mines Branch in the Canada Department of Mines to assay potential strategies
to develop the oilsands resource. The son of longtime GSC member Robert W. Ells,12 the
young mining engineer throws himself into arduous fieldwork in 1913 and establishes
several grounding principles still germane in the contemporary industry. For starters,
Ells makes clear in his “preliminary” first report (1914) the bituminous sands are no
harbinger of subterranean liquid crude, but rather the potential raw resource
recoverable by surface mining. Just as salient, Ells identifies the challenge of separating
bitumen from sand. He reviews chemical and organic solvent extraction yet favors
hydrolytic separation, which remains today’s primary industrial chemistry. We can
understand the proposed bituminous product of this separation process as analogous –
11

Petroleum of Trinidad and Canada intrigue Admiral Lord Fisher, father of the oil-fired British navy
(Davenport and Cooke 1924)
12
Surveys include asphaltic strata of New Brunswick including the Albert mineral in 1876-77 (Dowling
1900)
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although super-viscous – to the “crude” oil obtained after the first round of cannel coal
refining, from which secondary refining derived coal oil kerosene. However, the extraheavy Alberta bitumen, reasoned Ells, would be best suited as economical asphalt in
road construction and surfacing. Notably, Ells (1926) argues against the nomenclature
“tar sand” in favor of “asphaltic sand.”
Ells proves a workhorse in rugged Alberta fieldwork. In the course of eight
weeks’ summer research in 1913 around Fort McMurray, he surveys 175 miles of
riverine bitumen outcrops and recovers upwards of 200 hand-augured cores for
laboratory analysis (Ells 1914).13 This headstrong productivity runs Ells into trouble when
in a rush to pilot-test road-paving he paves a section of roadway in Edmonton in 1915
without obtaining official approval. City officials take loud umbrage, which leads to Ells
being placed under superiors’ close scrutiny. In 1917 he submits sprawling volumes of
typed observations and analyses to complete his 1913 field study. These demonstrate
breadth and insight as noted; however, an internal scientific review deems them
scattershot. Although Ells holds only a bachelor degree, he also studies at the Mellon
Institute,14 the center of petroleum research, where in the eyes of those around him he
develops a viable extraction technique for the oilsands. Nevertheless, when Ells returns
from overseas duty in World War I, he is limited to field research without access to
laboratories. Meanwhile the province of Alberta seizes the initiative in research
concerned with oilsands processing (Sheppard 1989).
3.4.3 Alberta Research Council: The province seizes the initiative in oilsands
development
Development apostle and president of the University of Alberta, Dr. Henry Marshall
Tory, establishes the Scientific and Industrial Research Council of Alberta (“Research
Council”) in 1919 to accelerate exploitation of provincial resources, not least the Alberta
oilsands. Well-advanced in appointing S.C. Ells into a lead role the following year, Tory
abruptly shies away based in part on discovery of the former’s haphazard method but
also in rejection of Ottawa’s insistence on continued authority. As an alternative, Tory’s
13
14

Bluffs of the Alberta River and tributaries up to 300’ expose mineable oilsands deposits.
Predecessor of Carnegie Mellon University
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first research scientist is road-materials chemist Dr. Karl A. Clark of the federal Mines
Branch, who had been one of the two internal reviewers who criticized Ells’ 1917
volumes. Ells’ indignance at being passed over for the Alberta job lasts his lifetime
(Sheppard 1989, 81). This perceived sleight personifies one of many obstacles that
undermine federal and provincial cooperation in the oilsands through the Second World
War (Chastko 2004, 54).
Similar to S.C. Ells, Karl Clark (e.g., 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924) initially prioritizes
research into the use of Alberta bitumen as road-surfacing material. These limited
horizons later expand exponentially, however, with popularization of a new refinery
technology known as “cracking,” which fractures heavy long-chain hydrocarbon
feedstock into short chain molecular components of gasoline. By 1926 both Clark and
Ells recognize the Alberta oilsands bitumen could be cracked into internal combustion
motor fuel, by then the most valuable fraction of petroleum, a hypothesis Clark confirms
in refinery test-batches. Nevertheless, however readily refiners might crack oilsands
bitumen, they remain flush with familiar liquid crude petroleum made cheap by new US
oilfields opened in the 1910s and 1920s. Contented in this favorable position, refiners
utterly dismiss the prospective Alberta product (Chastko 2004, 17; Ferguson 1986, 46).
Facing a problem that recalls the oversupply crisis of Samuel Kier, whose combustible
illuminant promises to sell higher volumes compared to patent medicine, Karl Clark
begins to understand demand for road asphalt in western Canada is miniscule compared
to the magnitude of the Alberta reserve. Despite market rejection, Clark increasingly
champions oilsands production for gasoline (1929). By comparison, the federal research
and development initiative stays stuck on roadbuilding applications (Ells 1929).
3.4.4 Abasand: Failures show the perils of oilsands commercialization
Territorial motives and counterproductive personal ambitions largely undermine
initiatives of Ottawa and Alberta to co-develop the Alberta resource from the 1920s
past the Second World War (Chastko 2004, Ferguson 1986, Sheppard 1989). One
episode illuminates several dimensions of tension: By 1929 the two governments
collaborate sufficiently to operate a small pilot project at Waterways on the Clearwater
River just south of Fort McMurray. Ells develops the compact surface mine labored by
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pickaxe; Clark guides his small bitumen separation plant relocated from Edmonton to
prove-out his hot water separation process. The bulk of bitumen production is reserved
for federal road construction experiments. During this summer work season, Clark hosts
a site visit by intrepid American petro-capitalist and former US official Max Ball, whose
backers intend to develop a bitumen venture at nearby Horse River. (Ball also shows-off
his pilot separation plant in Denver to Ells.) Ball impresses Clark, who looks forward to
selling his Waterways plant or at least sharing its experience as a blueprint. Meanwhile
by this time, Ottawa ratifies a nominal quitclaim with the Prairie Provinces, including
Alberta. This National Resource Transfer Act (1930) transmits legal title over natural
resources within Alberta from Ottawa to Edmonton. The Act’s quiet codicil, however,
retains federal reserve over 2,000 square miles of oilsands prospects. This loophole
comes to light post-ratification when the Ottawa government exercises its prerogative
to lease the Horse River site to Ball for his Abasand project, excluding Clark from
involvement and raising longstanding provincial rancor as a result.
A mere six months of production at Abasand is the reward for a decade of
development and start-up activities; in November 1941 it burns to the ground. Ball’s
syndicate rebuilds in 1942 but operations stall due to thin capital, after which Ball
wanders away. The federal government asserts wartime authority the following year
and takes over Abasand with a battery of consultants to gauge its and the wider
oilsands’ strategic utility. Clark has little involvement, yet as consultant to a prospective
management contractor he reviews the rebuilt facility and predicts design limitations
(Chastko 2004, 21). Days prior to full-capacity operations commence in 1945, the
Abasand plant burns to ruin a second time. Clark writes privately to his client in acid
condescension: ‘Things went just about as we felt they must from our experience and if
they had gone differently, it would have meant that we had gone off the beam badly
and did not know much for all our work’ (Sheppard 1989, 374). Clark attributes this
failure to ineptitude; however, those most embittered by the experience accuse the
federal government of sabotaging the oilsands prospect (Chastko 2004, 66, Ferguson
1986).
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3.4.5 Bitumount: The province acquires an industrial plant
Although shuttered for a decade in the wake of the Great Depression, Clark’s Research
Council gains a patron during the quarter-century reign of Premier Ernest C. Manning
(1943-68) when provincial expenditures on the oilsands substantially increased.
Particularly following the Abasand fiasco, the regime recognizes the need for greater
proof of concept to attract the multinational petro-capital it sought. Clark returns to his
provincial position. Also, to this end in 1944 prior to the second Abasand fire, the
province commits funds to promoter Lloyd Champion of Montreal to restart the
mothballed venture at an Athabasca River outcrop named Bitumount by Robert C.
Fitzsimmons, who had constructed a bitumen separation plant patented in 1931 and
later added a refinery. Thin capital and difficult markets most likely shut down the
venture; although Fitzsimmons maintains throughout his remaining years that provincial
officials colluding with Champion put him out of business (Freeman 1966).
Fitzsimmons’ Bitumount facility is deteriorated beyond repair and requires more
capital than Champion budget. Inexplicably in the eyes of Karl Clark, the ChampionAlberta venture outsources fabrication of the new separation plant to an Oklahoma firm
with no prior experience in the Alberta oilsands. Progress is slow and, once begun,
production is sporadic. Champion fails to raise his portion of the capital, so in 1949 the
province seizes full control; and thereby, Karl Clark and team gains their high-profile
opportunity.
As Chapter 4 details, rudimentary separation of oilsands bitumen is easily
accomplished; it is another matter altogether to achieve commercially viable yields.
Clark had separated bitumen back in his Ottawa lab and shortly after joining the
Research Council he proclaims, ‘there is reason to hope a simple commercial process
will soon be perfected’ (1922, 12). Indeed in 1923, the Research Council’s separation
plant produces 85 tons of bitumen to pave 450-feet of roadway on the outskirts of
Edmonton. Despite this advancement, residual water and clay in the bitumen bedevil
further progress. It will take another full quarter-century before the separation process
is ready for the Bitumount opportunity. The enigma arises in the confounding
materiality of micron-size clay “fines” in the process, which constitute what we might
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term a “Goldilocks” phenomenon. Too much clay in the ore mix depresses the quantity
of recovered bitumen; however, it turns out also that too little clay also inhibits isolation
of bitumen from oilsands (Clark and Pasternack 1949, Clark 1950; see also, Sheppard
1989, 171). Chapter 6 narrows in on the problem of clay at the heart of the industry’s
voluminous tailings waste crisis.
Ottawa retreats from the oilsands following the second Abasand disaster. In
these same years and ending a long drought, Alberta discoveries of liquid petroleum at
Turner Valley in 1936 and Leduc in 1947 divert provincial attention by the time of Clark’s
Bitumount initiative. Moreover, these Canadian discoveries pale in comparison to
massive new developments in the Middle East and Gulf of Mexico. The global economy
will remain awash in petroleum for decades to follow with little interest in a costly nonliquid alternative.
3.4.6 Alberta’s oilsands promotional event underwhelms
Yet against these tides of indifference, conflict, and incompetence, a small group within
the province continues to strain to encourage exploitation of its oilsands. Sidney M.
Blair, onetime research associate of Clark at the Research Council and later a
thoroughly-rounded petroleum industry consultant,15 agrees to study the economic case
for mining the oilsands. Given the relative success of Bitumount, Blair (1950) calculates a
forty cent per barrel profit on oilsands crude piped to Great Lakes terminals and sold at
$3.50 per barrel.
A government-sponsored Athabasca Oil Sands Conference (1951) to promote
this “Blair Report” mixes technical participants including Blair and Clark, three Alberta
Ministers (Industries and Labour, Highways, and Mines and Minerals) who serve as
trustees of the government’s promotional Oil Sands Project, as well as senior
representatives of Gulf Oil, Imperial Oil, Socony-Vacuum, Hanna Mining, etc. Following
several days’ discussion of technical developments and provincial policy in Edmonton,
the entourage sojourns by rail 150 miles north to Fort McMurray, then by riverboat 50
miles downstream on the Alberta River to tour the Bitumount plant. As doting parents
15

Universal Oil Products (Chicago), founder of Canadian Bechtel Ltd., which constructed Suncor and
Syncrude
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are blind to their offspring’s shortcomings, one can imagine how this rustic curiosity fails
to inflame passions of its industry visitors despite high-hopes of its prideful provincial
promoters. With regard to the Blair Report budget, the director of research for AngloIranian Oil16 dismisses its overoptimistic cost and sales projections (Chastko 2004). As he
predicts, the learning curve proves costly for eventual early-movers in the oilsands.
Similar to failed promotional efforts of the province in the 1920s, the 1951 conference
to publicize the Blair Report spurs little action from petroleum companies.
3.4.7 Geopolitics catalyzes oilsands pilot sites of multinational oil companies
Despite this cool reception, fateful strategic shifts lay the groundwork for oilsands
development. In May 1951 the liberal nationalist Muhammad Mossadegh nationalized
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., and quickly thereafter the 1956 Suez crisis imperiled vital
Middle East petroleum shipments. By the end of the decade exploratory core sampling
in the oilsands rises dramatically (Ferguson 1986). Unlike anytime previously, large
multinational petroleum companies begin to accumulate choice leaseholds in the
oilsands. Of 2.6 million acres leased to oilsands developers by 1962, three-fourths are
owned by US-based petroleum multinationals plus Anglo-Dutch Shell (Freeman 1966,
69-77). Remaining leases are held, Freeman uncovers, by a veiled network of Manning
insiders and industrial heirs. This includes former Minister of Mines and Minerals N.E.
Tanner, who had been trustee of the Oil Sands Project and then abandons these to
become involved in the acquisition of Bitumount upon the provincial liquidation. Going
forward oilsands industrial development is the reserve of petroleum multinationals,
while the era of Ball, Fitzsimmons, and Champion recedes. Freeman deems the sale of
leases to non-Canadian firms ‘the biggest sellout.’ In concurrence, factions within the
government insist the province should develop its resource for public welfare:
The tar sands offers a unique opportunity to change the historical trend
of ever increasing foreign control of non-renewable resource
development in Canada. Here is a reserve of the greatest magnitude
which does not require highly speculative investment to find and prove.
The world wide demand for petroleum will be so compelling within the

16
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near future that it should be Alberta's objective to increase Canadian
equity participation in the resource developments. (CUC 1972, 16)
This strategic statement of the Department of Environment’s Conservation and
Utilization Committee advocates for measured growth with high royalties, not the
intensive capital investment soon directed towards the industry incentivized by low
royalties.
3.4.8 Suncor: Longest continually operating oilsands mine
Three risk-tolerant leaseholders begin to pilot-test surface mining and separation
technologies in the late-1950s. Satisfactory results motivate early 1960s applications to
Alberta for licenses to develop commercial oilsands mines and processors. First is the
just-noted collection of Canadian and plutocratic interests led by a controlling
investment from Sun Oil of Philadelphia, owned by politically-conservative J. Howard
Pew and family, an independent survivor of Rockefeller’s Standard Trust. Proposals also
are submitted by both Shell Canada and Cities Service-Athabasca, which includes New
Jersey Standard’s Canadian subsidiary, Imperial Oil.
Then abruptly, the province contradicts its oilsands promotion. As noted, global
oil supply burgeons in the postwar years. In an effort to protect Alberta producers of
liquid crude, the Manning administration undermines its own longstanding
development policy and caps oilsands production at five percent of total provincial
petroleum output. One rationale is economic. In its haste to promote the oilsands,
Manning’s agencies had slashed royalties by more than half to 30 cents per barrel
compared to 68 cents for liquid crude. Overdevelopment of the oilsands would bleed
the treasury (Great Plains Research Consultants 1984, 90). Yet, in 1963 Alberta bends
this five percent oilsands allotment when it approves the Sun Oil 36,000 barrels per day
(b/d)17 facility. The two deferred applicants, each having proposed 100,000 b/d facilities,
were told to prepare to wait 9-15 years before another oilsands venture was likely to be
approved (Great Plains Research Consultants 1984, 91). The single approved licensee
launched in 1967 as Great Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. (GCOS; later, Suncor Energy Inc.
“Suncor”), suffers start-up troubles across every phase of the enterprise. For years
17
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output runs at a fraction of nameplate, akin more to a large pilot than viable industrial
facility; yet in 1974, the firm ekes out a milestone with its first quarterly profit, aided
largely by high oil prices with the 1973 Arab oil embargo.
3.4.9 Syncrude: Industry’s second mine threefold larger than Suncor
The Cities Service group responds to rejection with ambitious laboratory research.
Promising results lead to reorganization in 1964 as Syncrude Canada Ltd. (“Syncrude”)
with accomplished Imperial Oil executives tapped for leadership. In briefs to Premier
Manning, Syncrude chief executive Frank Spragins argues that delays in the oilsands give
hope to US shale (Bellemare 1990, 18-19). In the wake of the shaky start of the Sun Oil
project, the province encourages its two spurned oilsands suitors to resubmit. Shell
demurs; however, in 1968 Syncrude proposes to construct an 80,000 b/d facility worth
$200 million. Then suddenly again, Alberta proves schizophrenic and postpones
Syncrude’s approval for at least one year pending developments of the new boom on
the Alaska North Slope. Syncrude responds with an ‘ultimatum’ that insists the firm will
liquidate and walk away in the case of any further delay (Bellemare 1990, 26).
Subsequently, in 1969 Syncrude gains its approval.
In 1971 the Conservative Peter Lougheed regime (1971-85) commences a
Manning-like reign. Building on his predecessor’s development initiatives, Premier
Lougheed applies renewed provincial urgency to rapidly expand the oilsands industry. At
the same time, identifies Larry Pratt (1976), the 1973 Arab embargo resets American oil
strategy, led by influential petroleum consultant Walter Levy, whereby a “fortress
America” policy reemphasizes North American petroleum resources. With a wary eye
toward the competitive threat of US shale, the Lougheed administration retains Levy’s
services to seize the apparent moment. Measured projections of the day foresee a
Syncrude-size plant commissioned every three years; a second oil strategist, archconservative Herman Kahn who pushes Levy-like arguments to Ottawa, thinks that too
slow (Nikiforuk 2010).
Independent of these unrealistic expansion scenarios, Syncrude retains all the
cards on the question of capital construction. Whereas the Alberta oilsands stir singular
dreams in its Alberta boosters, to the multinational petroleum companies behind
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Syncrude it remains merely one play, unchartered with high-ante and risk, albeit with a
vast reserve with certain yields. The game plays out with few surprises. Following the
abrupt withdrawal of consortium member Atlantic Richfield Co. in 1974, Syncrude
calculates millions more dollars are needed to cover rising costs and thirty percent
equity shortfall. Gulf Oil Canada joins the mix; however, Shell’s lack of interest dashes
the last hope of fully-replacing Atlantic Richfield with multinational petro-capital. Chief
executives of Syncrude’s owners turn to brinksmanship. Despite sunk costs of $250
million, they insist face-to-face with provincial premiers and federal ministers:
contribute capital or we will scuttle it all. To continue the playing cards analogy, the
governments fold.18 In the Winnipeg Agreement (Government of Canada et al. 1975)
provincial and federal ministers agree to take a thirty percent equity stake in Syncrude
in return for an aggregate $600 million capital injection as follows: Canada (15%),
Alberta (10%), and Ontario (5%). Critics at the time heap calumny on Alberta for
retaining a too little stake in the growing oilsands mining industry (Pratt 1976). By its
1978 launch as just the second oilsands mine, Syncrude costs $2.3 billion, tenfold more
than its original budget, and there is no immunity from expensive start-up bugs as the
enterprise struggles to reach its revised 125,000 b/d production limit.
3.4.10 Fort McMurray takes contemporary shape
Although Fort McMurray lies at the confluence of the Athabasca and Clearwater Rivers,
the latter which serves as trade route to the East, the settlement remains a minor
colonial outpost during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Settler activity picks
up at the dawn of the twentieth century as the location hosts one of the Treaty 8
signings and Waterways just to the south serves as a point of steamboat embarkation
for speculators in the Klondike gold rush. By 1920 a railroad replaces the oxcart path to
Edmonton. Still, the population is little more than 5,000 when the initial influx of
workers arrives to construct and operate the first permanent oilsands mine, Suncor, nee
Great Canadian Oil Sands; it then reaches approximately 30,000 with the completion of
Syncrude in 1978 (Fumoleau 2004, Huberman 2001, Hunt 2011, Innis 1962 [1930]).
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Whereas single industry resource towns across Canada have been replaced by
fly-in fly-out operations (Barnes, Hayter, Hay 2001, McDonagh 2010) and several large
so-called “man camps” are associated with newer mine developments, Fort McMurray
lies within commuting distance of Suncor, Syncrude, and Canadian Natural Resources
operations. As a result, Fort McMurray appears to have attained greater permanency as
a government, services, and retail center in support of the oilsands mining industry.
Although the population of Fort McMurray during the dissertation fieldwork is
approximately 65,000, this swells by several tens of thousands more workers who rent
rooms in homes for months and even years on end. A substantial subset of this
workforce hails from the Maritime provinces where they establish in the words of Major
and Winters (2013), a ‘community by necessity’ (see also Ferguson 2011). Although the
housing stock replicates the bland suburbs across the US and Canada, which municipal
agents promote as a bastion of normalcy (Major 2013), this masks a ‘feral’ topology not
far removed from the Klondike prospectors of a century prior (Shields 2012).
3.4.11 The oilsands mining long boom
Through much of the 1980s these two pioneers – Suncor and Syncrude – stabilize
operations, and hostile labor relations in the case of Suncor (Boychuk 1996). By the
1990s both reach positions to undertake ambitious expansions of their oilsands mines
and refining facilities; in addition, they foster a crucial new round of resource
boosterism. Like a latter-day version of the Alberta Oil Sands Conference (1951) and
Blair Report (1950), a public-private assemblage known as the National Task Force on Oil
Sands Strategies is hardly the first of its kind; this combination of industry and provincial
decision-makers issues a report that simplifies the royalty regime and corresponds with
an inflection in oilsands economic history (National Task Force 1995). Within a decade of
the Task Force publication, aggregate oilsands production doubles to outstrip its
authors’ most optimistic aspirations (Nikiforuk 2010, Woynillowicz et al. 2005).
After a century of development initiatives, the region finally enters its first
sustained resource boom, which corresponds with soon-rising oil prices and political
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shifts in stalwart exporters Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. With rare setbacks 19 this
expansion continues through the years of primary fieldwork (2010, 2011, 2012). Alberta
returns to strategic primacy during this time. Echoing Walter Levy and Herman Kahn of
the previous generation, contemporary petroleum authority Daniel Yergin locates
Alberta as a crucial resource within the US-sphere, and promotes ramped-up oilsands
production to exploit their magnitude, proximity, and political stability (Krauss and
Rosenthal 2010). In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico
the oilsands industry promotes itself as the clean alternative (Kirby 2010), a concept
argued at length in Green Oil (Das 2009). In a similar register, due to regulatory
oversight and high wages argues Levant (2011), oilsands exploitation constitutes
exceptionally Ethical Oil.
Syncrude doubles capacity with its Aurora Mine opened in 2000. Royal Dutch
Shell becomes the industry’s third entrant with its Muskeg River Mine in 2002 followed
by Jackpine Mine in 2010. Alberta-based independent Canadian Natural Resources
begins production from its Horizon Oil Sands Mine in 2009. Aggregate annual
production of synthetic crude by the oilsands mining industry increases fifteen percent
from 2010 to 2012 to reach over 330 million barrels.20 Production begins in 2013 at
Imperial Oil’s Kearl mine and separator. In 2018 Suncor’s Fort Hills mine opens at the
original Bitumount lease. Once any oilsands mine begins operations, the capital plan is
to run to exhaustion, typically forty to fifty years. Syncrude has processed about thirtynine percent of its eight-billion-barrel reserve; Suncor with Fort Hills included has
consumed only thirty-four percent of its 6.7-billion-barrel reserve. Altogether by 2035,
oilsands mine production is projected to expand to 1.82 million b/d, a nearly fifty
percent increase over 2018 levels (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2019).
3.4.12 Post fieldwork conditions
Fieldwork concludes in 2012 with the oilsands development boom in full swing.
Subsequent contingencies pepper the oilsands mining industry. In the period January
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1995-2012 production declined only three years: 2000 (0.8%), 2005 (15% due to Suncor fire), 2008 (1%)
Imperial Oil began steam-generated in situ production at Cold Lake in the 1960s; a combination of
related steam injection techniques have led to a rapid increase in in situ production of bitumen, which
first surpassed mining output in 2013 and by 2015 was 17 percent greater.
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2014–16 world oil prices plunge seventy percent to less than $30/barrel. The primary
cause is the upwelling of US petroleum production as the specter of shale finally
materializes (from 5.5 to 9.4 million b/d during 2010–15). In 2015 the US government
rejects the Keystone XL pipeline, which the owner abandons in 2021. Epic firestorms in
the summer of 2015 obliterate residential neighborhoods and force the rapid
evacuation of one hundred thousand residents of Fort McMurray and surrounding
communities, which temporarily suspends most of the region’s bitumen production. In
2016 Suncor gains controlling ownership (nearly 54 percent) of Syncrude while Imperial
retains a 25 percent stake and Sinopec (China) holds nine percent. In late-2016 with oil
still less than $50 per barrel, the Canadian dollar exchanges for just 75 cents US.
3.4.13 Oilsands mining expansion ending?
In recent decades, the rapidly-growing industrial technique in the oilsands relies
upon steam injection into the geological formation too deep for mining, followed by
recovery of the resultant liquefied bitumen via conventional wells. Presenting investors
with lower costs of entry and wider geographic opportunity, these Steam Assisted
Gravity Drainage (SAGD, “sag-dee”) and related in situ approaches today account for the
majority of the region’s aggregate output. Readers should find no surprise that Alberta’s
provincial government is deeply involved in the research and development of this
technology. Although various in situ approaches have been developed in the oilsands
since the 1950s, the most significant advancement is the establishment of the Alberta
Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority (AOSTRA), which with a budget of $144
million funded evenly by public and industry proves out in situ methods in four major
field pilots (Spragins 1978). In situ production in the oilsands reaches 1.56 million barrels
per day in 2018 compared to 1.35 million b/d produced by the oilsands mines (Canadian
Association of Petroleum Producers 2019).
An inflection point may have been reached in the oilsands mining industry.
Development of an oilsands mine reflects capital logic that plays out in incremental
stages until the final “go.” Costs have always been high. Recently, this inescapable
constant combines with plunging global oil prices and uncertain availability of pipeline
capacity – the latter a win for activism. This leads a partnership of Suncor and French oil
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giant Total to cancel the well-advanced Voyageur project in 2013 and then in 2014 to
indefinitely mothball their $11 billion Joslyn mining project (Tait 2014). The next year
(2015) Shell Canada withdraws its Pierre River Mine application, which proposes to
double the firm’s oilsands production. Shell’s decision is the harbinger of a sharper pivot
as in 2017 the company sells out all of its oilsands operations to Canadian Natural
Resources Ltd, another oilsands mine operator. In these same years, Suncor publicizes
potential interest in a “leave it in the ground” strategy surprisingly compatible with
activist calls for an oilsands moratorium (cf. Homer-Dixon 2015). Most recently in 2020,
Teck Resources Ltd. terminates its Frontier project.
Beyond these decisions to withhold capital investment from new oilsands mines,
shaky reliability of existing operations – especially upgraders – pressures industry
profitability. Most notable during my fieldwork, ExxonMobil, the operating partner of
Syncrude at the time, postpones billions of dollars in expansions until at least after 2020
in order to divert capital into upgrader maintenance (Healing 2012). Additional capital
challenges arise in financial markets under pressure to reduce involvement in
atmospheric carbon-intensive industries. To this end, an expanding raft of insurers,
pension funds, and investment houses pledge not to invest in the oilsands industry or
new pipelines that service it (Flavelle 2020).
Despite this string of halted projects, Suncor provides possible counterevidence
to this apparent trend of decline. In 2016 – around the time, as noted, Suncor publicizes
potential interest in a mining moratorium – the firm increases its stake in Syncrude to
secure a controlling interest. Two years later in 2018 Suncor commences mining
production at its formerly mothballed Fort Hills Oil Sands Project jointly owned with
Total, which previously had been put on hold around the same time the Voyageur,
Joslyn, and Pierre River projects were shelved. Like Imperial Oil’s Kearl plant, and the
former Shell mines, Fort Hills implements a strategy of producing diluted bitumen as an
end commodity – for refinery markets in the US Midwest and Gulf – thereby eliminating
the cost and challenge of running upgraders with all the related material, logistical, and
cost challenges.
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In the midst of the boomtime underway during my fieldwork, B. Miner predicts
precisely this sort of behavior in the event of a prolonged downdraft in global oil
markets: ‘[If prices fall too low] they’ll put a padlock on the gate and walk away and
come back in five years or ten years when we can make money.’ In this light, no one
should express surprise if, at some future date, any or all of the Voyageur, Joslyn, and
Pierre River mine projects remove their “padlocks” to recommence development.
3.5 Alberta Oilsands Literature
3.5.1 Postcolonial violence and unevenness
Although the dissertation takes a narrow view of the socionatural relations of wage
labor production in the oilsands mines, it is important to recognize vibrant postcolonial
research aimed at this industry. Reaching back to the end of the nineteenth century,
Treaty 8 circumscribes aboriginal inhabitants of the oilsands region under the guise of
law, resulting in resource expropriation and environmental defilement that has
disenfranchised indigenous people by destroying a political economy dependent upon
fish, animals, plants, and water (Longley 2020). Beyond these legalistic machinations,
Simpson (2019) pinpoints violence as the necessary condition of the dispossession,
enclosure, and continuing colonialism that constitutes the Alberta tar sands as national
resource. Fundamentally, these are policies of elimination and assimilation (Ray 2017).
Exacerbating the violence of oilsands extraction, neoliberal ideologies of occupation and
resource extraction normalize and racialize the legacy of settler colonialism in new
formulations of non-white wage labor exploitation (Preston 2017).
Pathways out of this ongoing violence are elusive. Bowness and Hudson (2014),
for instance, locate no avenues for meaningful democratic input to industry activity.
Notably however, activism – frequently in the face of violent state suppression – has
achieved marked successes, particularly in quashing new pipeline construction, which
effectively bottlenecks the distribution capacity of the oilsands (e.g., Lukacs 2014,
McCreary 2014, Simpson and Le Billon 2021, Stendie and Adkin 2016). These actions are
complemented by a range of initiatives by artists and activists to raise awareness
(Cardinal 2014, Kane 2021, Leclerc and Weyler 2014). Indigenous resistance to colonial
development in the oilsands region reaches back decades, even over a century (e.g.,
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Audette-Longo 2018, Fumoleau 2004, Laboucan-Massimo 2014), which fits the pattern
in the Americas of radical aboriginal resistance since first contact (Simpson 2017).
Despite these successes however, activism is fragmented among conservationists,
climate advocates, and Indigenous-led movements observes Coats (2014), who argues
that successful counter-hegemony will emerge most effectively under unified leadership
of the latter. In concurrence, numerous commentators observe the potency of
Indigenous actions in the Canadian courts where treaty rights have been reaffirmed in
recent years, thus, leaving open the possibility of profound legal victories against
colonial extraction (e.g., Lameman 2014, Parlee 2016, Thomas-Muller 2014). With a
vision beyond court action as an endpoint, Arnold (2018) argues delegitimization of
extractive capitalism ultimately depends on emergent indigenous cultural politics that
seek to create alternative communities altogether independent of capitalism (see also
Wickstrom 2014).
3.5.2 Neoliberal hegemony
Studies of the oilsands mining industry detail outcomes of a hegemonic petro-state,
legitimated through industry-friendly oversight and discourses that advance capital
interests while they simultaneously hide failed state stewardship (Adkin and Miller
2016, Adkin and Stares 2016, Carter 2014, Fluker 2014, Garvin 2016, Grant 2014,
Haluza-DeLay 2014, Longley 2015, Parlee 2016, Urquhart 2018, Weis et al. 2014, Zalik
2016). This critical literature chiefly probes the capacity of activism to leverage
discursive campaigns into regulatory reform and larger counterhegemonic shifts. Any
one activist action, investigators argue, constitutes a tactical blow in a long war of
position;21 for instance, cost burdens imposed on the industry by resistance slow new
mines and pipelines (Adkin and Courteau 2016, Stendie and Adkin 2016), or perceptions
of hundreds of millions of people worldwide reshape through poetry and aerial
photography that highlight the industry’s environmental impacts (Davidson and
Gismondi 2011, Leclerc and Weyler 2014, Weis et al. 2014).
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These activist objectives fall into two sorts. More modest aims with near-term
attainability include imposition of higher resource rents, First Nations access to royalty
data, increased First Nations enfranchisement, and improved public consultation (Carter
2016, Mills 2017, Zalik 2012). Others’ goals are loftier, yet viewed as crucial to rein in
the drivers of climate change; namely, a moratorium on industry expansion as the
decisive first step toward post-fossil political economy ((D'Arcy 2014, Davidson and
Gismondi 2011, Homer-Dixon et al. 2015, LaDuke 2014); in the postcolonial analysis of
Simpson (2019), the oilsands objectify the imperative to ‘dismantle the category of
resources altogether’ (11; see also Vasey 2014).
Among this literature, Challenging Legitimacy at the Precipice of Energy Calamity
(Davidson and Gismondi 2011) remains notable for its combination of historical reach
and engagement with key issues (see also, Chastko 2004, Ferguson 1986, Great Plains
Research 1984, Hunt 2012, Longley 2021, 2020, 2016, 2015, Urquhart 2018). At its
heart, Challenging Legitimacy evaluates how both state and industry deploy discursive
tactics to legitimate tar sands exploitation, from nineteenth century roots to the present
day, and identifies resultant winners and losers – plus a strategy for progressive activism
to alter the historical trajectory. This work addresses one popular misconception. To wit,
the historical engine of oilsands industrialization is not petro-capital, but rather the
state, specifically Alberta province, which after fifty years of state-sponsored research
and development finally enticed global petro-capital into the oilsands. Industry
expansion over recent decades, Davidson and Gismondi argue, rests on the power of
ideological political discourse to bottle-up dissent and diffuse public concern, thereby,
to legitimate state-capital hegemony. As they make their case:
Attempts to engage in a more inclusive type of decision-making, or at
least exercises that give the appearance of inclusivity, have been largely
unsuccessful, leaving state and industrial interests at the center of this
policy-making community and all others making noise outside the closed
doors of boardrooms. (Davidson and Gismondi 2011, 201)
Even so, the authors contend activism can eventually catalyze a post-fossil regime.
Alternatives are stark and the stakes immense in this framework. With the oilsands
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conceived as an emblematic global precipice, Davidson and Gismondi conclude, the
choice is either: 1) continue reliance on ever-more disastrous hydrocarbons at climactic
peril, or, 2) challenge the fault lines of provincial political legitimacy so effectively as to
shutter the tar sands completely and potentially catalyze an epochal transition to global
post-fossil society. As implied, the wider body of this oilsands literature remains
sanguine towards the potential for both incremental improvements and dramatic shifts
in the oilsands.
At the same time, several reluctantly acknowledge status quo entrenchment,
and the at best distant prospect of uprooting it. Davidson and Gismondi themselves
concede this inertia: ‘The human exceptionalism paradigm, which prescribes faith in
future economic and technological solutions to ecological travesties committed today,’
they bemoan, ‘is being contested but by no means replaced’ (2011, 210). Despite
Alberta’s 2013 enactment of the most aggressive environmental monitoring obligations
of any Canadian province, these still fall short of ecological significance (Olszynski 2014).
There are simply no avenues for meaningful democratic input to industry activity
(Bowness and Hudson 2014). In a recent sobering check on progressive ambitions, the
first left-leaning Alberta premiership in decades quickly cratered to industry imperatives
(Adkin 2016). Consumerism in Alberta dulls the social capacity for transformation
(Davidsen 2016), while the tenor of “tar sands” environmentalism fails to connect with
Albertans, or even with environmental justice activists (Adkin and Miller 2016, HaluzaDeLay and Carter 2016, Vasey 2014).
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CHAPTER 4. HOW IT WORKS ON THE GROUND: CONTINGENCY-RIDDLED COMMODITY
PRODUCTION AND ITS HAZARDS
So many people have told me that I’m not alone, that people who have
worked in this industry for thirty years, people who are lifers, still don’t
really understand how it works… It’s just so big. (B. Calgary2)
The buildings don’t make money. The people don’t make money. Only
the product makes money. (B. Cousin)
Whereas Chapter 3 historicizes the oilsands industry in North American petroleum
geography, this Chapter 4 investigates the co-constitutional interplay of materiality and
work activities on the ground inside the “black box” of oilsands mining production. The
inquiry takes off from the point where an oilsands mining venture has already secured
applicable approval and licensure by government ministries and agencies, a regulatory
process explained in Chapter 5. See Appendix III for a simplified schematic diagram of
this oilsands mining production process.
Any one firm is too sprawling and complex for most insiders to grasp fully: ‘Guys
who work in a place for thirty years still don’t know how it works’ (B. Millwright). My
methodological approach to overcome this fragmented knowledge relies on weaving
together a narrative derived from informants in combination with technical literature,
reports, and regulatory filings of companies, the province, and nongovernmental
organizations. Continuity of production techniques in the oilsands mines makes
historical archives still relevant sources of insight into industry fundamentals, which is
confirmed in triangulation with the contemporary archive (e.g., Andrews et al. 1968,
Camp 1976, Clark 1929, Dor et al. 1967, Masliyah et al. 2011, Masliyah et al. 2004). As
should be expected when taken alone, these written sources sketch a deceptively
idealized understanding of material and work flows. Despite these limitations, these
descriptions still helpfully contextualize informants’ explanations of various points along
the production process as its complications play out on the ground in practice. And in
turn, informants shed light on the archival descriptions. The result provides some depth
of understanding into the contingency-riddled reality of commodity and waste
production.
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This complexity of oilsands mining operations is exacerbated by material
challenges arising in the vast volumes processed, sheer physical extent of the facility,
boreal climate extremes, and the qualities of bitumen and surrounding geology – as well
as the raft of chemical inputs, variability in production processes akin more to cooking
than assembly, and voluminous atmospheric and solid wastes produced in tandem with
commodities. Moreover, the solution to any one problem in this process of commodity
and waste production typically births a wholly-new challenge previously unknown.
Human error and recklessness is unavoidable under these conditions; however,
such behaviors are promoted by long shifts lasting over a week with few rest days
between and managers from foremen to executives for whom everything but product is
cost. Equipment failure is to be expected under the extreme operating conditions; yet,
ramifications of such failure are amplified by cutting corners in maintenance and
running machinery beyond design limits. An unexpected aspect of this research, but one
now understood as a fundamental facet of informants’ descriptions, is that their
recollections of the production process are often bound with descriptions of equipment
failures, accidents, and unsafe practices often pushed by supervisors.
4.1 Oilsands Mining Production: Sprawling 24/7/365 Process
In the construction, maintenance, and operation of billions of dollars in capital under
remote boreal extremes and hazardous working conditions employing thousands, each
oilsands mining enterprise materializes Promethean feats of engineering and labor that
metabolize raw earth into 1.5 million barrels per day of bitumen and synthetic crude oil,
along with clouds, mountains, and seas of by-product wastes. Comprised of three basic
phases, oilsands mining production begins with open pit mining to recover raw ore.
Then, a warm water flotation plant separates bitumen from pulverized ore; and last this
extracted bitumen undergoes refinery ‘upgrading’ to yield a commodity known widely
as ‘synthetic crude oil’. To achieve this outcome, oilsands mining enterprises combine
two historically unrelated industrial logics, those of surface mining and petroleum
refining. Although many techniques involved in oilsands ore recovery and extraction
long have drawn from the wider mining industry, oilsands mines are distinguished by
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their size and ceaseless operation. Recovered raw ore is bulky, so to achieve scale
economies any one oilsands mine processes volumes comparable with the world’s
largest surface mines. Crucially, these mines remain subservient to the relentless
appetites of their bitumen upgraders, which like oil refineries more broadly, demand a
continuous feed of input material to sustain operations. These upgraders are only shut
down for maintenance on multiyear cycles. Unplanned shutdowns lose income and
entail lengthy costly “restarts.” As a result, though rare in the global mining industry, the
oilsands bitumen mines and upgraders operate 24 hours per day 365 days per year. This
unremitting drive combines with the extensive reserve of bitumen – mine plans run as
long as 50 years (B. Mine) – to make the oilsands the world’s largest mine and mine
waste complex (Camp 1976, Masliyah et al. 2004).
4.2 Mine Preparation: Everything is Waste Except the Ore
After an oilsands mine has obtained government licensing but before ore recovery
operations commence, firms undertake extensive geological core sampling to inform a
detailed iteration of the mine plan, which remains under constant refinements of near
and long-term horizons, according to B. Miner, a senior mining engineer with 25 years of
experience. Next is to “grub and clear” several square miles of endemic tamarack and
peat fens known as muskeg that overlie the uppermost surface of the eventual pit
(Rooney et al. 2012), and subsequently to sink wells to evacuate the saturated
subsurface until water levels have been pushed beneath the projected pit-bottom. Over
the next 2-3 years the muskeg desiccates to the point that a truck-and-shovel corps can
remove it when it is frozen during winter months (Oliver 1975). Although historical
efforts to preserve muskeg were abandoned by some firms, others continue to store
muskeg with intentions to utilize it in future mine reclamation (B. Miner). Once a mine
has been commissioned, these overburden removal operations continue to advance
ahead of the working mine face. After muskeg has been removed work begins to dig
away and relocate clay and drift overburden to expose bituminous strata for extraction.
As in every step of mine development, the technical challenges are substantial. In one
instance the misfortune of one regional mine inadvertently solves the dilemma of
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another. Syncrude’s Aurora mine had long struggled with the challenge of sustaining its
hydrological depressurization; the solution comes abruptly when a nearby Shelloperated mine punches through a limestone cap over the same aquifer at the bottom of
its mine, which instantaneously depressurizes Aurora and creates an artesian well in the
Shell mine (B. Supper, B. Union).
The sheer scope of these preparatory activities prompts one senior mine
engineer to measure performance by the flow of material, where everything but ore is
‘waste’. In this informant’s eyes, all of the boreal forest and peatland, subsurface water,
and earthen overburden, plus additional “inter-burden” encountered deeper in the
mine collectively constitute waste that demands removal and storage in order to expose
bituminous layers:
The waste is in the way of the ore. Without removing the waste, I don’t
have the ore exposed to take to the plant for processing. So, it’s really
simple. The way I look at my job quite simply is I gotta get the waste out
of the way. The ore will take care of itself. It’s there. But you’ve gotta
move the waste. (B. Miner)
A compounding logistical factor is that material released from the pressure of the
geological formation swells volumetrically by twenty percent, and thus, material
handling requirements increase by an equal amount.
Notably, the technological capacity to remove and relocate overburden has been
a historical bottleneck to industrial production. Although the economically practicable
limit of overburden is reported as 250 feet thick actual working oilsands mines
penetrate less. The first contemporary mine, Suncor (1967), exploited bituminous sands
beneath an average of just over 50 feet of overburden, removed with front-end loaders
and 150 ton capacity trucks, following disappointing results with scrapers (Camp 1976).
One of the newer oilsands mines, Kearl has begun to recover bituminous ore under an
average 70 feet of overburden (Eisner 2008). By comparison, during the earlier
pioneering decades, smaller equipment capacities made this same overburden quite
imposing, which drove early mining ventures to glean from surface outcroppings
exposed by fluvial erosion. Particularly in contemporary oilsands mines, much of this
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overburden is reused. For instance, clay is recovered for placement in the cores of dikes
constructed with overburden to contain the post-production “tailings” sludge detailed in
Chapter 6 while gravel is reserved for road construction (Oliver 1975).
Overburden removal aside, before mining can commence the development of an
oilsands mine necessitates firms to build out expansive engineered facilities including to
procure river water, grade for drainage in anticipation of tailings deposition and dikebuilding, construct roads, and deploy a work camp (B. Calgary2). When mining finally
commences it follows a mine plan that aims to open up mineable benches at several
depths to recover raw ore simultaneously from richer deeper geological layers and the
shallower less-rich uppermost bituminous layer (B. Miner, B. Chicken). The blending of
these ore streams is explained below in the discussion of bitumen separation.
4.2.1 Mining oilsands one 100-ton shovelful at a time
It is difficult not to marvel at the magnitude of a contemporary oilsands mining
operation. A twelve-hour shift produces one-half million tons of raw bituminous ore,
taken in 100-ton chomps by monster shovels that dwarf the dinosaurs whose fossilized
bones they periodically chew up in their relentless feast. I observe tourists of Suncor
pose for a photograph before an upright haul truck tire 13-feet in diameter, arm-in-arm
with a coverall-clad driver whom they’ve decided is a hero. The largest Caterpillar 797F
ore hauling trucks (“Fs”) tip the scales at 400 tons gross and carry their equivalent
weight in bitumen ore, 400 tons, which becomes 200 barrels of oil, or US $18,000 at the
time of my study. Given the thirty percent profit margin of the two most established
mines at that time, every truckful pays $6,000 profit to their bottom lines.
The industry’s two pioneers, Suncor followed by Syncrude, commenced
production with two different approaches to large scale earth moving – excavation by
bucketwheel and dragline, respectively – which both loaded conveyor belts with
bituminous ore for delivery to their extraction plants. However, by the 1990s truck-andshovel technology had attained the capacity ratings necessary for firms to achieve
output goals while controlling marginal cost (cf. Camp 1976), and the two firms
migrated operations to that strategy. Suncor completed the switch by 1993, while
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Syncrude did not retire its third dragline until 2006. Management engineers continually
scrutinize truck-and-shovel operations for potential innovations. Frimpong and Hu
(2004), for instance, insist that production optimization initiatives must take into
account bucket dynamics, uneven seasonality and materiality, and their variable
interactions. The motive force powering shovel buckets appears to contribute to hardto-manage lumps, with hydraulic buckets more likely than electric-powered rope units
to generate such unsatisfactory raw material (Tannant and Cyr 2007). Yet, while shoveltype and bucket teeth configurations factor into productivity, variation between
laborers who operate the shovels can range as high as fifty percent (Patnayak et al.
2008). Notably, the newest P&H 4800XPC electric-powered rope shovel features a 135
ton bucket capable of filling 400 ton haul trucks in just three passes, rather than four
(JoyGlobal 2013). Truck-and-shovel is no sacred cow, although it remains the standard.
Suncor invested millions of dollars to field-test technology to crush and slurry at the
mine face and thereby do away with haul trucks; however, it determined capital costs
were too high to pursue (Energy Resources Conservation Board [ERCB] 2010). In the
latest initiative to cut labor costs, oilsands mining firms are pushing ahead with pilot
studies of driverless autonomous haul trucks (Moore 2019).
Oil prices are high during my study; the mines run at full tilt. An associate of B.
Doggy routinely becomes so engrossed in their repetitive tasks as a mine shovel
operator that they forgot to break during 12-hour shifts. (Incidentally, this prospective
informant turns down a direct meeting with me: ‘I have a mortgage to pay,’ was the
reason for declining.) Buddy Bucky operates a 120-ton mine shovel and recalls their
largest load of 482 tons delivered in four passes of the maxed-out bucket onto a Cat
797F haul truck. By comparison, the stalwart Cat 793, a ‘good truck,’ hauls no more than
240 tons (B. Chicken). Each “F” is networked with oilsands operations and Caterpillar’s
headquarters in Peoria, Illinois, to monitor that its usage remains within acceptable
limits. According to B. Bucky, the typical load per 797F ranges from 395 to 405 tons,
because when overloaded as in their record of 482 tons, haul truck drivers are
mandated to dump immediately while the firm is subject to contractual fine. Buddy
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Driver, a heavy equipment operator and “F” driver who claims to have carried 505-ton
ore loads, explains a workaround to detection, which begins by creeping in first gear
away from the mine face to evade the threshold of sensors. Then, ‘when you get to the
incline to climb out of the mine, pop the gearbox into second to throw the load toward
the back of the bed and fool the onboard scale,’ down to 440 tons in this example. The
widespread result of this kind of gamesmanship Buddy reports is an epidemic of blown
tires, cracked wheel rims, even cracked frames. However, B. Pool drives an “F” in a
newer mine carrying only 360-380 tons of oilsands ore, primarily to reduce the
occurrence of throwing loads off the back of the haul truck when it hit unavoidable
potholes. ‘When the shovel gives us a 400-ton load,’ ran their dictum, ‘we take pride in
delivering it all.’ Despite prohibitions, it was common to overload Fs to 110 percent of
rated capacity, and then run them in low gear for short distances (beneath the range of
detection) to remove overburden (B. Chicken).
The key informant B. Chicken had been a heavy equipment operator in the
industry for decades including a long stint as a haul truck driver – ‘meat in the seat,’ in
Buddy’s colorful words. The companies insist contradictorily, they explain, that workers
‘slow down,’ but also, ‘You get that last load at any cost.’ At the same time that safety is
an undeniable matter of concern, mining supervisors’ bonuses are peer-competitive
based upon shift production tracked in terms of distance-adjusted load counts; and the
competition works down to individual haul truck drivers who are compensated based
upon safe driving and tonnage dumped in the crusher hopper. B. Chicken elaborates:
You’re getting incentives to race and you’ve got a bunch of competitive
kids, you know? Twenty-two years old driving an eight-million-dollar haul
truck…with a full load on it…and smoking the tires off it…you see that all
the time. I’m surprised there aren’t more incidents just with reckless
driving. I’ve seen people going just crazy on roads, sliding and slipping
and bouncing. It’s a wonder that more people haven’t been injured.
There is a practical limit to incident reporting in the mine; haul truck wipeouts, minor
dings from shovels, and similar events remain uncounted as ‘incidents’ when they
neither impair equipment nor interrupt production. ‘Just back ‘er out and go’ is the
standard procedure, according to B. Chicken, both to avoid the administrative hassle of
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incident-reporting and to maximize production. However, incident-reporting can reflect
working cliques and vendettas, so some individuals are singled-out (B. Doggy). More on
this system-gaming is detailed below.
In addition to the demands of continuous operation, each step of the process is
fraught within interplays of climatic and geochemical materiality, technology, and
worker’s labor. To a substantial degree historical commercial exploitation of the oilsands
has depended upon the provision of labor power to advance and operate technological
capacity, both facilitated and buffeted by biophysical immutabilities. No phase of
oilsands mining can be construed as routine or simple, beginning with the sub-Arctic
latitude and idiosyncratic ore which is all at once brutally abrasive, tenaciously sticky,
and subject to vertical shearing. The teeth of Syncrude’s first generation mining
equipment were ground down in matters of days, forcing constant replacement
(Syncrude 2010). Throughout the long winter, water in the geological formation
immediately freezes in the mine face, necessitating that these faces be worked
continuously to prevent the needs for explosives treatment to thaw them (Speight
2000). This frigid ore sticks in haul trucks despite beds heated by rerouted hot exhaust
(B. Sailor) and when dumped into the crusher it clogs hopper intakes. At the other
extreme, summer-warmed sticky bituminous sand can coat equipment with as much as
fifty percent of its weight during a single shift of operations (B. Driver, B. Sailor, B.
Chicken, Oliver 1975). Syncrude’s blue ribbon geotechnical board registered surprise
that the firm avoided a catastrophic pit wall collapse during its opening decades of
operations, which relied upon massive draglines perched along the top edges of the
readily-shearing walls (Morgenstern and Scott 1997).
Buddy Chicken describes relentless intervention into the condition of roads and
ramps in the mine pit, which remain operable due to a campaign of continuous
conditioning, grading and repair. Seasonality, weather, and time of day all come into
play to shape the impacts on road surfaces due to the unremitting abuse of fleets of 800
net tons of haul truck and oilsands ore. Roads and ramps in the mine degenerate
unavoidably into potholes and punched-out ramp landings. Especially in upper layers of
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the mines which contain more clay, the same road frozen firm overnight can become
‘slick as snot’ in the afternoon sun, in need of sand to be passable. Overburden removal
operations come to a halt during wet weather because the terrain is too soggy while
less-experienced haul truck drivers shift to smaller trucks to spread sand (B. Drum).
Under harshest conditions, firms deploy seasoned drivers to descend treacherous
slippery ramps in order to continue to push the flow of raw ore. ‘Cause,’ explains B.
Chicken, ‘you gotta feed the monster, you can’t afford to shut down extracting.’
That monster – the unquenchable upgrader -- opens its maw wide in the mine
pit in the form of a gaping crusher hopper into which haul trucks dump their 400-ton
loads for initial processing on the way to the extraction plant. Taking advantage of
comprehensive instrumentation, Sharma and Cheng (2007) quantify the pounding
mechanical stress endured by one such crusher during nonstop operation to screen and
roll-crush ore material while hosting two simultaneous 400 ton haul truck dumps, which
combine to rattle-free the bolts holding-together this machine comparable in size to a 3story office building. Screening systems at this stage aim to remove boulders, marcasite
nodules, fossilized trees and other rejects. Crusher-jamming lumps of ore arise more
frequently in wintertime and more often from the geological formation’s shallower
deposits; and as noted, hydraulic bucket shovels are more likely than electric-powered
rope units to generate problematic lumps.
Crushers play a pivotal role in the relentless effort to blend material recovered
throughout the mine into a predictably-graded input of the bitumen extraction plant.
Relying upon seismic and core data plus experience in the pit, mine engineers
continually re-plan this blending over cycles ranging from the current week to five years
to as long as twenty-five or fifty years – modeling each and every haul truck load of
variably-graded material from shovel to delivery to the extraction plant (B. Miner, B.
Deer). Mine engineers and extraction operations maintain continual communication to
smooth inevitable transitions in ore quality from the mine, such as the transition from
the typically richest middle seam of the McMurray geological formation to the deepest
third seam, a transition that might reduce bitumen content from 12 percent to 8
78

percent. Efforts to smooth the feed grade also extend into real time operations; haul
truck drivers respond to dispatches to pull aside and yield to others hauling ore with a
more desired grade at the moment (B. Pool), or to divert activities away from orehauling (B. Drum). Some mines have automated these alerts (B. Chicken) while others
rely upon dispatchers in need of six years’ experience to reach full competence in
routing variable haul truck loads (B. Doggy).
4.3 Bitumen Separation: Crucial Economic Step
As Chapter 3 notes, Canadians Gesner, Ells, and Clark are historical innovators in
asphaltene and bitumen extraction, which this section explains in terms of the
contemporary oilsands industry. The companies’ extraction plants house the crucial step
of commodity production, an approach to hot water flotation tailored to the oilsands
widely-known as the “Clark Process” in honor of Karl Clark’s leadership in its
development (e.g., Fine Tailings Fundamental Consortium 1995): ‘By itself, [the Clark
Process] does not have a preponderant effect on the economics – but without it there
can be no economics’ (Syncrude 1973, 35).
4.3.1 Tabletop demonstration naturalizes bitumen separation
The basics of bitumen separation can be observed in bi-daily demonstrations at the Oil
Sands Discovery Centre operated by Alberta Culture and Tourism in Fort McMurray.
Simply obtain a fresh softball-sized sample of bituminous ore supplied by the mining
firms, explains a staff member, and place it into a Pyrex beaker about five times larger in
volume; then using splashes of steaming hot water obtained from an electric tea kettle
along with a stout wooden spoon, slowly mash the ore into a thick pulp – a process
known as ablation. Add more hot water to fill the beaker while beating vigorously to
dissolve lumps and create froth, an activity known as aeration. Set aside to rest. After
just a few minutes a discernable black band accumulates at the surface of the otherwise
cloudy beaker filled on the bottom with a layer of sand, a step known as flotation. The
black substance is extracted bitumen, the petroleum “prize” that drives the oilsands
mining industry. The lower two components, the process-contaminated water and
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heavier solids, staff explain, are known collectively as tailings, which they assure
audiences, the industry further treats and impounds.
4.3.2 Challenges of bitumen separation at industrial scale
Complications not apparent in the tabletop demonstration become causes for concern
at industrial scales first achieved by Suncor and Syncrude. The sheer scope and
complexity of operations in practice must continuously negotiate minefields of
contingencies arising in the interplay of fallible human work and technology, geology,
and climate that complicate the actual industrial practices in bitumen separation.
Despite the contemporary industry’s achievements, it continues to wrestle with many of
the same challenges encountered a century ago; namely, how to provision sufficient
freshwater for the process, increase the bitumen separation yield, purify it this
recovered bitumen, and manage the waste produced in the process (Masliyah et al.
2004). To give one example, the same ultra-fine particles in the waste stream that
confound Karl Clark at his pilot plant in Waterways in the 1920s (Ferguson 1986)
continue to defy resolution by the industry today (Masliyah et al. 2011).
In their initial operations, Suncor and Syncrude ablate ore with steam and caustic
soda in rotating drums, 100 feet long and 16 feet in diameter at one plant (B. Cousin),
which although common in mining, undergo unique wear-factors in the oilsands.
However, in most oilsands mine operations today such drums no longer operate; rather,
crushed ore is slurried and piped from distant expansion mines to the primary
extraction plant. The reliance upon piped slurry developed initially as the low-cost
alternative to either unreliable conveyors or too-long haul truck runs for gathering the
output of remote expansion mines such as Syncrude Aurora and Suncor Steepbank and
Millennium (B. Prof); yet in an instance of serendipity, piped oilsands slurry
subsequently was found to achieve much of the primary bitumen extraction process
while reducing reliance on massive tumblers to pulp ore (B. Cousin, Sharma and Cheng
2007). A cost incurred by this strategy is constant maintenance and replacement of
slurry pipelines to counteract the abrasive properties of raw oilsands slurry. Firms
transport this slurry in expensive hard carbon-steel pipes that laborers periodically
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rotate, first 90°, then 180°, and finally end-for-end to even-out the wear and tear and
thereby extend service lives (B. Retiree).
Aeration and flotation steps of bitumen separation occur in towering primary
separation vessels, downwardly-conical structures that in one plant measure 125 feet in
height by 75 feet in diameter across the top. Screened for debris again, caustic
bituminous slurry is further aerated upon injection into the separation vessel. Much as
in the glass beaker demonstration, heavy sand settles into the tapered bottom where
it’s drawn out; aerated bitumen floats in a bubbly froth to the vessel surface, where
guided by rotating rakes it flows to collection drains around the outer rim. Innovations
have reduced the temperatures of flotation water from Clark’s “hot” 180F to “warm”
around 160F. Still, B. Catwalk perches on catwalks in 180F heat over the open tops of
primary separation vessels in order to remove debris manually. In addition to the heat,
salts and acids produce a highly-corrosive atmosphere, which caused one extraction
plant roof to cave in during the industry’s early decades (B. Cousin). Firms set ambitious
control limits for the ore content of slurry entering primary separation vessels; at least
one mine aims to maintain slurry graded to 1/100 percent bitumen and the mine and
extraction managers maintain ongoing communication to ensure this consistency (B.
Miner).
Rapid variation in this feed can hold disastrous consequences. If the bitumen
content spikes too rich, for instance, the separation vessels can well-over and quickly
the plant becomes waist-deep in hot bitumen that subsequently cools to the hardness
of soft rock; or if caught in time, the plant dumps valuable bitumen into waste ponds.
These contingencies plague the industry’s infant years (B. Deer, B. Cousin). The froth
recovered by this primary separation process consists roughly of 60 percent bitumen
and a 40 percent mix of water, bitumen, and solids. Firms add volatile diluent, typically
naphtha or paraffinic solvent, to keep this bituminous compound pipeable, and then
centrifuge it to reduce solids (Masliyah et al. 2011). Despite these efforts, the output of
the centrifuge retains approximately 6 percent water and 2 percent solid particles,
which require another round of filtration prior to delivery to the upgrader (B. Cousin).
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4.3.3 Maintenance of the separation plant due to sand
In the Clark process extraction plant, substantial labor time continuously maintains and
improves the high wear zones of the plant exposed to erosive sand. Indeed, at one firm,
whereas the bitumen upgrader sits with production managers, in the extraction plant
the maintenance manager calls the shots. The cost of catastrophic equipment failure is
high, due less to lost production – as redundant systems can take up the slack – and
rather much more, to the time-consuming cleanup cost of overflowing hot bitumen.
‘This product, it turns to tar and then it turns to cement,’ explains B. Deer, who then
describes the challenge of extending usable lives of metal components exposed to the
gritty raw material processed by stage one separation:
Basically, the main focus in extraction is increasing mean time between
failure. We have a lot of redundant equipment, so we have the option of
taking things down often… because it’s a high wear environment. So, the
piping – generally we have piping last a year – and if we leave it to two or
three years, we’ve got holes. So, we were trying to improve flow
uniformity, flow quality, and mean time between failures. So, we were
changing out pump train components regularly. Our casings, the pump
casings were four inches thick. The minimum on that is 1.2 inches. And
we changed them out every year. So, we were losing 2, 2.5 inches of
material every year.
At this point I interject: ‘That’s very different than run-to-fail. You are doing a
tremendous amount of preventative maintenance or replacement.’ B. Deer agrees,
‘That’s right,’ and details the search for advanced wear-resistant materials:
So, we tried many different hard facing components. So, it’s basically
ultra-high wear material, laser clad, ceramic beads and epoxy, uh, just
high strength high hardness, cast materials… so, we substituted all of
these things in at one time or another just searching for a quarter extra
life, doubling the life. We had some good luck with some of the materials.
We doubled the life of our section liners with a laser clad hard liner, and
we doubled the life of our breaker screens by adding chromite iron blocks
on them instead of a tungsten overlay. And so, we had some excellent
success. In terms of changes of design as well as material.
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4.3.4 Middlings: Materialization of the industry’s challenges
Recall, primary separation recovers only 60 percent of the available bitumen. Suspended
inside the tabletop beaker between floating bitumen froth at the top and hydrophobic
sand at the bottom, a wide band of turbid “middlings” contains mostly water, but also
fine-grained solids and valuable bitumen that failed to rise to the surface in the bubbly
froth. In these peculiar middlings, it is no exaggeration to say, the industry comes faceto-face with its two fundamental challenges, which after a century of research and
development persist. These are, namely, how to optimize bitumen production and how
to cope with its waste. Generations ago, Clark and Pasternack (1949) emphasize the
crucial role of fine clay particles contained within oilsands ore. A threshold
concentration of clay is necessary, they conclude, for bitumen separation to proceed
(Fine Tailings Fundamentals Consortium [FTFC] 1995, Liu 1993); and in addition, they
emphasize, post-extraction, these crucial fine clay particles stubbornly refuse to
precipitate fully out, leaving intractable “middlings” water. From their initial launches,
Suncor and Syncrude subjected middlings to re-frothing in secondary separation cells to
increase bitumen yield and capture fine solids, modifying approaches first attempted by
Clark in the 1920s to improve the recovery rate at Waterways (Ferguson 1986). Tertiary
extraction technologies have added hydro-cyclones followed by yet more frothing and
centrifuging all to boost overall marginal recovery of bitumen above 95 percent; and
also, to capture as many “fine” (<45 microns) clay particulates from the waste stream as
possible in an effort to minimize volumes of the most confounding waste tailings
detailed in Chapter 6.
Bitumen scavenged through secondary methods combines with the product of
primary separation; and as introduced above, these undergo treatment with diluent to
remove water and decrease viscosity so this diluted bitumen (“dilbit”) will flow, and
then centrifuging to reduce solids as well as additional filtration, hydro cyclone
treatment, further frothing etc. to squeeze out bitumen and ultrafine solid particulates
(Rao and Liu 2013). Suncor claims 98 percent bitumen recovery in its Millennial mine
operations. This purified dilbit travels first to a battery of storage tanks that inventory a
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buffer supply of diluted bitumen, chief input into the upgrading process discussed in the
next section. Before that, however, it bears emphasizing that for nearly a century, water
flotation has enabled oilsands bitumen extraction. Yet, only with recent advancements
in analytical instrumentation – particularly atomic microscopy – emphasize Masliyah et
al. (2004), has the molecular process of bitumen separation begun to come into focus,
leading for instance to revisions in Clark’s widely-reproduced sketch-theory of the
bitumen/sand/water/clay matrix.
4.4 Bitumen Upgrading to Add More Value
As detailed in Chapter 3, Karl Clark (1929) reasons early on that the market for oilsands
bitumen for road surfacing was limited, although that application had driven federal and
provincial research up to that time. The greater potential lay in transportation fuels,
Clark concludes, which necessitates refinement beyond recovery of purified bitumen
alone. In furtherance of this objective, the oilsands mining industry has developed an
“upgrading” process of thermal and pressurized refining techniques to both extract
lighter compounds from heavier bitumen “bottoms” and to remove noxious sulfur and
ammonia, thereby yielding a blended liquid hydrocarbon known generically as synthetic
crude oil (SCO).
Although each of the first four oilsands mining enterprises (Suncor, Syncrude,
Shell, and CNRL) is predicated on the production of fully-upgraded SCO, a market for
dilbit has developed among Midwestern and Gulf refineries with facilities to handle
heavy feedstock. The industry’s two newest mines, the Kearl Oil Sands Project owned by
Imperial Oil and the Fort Hills operation run by Suncor, specifically target this dilbit
market to avoid capital and operating costs associated with upgraders in northern
Alberta. Indeed, while SCO remains a core product, the other firms also market lesscomplete blends such as dilbit and sulfur-heavy (“sour”) SCO.
Informants provided insights into these upgrader sub-activities. Consistent with
findings above with respect to mining and separation stages, my research uncovers an
upgrading process fraught by interactions of fallible technology, climactic and material
contingencies, capital priorities, and human unpredictability that complicate its
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operation. Upgrading produces synthetic crude oil in a two-stage, thermal/chemical,
process. Stage one, known as “coking,” draws dilbit from inventory in storage tanks and
warms it to about 500F in order to recover the volatile naphtha fraction, which is reused
as diluent. Furnace-powered cokers then heat bitumen to 900-1,000F in order to boil off
and then re-condense hydrocarbon gases and oils contained within the bitumen,
notably naphtha, kerosene and gasoil, leaving behind petroleum coke as waste. Step
two of the upgrading process takes in the oil products of first stage coking, and through
applications of hydrogen, catalysts, heat, pressure, vacuum, and additional distillation
refines these feedstocks further while removing sulfur and nitrogen, which results in
synthetic crude (cf. Speight and Moschopedis 1981).
Organized labor pushes for construction of new upgraders in the province,
particularly expansion of the existing concentration in “upgrader alley” northeast of
Edmonton in the Fort Saskatchewan vicinity, also promoted as the “heartland”. Graffiti
at the base of a new Fort McMurray overpass shouts, “REFINE IT HERE,” in eight-foothigh letters. Notably, the Alberta government is an investor in an Edmonton-area
upgrader that processes bitumen obtained in “payment-in-kind” schemes where the
province accepts dilbit in lieu of cash royalties, which to date has been a money losing
arrangement for the province (Morgan 2021).
4.4.1 Coking to remove the heaviest “bottoms” from the separated bitumen
If the crucial step of commodification is the separation of bitumen from its ore matrix,
then the highest marginal value is added in the coking process. For Suncor, Syncrude,
and CNRL the firms hosting mine-side upgraders, the coker is the ‘very heart’ of the
enterprise avers B. Calgary, a key informant with wide experience in management
initiatives involving batch coking. Sticking with this analogy, the need to sustain a
ceaseless coker heartbeat becomes all the more imperative at Syncrude, where reliance
on a continuous “fluidized” coking process means that any significant interruption of the
bitumen feedstock can result in catastrophic shutdowns, and thus the entire enterprise
feels the pressure to sustain the coker (Hyndman 1981, 646). By one internal estimate, if
Syncrude’s coker loses its bitumen input for one to two hours, the resulting two-month
shutdown and restart requires 2,000 additional laborers (Kruger 2008). To avoids such
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calamity, the company implements ad hoc fixes to keep its coker running. For example,
one firm purchases a fleet of [industrial vacuum] ‘sucker trucks’ so a small business can
operate nonstop for two years to mitigate a chronic fluid leak, which otherwise would
have required a coker shutdown to repair – ‘they made buddy a millionaire’ (B. Cousin).
Tried and True Batch Coking
Standard Oil of Indiana’s Whiting refinery first developed petroleum batch
coking in the early 1910s to squeeze recoverable gasoline from the distillation fraction
known as gasoil in order to capitalize the surging demand of automobiles (Wilson 1928).
This technology, also known as delayed coking, remains widely deployed worldwide to
process heavy oil feedstock, and was adaptable to the even heavier oilsands.
In B. Calgary’s thinking, the central issue in batch coking is how industry veterans
present it as a straightforward operation with ample margins for error. The functional
flow chart is simple after all. However, the complexities of material, human operators,
and the reaction vessels (‘that’s a lot of valves’) translate into practices of bitumen
coking historically fraught with mishaps. Buddy Deer specifies selected causes of failure:
cracks, improper sealing, and operator error resulting in valves opened at improper
times.
Batch coking works by charging a coker drum with bitumen heated to above
900F in order to draw off volatized lighter hydrocarbon gases and liquids into a
distillation column known as a “fractionator” that condenses the volatized compounds
into three chief fractions: naphtha (sent to the extraction plant for use as a bitumen
diluent), kerosene and gasoil sent to secondary upgrading. Batch coking in particular is a
brute thermal approach to ‘cracking’ heavy bitumen explains B. Calgary: ‘basically…
we’ve got a really heavy feed so we’re just gonna heat the crap out of it, then the
heaviest stuff will turn into coke and then we’ll have something lighter that comes out
the back end’ (cf. Berger and Anderson 1981). Heavier constituents of the bitumen left
behind bake into coke deposited inside the drum which, once filled, ends the process.
High pressure water drills remove annealed coke leftover from the process (Ellis and
Paul 1998, B. Shower). Hot waste coke goes to the coke dump. In a breakthrough,
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Suncor has streamlined its coking process from 13 to 11 hours, thereby enabling one full
cycle within each twelve-hour shift (B. Deer). One strategic advantage of delayed coking
is that the process starts and stops by design, thereby avoiding the ceaseless bitumen
feed demanded by fluidized cokers. On the downside in the view of B. Calgary, the
turnaround process of batch coking opens the door to failures and the copious dumping
of coke reflects a chemically-clumsy use of the bitumen feedstock.
Although Syncrude and Shell deploy technological advancements over delayed
coking described below, CNRL commences production in 2009 using a delayed coker.
Suncor expands delayed coking for its remote Millennium mine brought online in 2008.
Delayed coking has been the tried-and-true bankable technology according to B.
Calgary, who recalls a consultant’s presentation that compares new technology
adoption cycles by all industry (5-7 years) to the petroleum industry (20 years). As in any
business reducing capital risk is a key goal, and to that end, ‘It’s all in the design phase’
instructs B. Rabbit, who illustrates the point with Syncrude’s upgrader extension UE-1 as
the ‘perfect example of poor design.’ CNRL’s multi-train upgrader design was a clear
effort to steer clear of such complexities. Yet, B. Rabbit continues, design alone does not
fully predict actual performance. Syncrude pipes product while newer CNRL has been
buggy and accident-prone.
Fluidized Coking – innovative technology
The three fluidized bed cokers installed at Syncrude are the world’s largest, and
by no means simple. The technology license owner is Exxon-Mobil and enables the
injection of hydrogen into the coking process and partial desulfurization in a continuous
– as opposed to batch – process. One advantage of fluidized coking is that coke dust
rendered by the process can be combusted to stoke the coker and its furnace; another
waste product, carbon monoxide, is similarly burned as fuel for heat (Spragins 1978).
However, as discussed further below, in practice this setup has been a source of
unreliability.
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Non-Coking
Oilsands mines first developed by Shell maintain an adjacent extraction plant
that notably implements an innovative paraffinic process to produce a form of dilbit
that travels by pipeline to an upgrader northeast of Edmonton where direct
hydrotreating – sans coking – refines it into a synthetic crude blend. The Shell solution is
more elegant chemically than the Clark process in the eyes of B. Calgary who, without
intending to copy Shell’s operation, theorizes a similar strategy through personal
research conducted during idle hours. The newer Kearl and Fort Hills mines deploy
comparable paraffinic approaches. To be sure, this non-coking technology remains
noxious, captured by the catchphrase of an engineer who worked at this Shell upgrader:
‘We’re not making rainbows and unicorns,’ sardonically recalls B. Show.
4.4.2 Secondary upgrading: Wicked challenge of sustaining heat
The output of the coker is a heavy gasoil with high sulfur content not unfamiliar in the
spectrum of liquid crude oils recovered in selected global reserves. To this end, the
oilsands firms’ secondary upgraders are comparable to conventional refineries, which
process a continuous supply of feedstock through a series of hydrotreaters and
fractionators operating under various conditions of heat and vacuum to produce
synthetic crude oil as the highest value output. Maintenance engineer B. Show is
involved in seven plants in secondary upgrading, which are involved in several
descriptions in the remainder of this chapter.
Wicked Challenge of Sustaining Heat
Electrician B. Scofflaw emphasizes that bitumen upgrading relies upon chemical
alterations impelled by a series of “thermal cracking” steps. A lattice of “steam tracings”
and insulation envelops miles and miles of pipes and hydrotreaters to maintain heat in
the process. One upgrader utility plant distributes steam for year-round use by some
plant facilities but only seasonally by others. Whereas the processing plant operators
and engineers would prefer 203F steam, the utilities plant strived to stay above a 198F
minimum, a goal profoundly complicated by frigid winters. A typical hydrotreater is
wrapped by 1,500 to 2,000 steam tracers joined by a manifold to the main steam supply
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line; at one time constructed of jointed pipe but today largely of tubing, each tracer is
100 to 300 feet long, with the return portion of each tracer circuit collecting condensate
into a water recovery manifold. Operational pressures run around 50-100psi, a scalding
danger yet not explosive (B. Calgary, B. Rabbit, B. Panel, B. Show).
Numerous informants explain how in the wintertime leaks in steam tracings
freeze on contact with frigid air resulting in the buildup of massive “ice castles”. I had
developed the impression that steam tracing leaks go hand-in-hand with the business.
Buddy Calgary heartily dissents: ‘I would challenge that mindset. Petrochemical plants
that I came from [in cold Alberta], didn’t have or accept leaks. So, I mean I don’t know,
I’m not a materials or inspection engineer, so I don’t know the underlying issues of
exactly why these plants have a lot more steam leaks than we had,’ before conceding
that the volumes, pressures, and distances involving steam and oilsands upgrading were
all contributing factors. ‘They have more steam going all over the place,’ was Buddy’s
shorthand concession. A sub-section below concerned with unresolved maintenance
issues, returns to these steam tracings, ice castles, and tragic consequences.
Almost to a person this contingency of frigid conditions is explained in the
shorthand expression, “forty below,” which happens to be the point where Fahrenheit
and Centigrade scales correspond with each other. Early GCOS operations overcame
many cold weather obstacles, yet operations ceased when temperature reached ‘minus
40’ (Great Plains Research Consultants 1984, 115). Oilsands operations must be
designed to function at -40C (Speight 2000). During the 1978-79 winter, Syncrude
gained invaluable experience with the ‘harsh realities’ of mining and materials handling
‘at forty degrees below zero’ (Scott 1981, 43). A short dialog with key informant B.
Rabbit conveys the limits imposed by the cold:
B. Rabbit: Forty below is when you start to have problems.
HD: Problems?
B. Rabbit: Pro....blems... in the plant. Forty-two below is where you start calling
people.
HD: What kind of people?
B. Rabbit: It’s like Ghostbusters, who you gonna call?
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In B. Rabbit’s particular example, the challenge is maintaining heat and fluid operations
across the upgrader, especially alarming, ‘when flames die’ at minus forty-three.
4.4.3 Upgrader operations: Cruise control with high-stakes contingencies
Standing aside the upgrader a single-story blast-resistant building houses the most elite
tradespeople of the upgrader, plant operators who labor in its inner sanctum known as
the control room. When compared with the facility’s conventional outer office space,
the new ergonomic control room is all the more striking. Entering through swinging
doors gives the impression of passing an air-lock. The resonance of the tiled utilitarian
corridor gives way to hushed stillness while stark white walls, floors and ceiling are left
behind for a pallet of warm grays rather dimly lit but for directed spotlighting of several
dozen operator workstations. Each workstation hosts multiple LCD screens with
numerical, graphical, and schematic data that enabled operators to run their individual
plants, telephone and radio to coordinate with other plant operators and to
communicate with field engineers within the plant itself. Several informants are
experienced engineers who rarely—sometimes never—step foot in the plants
themselves.
Under the best of conditions, the tasks of these panel operators can be
compared to rural driving with cruise control or flying with autopilot, explains B. Rabbit,
a key informant knowledgeable in instrumentation and control across the upgrader.
While operators must remain vigilant, during halcyon stretches an occasional minor
adjustment holds plants well within control limits. However, stresses B. Rabbit, ‘The real
skill is how to cope with the unpredictable part of the processes we use…. Everything is
good when it’s good, but how do you handle it when it’s bad?’ Here is where the
challenge of an effective control room becomes clearer. Given that the upgrader
contains approximately 90,000 pumps and valves in aggregate, operators require that
workstations not bombard them about normal process fluctuations – even those into
the ‘red’ zone. At the same time, they need prompt alarms ahead of emergent failures –
especially boiler trips and upsets. Buddy Rabbit role-plays:
“And if I have to do something, make it simple so I get it done quickly.”
Cause [the operator’s] on the radio telling some guy out there, and it
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could be a safety issue…. What’s been recognized is that ultimately the
operator, if he misses the clue that’s gonna give him the warning to save
the day, millions of dollars, lives… or I should say in the right order, lives
and…then that’s what it’s all about.
With so many operating parameters and permutations – for instance flows can change
abruptly while temperatures are more stable was B. Rabbit’s example – and continues:
The combination of that could be very confusing. So, when a boiler trips
and there’s lots of heat and lots of steam, there’s a dangerous position,
there is danger [of fire]; [the operator] has to eliminate the danger
before he identifies the problem.
Thus, a well-designed alarm commands precipitous actions without the need to explain
the rationale, the accuracy of which the operator and process engineers later determine
in due course.
4.4.4 Continual flaring: Manifestation of upgrader variability
By design, upgraders burn flares continually to vent-off ‘overpressures’ of short-chain
hydrocarbons no heavier than butane, which are too light to be commoditized (B. Deer).
“Upsets” in the process are the second chief cause of flaring. When batch cokers
shutdown half-way through a cycle (or fluidized cokers shutdown anytime), for instance,
a significant volume of partially processed gas would damage the downstream
hydrotreaters and no capacity exists to store massive quantities of vaporous
hydrocarbon; simply no alternative remains to venting/flaring the material. ‘Most of the
flares are tied in to our safety valves, which is part of the point of the flare system,’ B.
Deer explains:
Because we have a lot of systems that carry material that is really
dangerous to people; so, if there’s ever an overpressure event in that
system you want that to vent out of the plant and to some safe disposal
area, which is the flare. So, for us, when we have to dump to flare, there
really isn’t (sic) a lot of secondary options.
During coker upsets the most prevalent flared substances may be sulfur dioxide (SO 2),
dumped nonstop for several days in extreme circumstances. Other common substances
produced/used by the process and ‘really dangerous to people’ include hydrogen sulfide
(H2S) and carbon monoxide (CO).
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Sulfur and Nitrate - ‘We run a very sour process’ (B. Shred)
Oilsands firms fix and remove sulfur from cokers and hydrotreaters, both to
prevent production rates from slipping, and damage to other plants in secondary stage
upgrading (B. Shred). Thus, sulfur compounds are frequent constituents of sustained
heavy flaring (Timoney and Lee 2013, B. Deer). Two ubiquitous sulfur compounds in the
upgrader are deadly hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and sulfur dioxide (SO2), emissions of which
are capped by provisions in operating agreements, yet, frequently exceeded during
upsets and restarts. Known as “sour gas” and highly toxic to humans, hydrogen sulfide is
heavier than air, so it sinks and pools on the ground and in depressions. Buddy Boom, a
safety expert, cautions one must never approach a downed worker in a depression due
to the risk of H2S. Buddy Cousin recalls once walking through the upgrader and glancing
down, shocked at the black air below waist level – H2S levels were ‘off the charts’. Sour
water strippers in the upgrading process use steam-blast to remove hydrogen sulfide
and ammonia from hydrocarbons. The former is purified and pressurized to several
hundred pounds, and then burned as a fuel source; the latter is fixed as nitrate for sale
to the fertilizer industry.
Sheet metal worker B. Sauna3 is nearing completion of a multiyear long-distance
commute to work in construction of the Syncrude SERP (Sulfur Emissions Reduction
Plant), which will enable the firm, they explain, to increase production while remaining
compliant under existing emissions caps. ‘Anyone with a brain knows they’re not going
to reduce their overall discharge,’ they scoff, but then add, ‘I’m proud to work on it. It’s
the first of its kind in the world. Lots of people think they don’t do anything up here with
the environment.’
4.4.5 Costly fires, upsets, shutdowns, startups, and turnarounds
If we return for a moment to B. Calgary’s analogy of coker qua heart, then all of the
upgraders suffer recurring infarctions which blow up as fires in their cokers and
connected systems. Whether firms have deployed batch or continuous processes,
catastrophic coker fires have plagued the oilsands industry from the start and continue
with regularity. Timoney and Lee’s (2013) survey of environmental incidents reported to
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Alberta Environment 1996-2012 identifies several coker fires: CNRL (2011, 2012), Suncor
(2003, 2008), Syncrude (1996, 2000, 2012). However, they concede the dataset is
incomplete, apparently confirmed by press accounts of additional coker fires during
their study period: Suncor (2009) and Syncrude (Canadian Press 2007). Shell’s Scotford
Upgrader does not operate a coker; nevertheless, it has not been immune to fires
(Reuters 2007). Moreover, fires erupt in other areas of the upgrader, for instance in
2005 Suncor’s fractionator burned out of control in an electrical fire (Ebner 2007). The
20-year ticketed electrician B. Scofflaw marvels how that fire melted #9 chrome into an
ingot, ‘because we didn’t use the proper fireproof shields, because they were ordered
wrong but the drive for ‘do it now, now, now’ overrides the decision,’ is the explanation.
4.5 Operations Management: “Production, Safety, Environment” Versus “Production,
Production, Production”
Recall from Chapter 1 that ecological modernization theorizes neoliberal rollout can
facilitate scientific advancements in industrial efficiency sufficient to achieve
breakthroughs in environmental abatement and remediation (Mol 2001, Mol 1995).
Also described in Chapter 1, geographical literature concedes some neoliberalization
projects apparently achieve a degree of ecological modernization’s promises. The
oilsands firms call this the “triple bottom line” of “production, safety, environment.”
The limits of the safety component of the triple bottom line become clear in the
actual practices of labor and management, gleaned from interview data that this section
highlights. ‘I’ve seen a lot of people being killed out there,’ recounts B. Doggy: People
crushed, ‘he looked like somebody stepped on a package of ketchup, all they found was
his boots’; and people burned fatally when a pipeline under construction fills with gas
and then ignites, ‘basically turning into a flame thrower, frying them.’ Although some of
these occurred as long ago as the 1990s, B. Doggy insists, ‘Things still happen today that
they keep hush-hush. Everything’s confidential; we’re not allowed to talk about it. They
pay you off.’ Buddy Chicken confirms one such quiet payout ‘to the widow’ related to an
accident involving an – at the time – newly deploying Cat 797F haul truck.
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Two general types of mishaps are most prevalent, those due to human error and
those due to equipment failure. B. Cousin, whose career begins in the early days of
Syncrude, reflects ‘I can’t believe I survived,’ and marvels how fatal accidents remain
limited to at most a few workers at a time, rather than the hundreds who could be
involved in any given incident. B. Chicken repeats, ‘dodged a bullet’ in recalling
numerous close calls. Laborers face additional risk exposure due to managers’ cavalier
adherence to safety guidelines and aversion to maintenance expenditures.
4.5.1 Tacitly promoted recklessness can be fatal
Mundane risks occur daily, such as jumping down ten feet from haul truck cabs
suspended in the air when full loads of frozen ore stick in the beds after attempts to
dump them (B. Chicken). An undercurrent of thought among my informants insists the
firms’ abandonment of the master-apprentice process of job training has left numerous
workers undertrained and thus at higher risk of incidents. A young worker drops a
wrench into the bottom of an apparently empty tank and then, climbing down to
retrieve it, collapses. Their work partner descends to assist and they both die,
succumbing to poisonous hydrogen sulfide gas (B. Boom). Inexperienced workers
attempt to thaw a stuck valve on a vacuum “sucker” truck in the frigid winter. Yet,
instead of applying steam, they employ a propane torch, which blows up the gaseous
contents of the truck and kills three (B. Cousin). The truck is there in the first place to
remediate a chronic leak that would require a coker shutdown to repair, a contingency,
as explained above, to be avoided. Asked if machismo gets in the way of proper safety
procedures, B. Boom answers with an example from a pipeline, workers using
sledgehammers to pound couplings into place – metal on metal – without ear
protection. Buddy brings it up to the foreman, and the next day sees the pipeline
workers standing in the same position with their fingers in their ears. Thus, Buddy
knows they took their advice to heart, but workers don’t use free earplugs. Buddy
Lighter is working in a trench fitting new pipe when a contractor’s ‘owner’s son in his
Hush Puppies’ shows initiative by climbing into a vacant excavator to accelerate the
work pace. Everything proceeds smoothly for some time, until he tears into a 42-inch oil
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pipe. ‘It looked like Jed Clampett’ within minutes as more than an acre floods ankle
deep in oil.
Even experienced workers are not immune to life-threatening mistakes. ‘I’ve
seen a guy, a welder, inhale some gas from a certain kind of pipe that wasn’t supposed
to be cut… talking to first aid, next thing you know he’s on the floor with red welts all
over his face and he couldn’t breathe’ (B. Doggy). Despite exhaustive safety procedures
to conduct scuba maintenance in tailings ponds, a diver drowns because in a faraway
control room a person with best intentions turns-on what appears to be a senselessly
idle pump, a fatal error made possible by a control panel left unlocked (B. Cousin). With
25 years’ experience in trades and carpentry, B. Carpenter is fired after dropping a
scaffolding pipe 80 feet to the ground. Although the mishap causes no injuries, the
timing is misfortunate as the pipe lands, bounces and rattles at the feet of executives on
tour being led by a foreman who all day has been ‘bird-dogging’ to make a show as the
project is behind schedule. Buddy, who is dismissed summarily, concedes sleep
deprivation could have played a role. Over the preceding month Buddy had been
allowed to push the policy limit of 18 break-free days of work followed by 3 days off;
instead logging 16 twelve-hour days on the job, one day off, then 12 more twelve-hour
days of work followed by 2 days off.
4.5.2 Deferred/improper maintenance and run-to-fail
Deferred and improper maintenance and run-to-fail is a common hazard embedded
throughout operations: contractors running haul truck tires to blowouts (B. Chicken),
and valves run until they rupture in a ‘firefighting’ approach to upgrader maintenance
(B. Show, B. Rabbit). Other examples throughout the process include intervening with
leak boxes to catch drips rather than replacing leaking valves (B. Show) and employing a
fleet of high-volume vacuum (“sucker”) trucks to avoid a coker shut down (B. Cousin).
Inventoried parts for a coker are cannibalized to hold together other sections of day-today operations; these supplies are not replenished, leaving no backup parts (B. Hockey).
The corrosive atmosphere of extraction leads to the partial cave-in of a plant roof in the
industry’s early decades; yet, rather than replace it immediately, a Jerry-rigged stopgap
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fills the breach for five years before permanent repairs take place. Buddy Cousin
recounts the tale to underscore the logic of the firm: ‘The buildings don’t make money.
The people don’t make money. Only the product makes money.’ A catastrophic
electrical fire at Suncor in 2005 stems from the pressure to ‘do it now, do it now, do it
now,’ rather than wait for proper heat shields, which had been improperly ordered (B.
Scofflaw).
Given the imperative of mine production, one example of improper maintenance
is particularly odd in its seeming counter-productivity. Buddy Hockey describes the
challenge of delivering high voltage to power the large mining shovels. Crucially, 13.4 kV
switches can fail due to cold and lack of maintenance. Even under normal operating
conditions these switch connections heat to almost 400F, but B. Hockey describes an
internal review that uncovers some stainless-steel switches melted half-through due to
arcing. The melting point of stainless is at least 2500F.22 No further inquiries seek to
resolve the matter. Moreover, the firm’s purchasers fail to heed a senior journeyman and
instead continue to acquire cheaper aluminum switches, which are not up to the rigors of
the climactic conditions and thus fail in a year. These high voltage electrical failures are
particularly hazardous, Buddy emphasizes, in the vicinity of petrochemicals under heat
and pressure. A seeming contradiction lies in the cost of switch failure, which takes a
shovel out of production for at least one full day. Buddy Hockey makes it clear the cost of
a stainless switch is a fraction of lost shovel productivity, valued at the time: 10
trucks/hour*24hr*$18k/truck = $4.3 million in revenue.
One widely-discussed fatality fits into this category of lack of maintenance due to
cost avoidance. On New Year’s Eve 2008 a field technician is alone outside in dark frigid
conditions on the upgrader catwalks when an overhead “ice castle” weighing up to
several tons gives way and crashes upon him, causing death. In 2011 the company is
found liable under the Alberta Occupational Health and Safety Act. As a result, it is fined
a $11,500 and ordered to pay an additional $365,000 to fund Fort McMurray-based
Keyano College to train workers about ‘hazard assessments, awareness and control in
22

https://www.thyssenkrupp-materials.co.uk/stainless-steel-melting-points.html (accessed 26-Aug-21)
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relation to winter conditions and the formation of ice,’ plus a final $100,000 in student
assistance (Gerson 2011). This penalty fails to align with the material circumstances; lack
of maintenance – not awareness – is the cause of the fatality. Buddy Show offers a
closer account:
So, we’ve got the fatality on the books. Of someone killed by ice created
by a failed steam tracer. On a line that’s falling apart. Two years after that
fatality, or one year I think, occupational health and safety arrived on site
to conclude their investigation.
This is Alberta occupation. So, this is the police as far as safety is
concerned. Came to get the permit to go into the area and was told by
the permit writer that they could not enter the area. The occupational
health and safety guys are asking why and they said, “there’s too much
ice overhead, you can’t go in there” (laughter).
Needless to say, the next day the guilty verdict was rendered. I
was involved in discussions about needing to get that line fixed. I actually
never linked it to the fatality. I never understood that had happened at
the same place... but multiple, multiple discussions about, “no you can’t
have those contractors right now. Um… we’ve got too many FTEs
employed in maintenance right now.” They’re working on other
priorities. Like should it be a higher priority than what killed someone last
year? So, I guess that’s one decision: production, or money, totally
overrode safety. In the face of the safety police on site.
Exact same situation as far as I’m concerned. Multiple safety
observations – you’re talking like 100 entered – by the rank-and-file
employees over the course of this preceding winter about the worsening
conditions in our hydrotreater. And then in April, the senior manager
telling us, “No, we’re dismissing your steam workforce”. And us going,
“Hey, did you get out there to look at it?” “No, I didn’t make it out there
this year.”
Failed steam tracers. Creating these huge ice castles. I mean I
walked staircases this winter that you couldn’t actually see the stairs
because the cloud of steam I was walking into was too big. And hanging
off the bottom of that grating would have been like an iceberg the size of
an elephant. That could let go at any time. No structural integrity. Those
are two decisions that I was privy to where production overrode safety.
They’re just leaking though, they’re not failed. You can still pound
steam through them. Especially since that ice castle almost effectively
seals it. The steam will shoot past. So, you can probably maintain your
temperatures.
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I ask: ‘Would it be when the operator says “I can’t maintain my temperatures”
that maybe something would get fixed?’
Yeah, maybe they fix that tracer. And that would be the kind of job that
would come as a break-in, right? The hydrotreater is gonna be down if
you don’t fix this! We’re literally pulling guys off who are fixing the other
failed tracers to go fix this one. “That one’s important? Yeah, of course, it
affects production.”’
Other plant failures present undeniably immediate hazards.
B. Shower volunteers an anecdote in which they and two co-workers dodge
serious injury: Walking down a corridor inside the naphtha recovery unit, B. Shower
comes across a leaking pump with its status light lit. ‘The thing is the guy ahead of me
walked right past it, young, say twenty-two. I didn’t say anything because I didn’t want
him to lose his job.’ With misfortunate timing, the pump fails catastrophically, instantly
soaking B. Shower head-to-toe with super volatile butane and syrupy gasoil. Fearing a
phone call might cause a spark that sets them on fire, B. Shower walks to the plant’s
control room where they smell B. Shower even before they can open the interior doors,
and emphatically direct them to the emergency shower installed there for just such
contingencies.
In the meantime, two workers – one a gung-ho veteran and one inexperienced –
by some accounts rush directly to the failed pump – and promptly catch fire, yet
fortunately their flames are quelled. As B. Rabbit comments after hearing this anecdote,
there are three possible responses to industrial crises such as this: 1) calm
commonsense response directed by the appropriate operator; 2) recklessness; 3)
turning to emergency handbooks ‘written down ten years ago,’ and thus, meaningless
to current workers. In practice only the first two approaches are taken, explains B.
Rabbit, and seasoned operators usually – but not always – manage to impose the first.
4.5.3 The imperative of production
Despite mine safety rules, supervisors’ bonuses are peer-competitive based upon shift
production tracked in terms of distance-adjusted load counts; and the competition
worked down to individual haul truck drivers whose incentives are based upon safe
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driving and tonnage dumped in the crusher hopper. In the mine pit, the company
contradictorily insists, workers must ‘slow down,’ and also, ‘You get that last load at any
cost’ (B. Chicken). On a related note, road conditioning and maintenance are
unavoidable costs in the oilsands mines. This includes spreading sand to improve
traction and watering to suppress dust, which are carried out by drivers who could
otherwise be engaged hauling oilsands ore. Of course, hauling ore contributes more
directly to managers’ shift performance metrics; thus, not surprisingly, some routinely
neglect dust in particular (B. Chicken). After fire cripples an extraction plant, access to
the area is restricted. ‘We had areas roped off, PCBs, do not enter, and our job was to
go around chipping ice, and when we told the supervisor we couldn’t go in the area he
walked up to it and rip down all the plastic tape and says “yeah, we’re going in there” –
without doing any checks for PCBs’ (B. Bang).
4.5.4 Gaming safety accountability systems
Four types of system-gaming among tradespersons and equipment operators arise
repeatedly in the research. These involve punitive drug testing and its avoidance, hiding
lost time injuries, falsifying trades certification “tickets,” and shirking work. The Alberta
Federation of Labour in Edmonton devotes a 2012 public meeting – which I attend – to
the systemic flaw of the oilsands mines and upgraders, namely, safety regulation:
Occupational health and safety regulators refund portions of the firms workers’
compensation payments as rewards for low claims. The problem is reliance on company
self-reporting; thus, the perverse incentive is to blame workers for accidents or hide
them altogether. On the former, everyone knows companies administer drug screening
(“piss tests”) after every accident in the hope of justifying termination and displacing
liability. A day after B. Boom’s pipeline project shuts down for a safety review there is an
accident. An unattended welder’s line has leaked gas, which collects in the 42-inch pipe
under construction. When the welder re-ignites his torch, the gas accumulation flares in
a fireball that blasts out of the pipe to char a ragged 42-inch black circle on the side of
his truck. After such incidents, an immediate “piss test” is routine; however, the
welder’s helper refuses and quits. This leaves his record clear of what many presume
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would have been a positive reading for THC. Quitting after an accident lets him tell his
next employer that he had to get away from the clear danger, which was proven by the
accident. Lore has it that another strategy of workers is to wear a bag of “clean” urine
close to the body in case a sample is required.
An experience of B. Chicken illustrates the game of hiding lost time injuries. B.
Chicken recalls how the force of a nearby haul truck tire blowout left them with an
eardrum rupture and back injury that made it impossible to drive equipment. Yet,
despite the need for clinical treatment and painkillers, Buddy misses zero days of work.
Rather, every day for several weeks a taxicab would pick them up at home and take
them to an onsite office where they would “work” reading and dozing for eight hours
(paid for twelve) before being taxied back home.
Due to a combination of size, turnover, and contracted labor, the firms simply
cannot keep track of their workers and their qualifications. False credentialing comes up
repeatedly. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers launches a program to
keep counterfeit “tickets” out of Alberta (B. Scofflaw). On a related note, for $500 per
month one can obtain a journeyman carpenter “ticket,” resulting in “carpenters” onsite
who cannot construct a window (B. Bang). It is possible to collect a paycheck without
doing any work – the firms simply cannot keep track. Senior carpenter B. Boston recalls
a maintenance job known amongst insiders as ‘hide and seek for a thousand a week.’
Buddy Bang brags of working for five years as a well-paid lubricator without ever
learning where all the relevant grease nipples are located. Some work avoidance is
detrimental. Buddy Hockey explains a chief cause of failed pump motors is seized
bearings; which an audit confirms is the result of both the failure to follow prescribed
lubrication regiments and also rough handling of filters (‘banging them with broom
handles’), which injects fine debris directly into the heart of motor works in complete
contravention to the purpose of the filter.
In conclusion we see that the production process and its hazards are functions of
stubborn materiality, capital decisions, engineered design, management strictures,
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equipment fallibility, as well as human error and negligence that results from sheer
chance and also the ceaseless drive for production.
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CHAPTER 5. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND SOCIONATURAL RÉGULATION
The continuous interventions of the state into capitalism’s crises are best
understood neither as adjustments to an otherwise stable regime, nor
desperate attempts to stave off inevitable collapse; but rather, state
juridico-political agency is by its own constrained capacity, doomed not
to resolve the crises of its creation. (Offe 1984)
There have been people who have stood up in meetings and said, “the
gas falls like anvils and it’s killing us.” They don’t last long. (B. Scofflaw)
Recall our empirical progress to this point. Chapter 3 locates the Alberta oilsands within
the North American and global petroleum economy as an obdurate socionatural
resource researched and developed by state agents for nearly a century until reaching
the threshold of economic viability in the 1960s, when global petro-capital first takes
root in the oilsands. Chapter 4 traces the present-day process of commodity and waste
production from the oilsands mine, to extraction, to refinery/upgrader, to effluent
stacks and tailings ponds. Special attention is paid to contradictions between the
production imperative and concerns involving laborers’ safety. Chapters 5 investigate
that same production process in relation to provincial environmental regulation, which
involves state agents, nongovernmental agents (including quasi nongovernmental
organizations (“quangos”)), firm self-regulation, and whistleblowers. Informed by
archival and interview data, the chapter first considers the activities of provincial
environmental regulators, before turning to workers’ material practices within the
regime of environmental regulation and their perceptions of their relations with
environment and with environmental activists as well. This culminates with a brief case
that examines the fraught weeks leading up to a new mine’s23 commissioning when
regulated environmental contingencies interfere with the schedules set by petrocapital’s priorities. Looking ahead further, Chapter 6 narrows to the particular case of
environmentally regulated tailings waste produced by the oilsands mines.
5.1 Key Regulatory Agencies During Fieldwork
Folded together today into the Alberta Energy Regulator under the 2013 Responsible
Energy Development Act (REDA), two previously independent agencies are germane to
23

The mine in question will remain unnamed to help preserve confidentiality of informants.
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my fieldwork. The Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) oversaw the oil and gas
industry consistent with the historical priority of petroleum regulation; namely,
“conservation” of production to sustain markets through rationalized extraction that
limits “waste” (Huber 2011, Ise 1926, Nash 1968, Zimmermann 1957). The ERCB was
founded in 1938 (as the Conservation Board) to assert regulatory rationality over
producers in the Turner Valley oil and gas field, Canada’s first western boom. Although a
provincial authority, ERCB economic implications made it, ‘one of the most important
regulatory bodies in Canada,’ prefaces Breen’s (1993) political history. Across the liquid
crude industry, conservation typically specifies oilwell density, for instance one well per
forty acres; whereas, in the oilsands, it sets the lowest quality ore that firms must
process to prevent them from “skimming” the richest seams.
The ERCB granted final approvals and licenses to oilsands firms to launch or
expand extraction operations and exerted some ongoing environmental oversight, but
only after the second agency, Alberta Environment (AENV), had approved applicants’
environmental impact assessments and specified permissible pollution limits and
abatements in ten-year licenses and approvals. AENV coexisted within the hybrid
Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development (AESRD); however, my
interactions stayed within the AENV silo, which oversaw approvals and compliance. To
reiterate, these AENV approvals legalize the discharge of megatons of poisonous and
greenhouse gases and billions of gallons of oily toxic mine tailings generated by the
oilsands production process.
AENV regulated under two main environmental laws: The Environmental
Protection Enhancement Act 1995 (EPEA) was the standard against which applicants’
environmental impact assessments were approved. The 1996 Water Act, although
aimed primarily at agricultural industries (Heinmiller 2013), guided oilsands regulators in
the issuance of licenses to divert and use water, approvals to alter water, and the
specifications of water containment structures. For instance, to divert new water from
the Athabasca River, to befoul that new water in the separation plant, and to construct
and maintain the dikes that contain tailings ponds. AENV asserted four levels of
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regulatory enforcement: warning, administrative penalty, order, and prosecution. The
2012 Lower Athabasca Regional Plan carved out a “Green Zone” of provincial land
managed by AESRD downstream of the oilsands mineable area.
5.1.1 Practical distinction between ERCB and AENV
Buddy Boots distinguishes the two key agencies’ domains of interest. The ERCB regularly
required firms to submit actual production results and, on different schedules, forwardlooking mine plans – both to project royalties payable to the province. Here, Nikiforuk
(2010) exposes the provincial audit process four years in arrears. ‘Their main mandate is
exploitation of the resource,’ explains B. Miner who interacts continually with the
agency. ‘They want yearly mine plans, they want to know how much bitumen we said
we were gonna mine last year, how much did we mine, how much are we gonna mine
next year,’ Buddy continues, ‘ERCB also wants the lease boundary type information. So
those are big ones.’ AENV, meanwhile, was involved in ongoing air and water
monitoring along with wildlife abatements.
Crucially, the operating parameters established under these agencies’ regulatory
permits structures the work of environmental offices and production activity. Firms’
environmental offices remain the sole points of contact when environmental incidents
occur onsite regardless of the point in the production process. ‘Because communication
between a regulating government body is very delicate,’ explains B. Deer,
‘[Environmental incidents] shouldn’t be handled by every pipefitter or engineer. Only by
the authorized folks. That’s the environmental group’ (See also, B. Bear).
The crucial material paradox of the regulated oilsands production process –
further detailed in Chapter 6 – is driven by the ERCB mission to maximize resource
utilization by requiring the industry to mine and process lower grade ore than it would if
economics were the sole consideration. Perversely, extracting bitumen from this lowgrade ore produces a disproportionate quantity of particularly onerous waste that vexes
industry and environmentalists alike.

104

5.2 Shortcomings of Oilsands Environmental Regulation
5.2.1 Development-first environmental approvals
Environmental regulation of the oilsands falls short, both in terms of meaningful public
influence and ecosystem protection. Although the Alberta constitution protects human
right to life and self-determination, the bar is high both on the question of causality and
establishment of standing (Fluker 2015). For instance, a recent provincial judgment
draws the limit on historical suppression of civic involvement in the approval process
when it compels the resistant regulator Alberta Environment to admit public
commentary from people living in the midst of a proposed oilsands development (Fluker
2013). Still, in neighboring Saskatchewan, oilsands operations need give no prior notice
to First Nations inhabitants before commencing exploratory activities (Bankes 2014).
When the “duty to consult” does exist, it has devolved into secretive deal-making
between First Nations bands and petro-capital on a project-to-project basis resulting in
social and ecological fragmentation (Longley 2015, Parlee 2016, Zalik 2016). Regardless
of these deals’ legality, just downstream from Syncrude and Suncor some among the
First Nations Fort McKay band refer to their payments as ‘hush money’ (B. Chicken).
The latest Responsible Energy Development Act (REDA) has intensified alienation
of First Nations and the public – even landowners – from consequential influence in the
provincial fast-track approach to petroleum development (Davison et al. 2018). Adopted
just after my primary fieldwork was completed, REDA rolls up provincial resource
conservation and environmental agencies into a unified entity. Nominally, this new
Alberta Energy Regulator enacts the most aggressive environmental monitoring
obligations in Canada; unfortunately, however, it ultimately invests pro-development
interests with insuperable final say (Olszynski 2014). Pro-industry and toothless by
design, REDA fulfills the decades-long effort by the oilsands mining industry to
streamline the application process into a “single window”; while it fails utterly to
remediate – let alone improve – patchy oversight and poor public influence (Fluker
2014, Vlavianos 2012). This unevenness tracks with the historical sellout of First Nations
and environmental interests to the benefit of hegemonic industrialization, laid bare by
the 19th century land enclosure and 1970s expansion wave (Longley 2021, 2015). As a
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point of emphasis, my informants within the provincial environmental regulator refer to
development applications submitted by oilsands firms as “approvals” in concession to
the foregone outcome of their reviews.
5.2.2 Shoddy records, chronic contraventions, and scant enforcement
Approvals, when finalized, specify their holder’s maximum allowable environmental
impacts – daily tons of sulfur dioxide emissions for instance. In practice however, these
restrictions appear rarely enforced. In response to their project to catalog oilsands
environmental infractions from the ostensibly public provincial Environmental
Management System, Timoney and Lee (2013) are directed to route all requests through
bureaucratic Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy (FOIPP) Act applications.
This disclosure process turns out to be so onerous and incomplete that the researchers
expand their original scope beyond environmental records alone, to include the barriers
to public access. Short of this FOIPP hurdle, the public has no way to track the status or
outcome of incidents. Yet, even then, over the course of three months of requests, the
authors receive ‘erroneous, corrupted output’ (13; see also, 12-30). In the end, they
piece-together 9,262 incidents in the oilsands during the 16½ years between 1996 and
mid-2012, including 4,063 contraventions, or an average rate of 0.67 contraventions per
24 hours throughout the period. This figure assuredly understates the actual frequency
due to redaction, incomplete records, and multiple environmental incidents compiled
into single events, the researchers explain. Perhaps not surprising, eighty-eight percent
(88%) of these incidents are attributable to Suncor, Syncrude, or both given their long
tenure; although, in the last calendar year of fieldwork, Canadian Natural Resources Ltd.
– the third oilsands mine with an onsite upgrader – reports incidents at the same rate as
Suncor (98 and 95 incidents, respectively). Virtually no data is available from prior to
1996. The authors calculate that less than one percent (0.91%) of contraventions suffer
punitive enforcement (2013, 245). Although several informants make it clear the firms
are concerned to avoid negative publicity that a major environmental incident would
provoke (B. Boots, B. Sharp), this low rate of provincial punishment does little to
encourage compliance.
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More fundamentally, independent of the enforcement regime, material
conditions in the oilsands impose structural limits on operational reliability
(Morgenstern and Scott 1997). Informants recount how run-to-fail decisions and safety
shortcuts in the mine and upgrader increase both short-term profit and the probability
of catastrophic incidents. At the same time, the swap-out of old parts also carries a host
of risks due to ill-matched replacement components and lost institutional knowledge.
Thus, if not due to neglect, failure arises in sheer complexity. Timoney and Lee (2013)
concede as much regarding a 2010 coker fire at Suncor that burned into a third day:
‘The incident is a good illustration that the combination of system complexity,
interconnectedness, and the processing of hazardous and flammable materials makes
environmental incidents and resultant impacts essentially inevitable’ (p 57, added
emphasis). Impactful failures feature prominently in the structure of production.
5.2.3 Discursive obfuscation and regulatory failure
A growing body of ecological science pinpoints the industry’s damage to regional air,
water, land, flora, and fauna (Finkel 2018, Gosselin et al. 2010, Hebert 2019, Kelly et al.
2010, Kelly et al. 2009, MacDonald 2013, Pilote et al. 2018, Rooney et al. 2012, Timoney
and Lee 2009, Thomas et al. 2020, Tolton et al. 2012, Wells et al. 2008). Rather than
redress these and other shortcomings, both Alberta and the industry promulgate
discursive campaigns to counter the industry’s critics and downplay environmental
destruction in the oilsands (Adkin and Stares 2016). Arguably most condemnable is
suppression of public access to information about resultant environmental outcomes,
which in the eyes of Smandych and Kueneman (2010) elevate to criminal culpability.
These activities reinforce a half-century process of center-right developmentalism
(Adkin 2016, Haluza-DeLay and Carter 2016, Pratt 1976). In point of fact, as Chapter 3
describes, Alberta has been a petro-state devoted to exploiting the oilsands since its
1905 confederation with Canada (Chastko 2004, Davidson and Gismondi 2011), in line
with the longer North American petro-economy. More recently on top of this historical
agenda to shape consent, provincial and federal governments have securitized the
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oilsands to thereby justify heavy-handed coercion of activists and opponents (Le Billon
and Carter 2010).24
The overall picture of the oilsands paints Alberta at the precipice of regulatory
failure with open gaps between permitted practice and actual performance, or between
regulatory under-enforcement and the capacity of regional ecologies to withstand
industrial damage (cf. Drummond 1996). These problems appear to exemplify what
Young and Keil (2007) identify in other words as the urgent need for research to specify
‘what can and what cannot be regulated successfully in the nature-society relationship’
(143). The situation is so dire even staid industry sympathizers have concluded the
credibility of provincial and federal environmental oversight has been so damaged, only
an independent review board can rebuild its integrity Dowdeswell et al. 2010, Wallace
et al. 2012).
5.3 Environmental Regulation in Practice
Without disputing the “regulatory failure” thesis, indeed again as noted, in marshaling
evidence that supports it, the remainder of this chapter digs into the details of
structured work – of both regulators and firm workers, both blue and white collar – and
their minute-to-minute activities that in aggregate produce the firm’s regulatory
non/compliance. Informed by an ethnographic method that combines interview,
participant observation, and archival sources, my focus aims always at the moments
laborers and government agents are translating the production strategy vis-à-vis the
objects of environmental regulation, invariably co-constituted with obdurate
materiality. These informants portray environmental and safety regulation as a
continuous set of practices among firms and the state, inhabitants and laborers, NGOs,
as well as material nature. Oilsands work is undeniably structured by environmental
rules on the one hand, yet on the other, these are inadequate to prevent the impacts
identified by ecological scientists described above.
To be clear, the intersection of labor with environmental regulation runs beyond
idealized procedures to include a raft of underreporting, gaming, luck, and
24

See the description of my 2011 border crossing in the Methodological Approach section 2.4.
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nonregulation. Regardless, most labor unfolds within the structured drive to produce,
which engenders associated safety and environmental impacts. Work rules stress
adherence to safety and environmental strictures; however, every management level
from foremen to executive pushes the envelope of environmental compliance. On top
of that, material conditions produce ever-present variations, upsets, and failures,
exacerbated by maintenance regimes pushing to the edge of failure. In a study that
prompts withering criticism of environmental regulation over the oilsands, Timoney and
Lee (2013) concede the structural limits of environmental strictures:
The bitumen operations are technologically complex, functionally
interconnected, and large. The operations are run to maximize
production. Large volumes of hazardous materials are used, processed,
or released every day. Because the plants run at maximum rates, at high
pressure and high volume, any upset, such as a power outage, loss of a
seal or gasket, a plugged vent, an overload, ice formation, a leak, a
malfunction in a control circuit, or a human error, can have a significant
effect. The narrow margin for error in a high throughput system with
strong feedbacks means that incidents are inevitable. As a result, there is
a high probability of unit upsets that are associated with exceedances
and other incidents. (190)
Or said another way, laborers impact and are impacted by the environment in the
course of job activities in a production process all at once environmentally catastrophic
and, at the same time, scrupulously abated compared with global norms.
5.3.1 Regulators’ relations with environmental regulations
Alberta Environment (AENV) functioned through three interrelated branches: Science
and Monitoring; Approvals; and, Compliance. Regulators in AENV, noted above, referred
to oilsands environmental impact applications as “approvals” in a concession to the
foregone outcome of their reviews. Yet, they certainly exerted some influence,
particularly at renewal points for the firms’ production authorizations, which offer only
10-year terms on top of 50-year land leases. At these decade intervals, AENV approvals
engineers required companies to invest in leading-edge abatement technology,
effectively mandating some degree of ecological modernization (B. Reg3). At the same

109

time, technological innovations of provincial scientists, firms, and industry consortia
inform the standards imposed by regulators (B. Job).
As the Chapter 2 methodology introduces, my initial opportunity interview with
an Alberta environmental regulator arises in the public reading room of the AENV Twin
Atria records library in Edmonton. I had handed a clerk a request slip to review
“notification of incident” call summaries, which companies must submit when they
exceed permitted pollution limits or breach standard operating practices. My purpose
had been a preliminary data survey; only later did I come to understand my inquiry was
fresh on the heels of the exhaustive study of the same documents by Timoney and Lee
(2013) described below. Apparently, AENV remained prickly as a senior regulator soon
approached me to learn my intentions.
Buddy Reg worries negative publicity prevents fuller explanations of the intensity
of environmental oversight in place. Buddy expresses concern my intent is to publicize
rules breaches and their embarrassingly light enforcement actions. As an alternative, B.
Reg wishes the agency would receive more accolades for its accomplishments, not least
for its aggressive standards and enforcement over dike structures around tailings ponds.
Indeed, confirms geotechnical surveyor B. Transit, Syncrude monitors dike wall
perturbations to tolerances of less than one centimeter. Failure models of these dikes
predict inundation of the Athabasca valley upstream to flood Fort McMurray.
The agency’s approach to environmental regulation is more cooperative than
punitive, marked in practice by torrents of reports, phone calls, emails, onsite testing,
and retesting that occupies staff to analyze, spot trends, launch
initiatives/investigations, and seek recourse. In AENV’s Fort McMurray district alone,
more than 2,000 such environmental reports were filed monthly, including hundreds of
incidents reports, explain Buddies Reg, Reg2, and Reg3. This blizzard of activity, points
out Carter (2010), nearly overwhelmed AENV regulators decimated at the time by staff
cuts and narrowed key metrics merely to whether firms filed reports on time. On top of
this, animal control reports, among other arguably secondary concerns, drew provincial
resources away from urgent conditions of air pollution and tailings ponds. The majority
110

of B. Reg’s time in Compliance demonstrates these priorities as most was spent – not on
penalties, but rather – on granting company requests for variances from their permits,
typically justified by unpredictable materiality and human error, not malfeasance
(setting aside the question of delayed maintenance regimes).
Of central importance in the AENV-industry relation was how environmental
defilement – even beyond permitted limits – was less egregious in legal terms than is its
non-disclosure. ‘Non-reporting, we take very serious; under reporting, that’s what we’re
worried about,’ stresses environmental regulator B. Reg3, who recognizes a significant
distinction between one-time anomalies and chronic violators. A “warning letter” begins
to set a track record for each “call” or “incident” in the AENV Compliance vernacular. ‘I
say “investigation” and people here panic,’ explains B. Reg3. In the end, the province
issues qualified pardons for most infractions. One rarer example is widely discussed – a
firm is penalized for failure to report the dumping of diluent into a tailings pond.
Consistent with AENV’s tiered approach to incidents, the problem is not that the diluent
is dumped in the tailings pond, which is not uncommon (B. Boots): ‘But we will
investigate if these [incidents] are not reported’ (B. Reg3, Buddy’s emphasis). ‘The
public’s concerns are our hammer,’ Buddy explains.
Nevertheless, practical compliance enforcement remains limited by the firms’
begrudging cooperation. As B. Reg3 puts it, ‘If it wasn’t voluntary compliance, how
would we… (pause) my god… (pause) how would we get out there? It’s going to be a
nightmare.’ If AENV took an adversarial stance, ‘These companies would close right up’
(B. Reg3). Outside of this degree of firm cooperation with AENV, incidents deemed
worthy of deeper investigation do originate from whistleblowers onsite who identify
industry violations. The infamous case of “the ducks” spotlighted below in Chapter 6, an
informant tells me, begins with complaints filed by disaffected employees.
5.3.2 Quango fig leaves
During fieldwork Alberta environmental regulators had established and partially funded
several quasi-nongovernmental organizations (“quangos”) to enlist membership
representative of firms, government, nongovernmental organizations, and First Nations
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in an effort to administer “environmental effects monitoring” in a manner positioned to
be acceptable to all involved stakeholders. This section discusses two quangos. The
Wood Buffalo Environmental Association (WBEA) dedicates activities to measurements
of air quality across the region. The Regional Aquatics Monitoring Program (RAMP)
collects water quantity and quality, sediment, and fish samples from the Athabasca
River, tributaries, and lakes. Participation in these quangos number among the many
stipulations set by firms’ operating approvals and licenses (Lott and Jones 2010).
The WBEA grows out of the 1985 Air Quality Task Force established by Alberta
and oilsands firms to engage complaints over odors lodged by the First Nations
community of Fort McKay just a few miles north – and downwind – of Syncrude and
Suncor plants. The portfolio expands to several dozen monitors across the RMWB in
population centers and proximate to – however, not directly in the midst of – the firms’
operations. WBEA uploads real time air quality reports, including to digital displays in
the hallways of the Fort McMurray community recreation center. It is not until 2009
that the WBEA adopts an institutional commitment to peer-reviewed scientific method.
Perhaps this new WBEA strategy is understandable as preemptive avoidance of the
travails of RAMP.
Syncrude’s (2009) promotional sustainability report touts the company’s
involvement in RAMP, which it calls a ‘science based, multi-stakeholder’ organization
(68). Similarly, in a 2008 promotional brochure, the Alberta government promotes the
beneficial contributions of RAMP. Outside such assurances, prominent NGOs and First
Nations groups abandon RAMP soon thereafter, frustrated over its domination by
industry (B. Bear 2012, B. Engo 2012). In response, RAMP commissions an independent
review of its research program in an effort to bolster its legitimacy. Among several
findings of shoddy science, this review details how RAMP violated basic scientific
principles when it placed monitors only upstream of potential industrial sources of
contamination of the Athabasca River. ‘The standard approach,’ the peer review acidly
observes, ‘would be to monitor both upstream and downstream’ (Ayles et al. 2004, 28).
A follow-up organizational study includes a review of plans to outsource data collection
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to third parties. Unfortunately, however, RAMP is found to have made little headway
towards scientific relevance (Main 2011).
Despite these profound shortcomings, RAMP’s “authority” is repeatedly invoked
by the industry and province alike as evidence of effective environmental governance in
the region. Besides its invocation by Syncrude mentioned above, the province also cites
RAMP as an authority long after that claim had become questionable on its face (e.g.,
Alberta, Canada 2008). One buddy with intimate knowledge of RAMP believes in
retrospect the organization should have been clearer about its limited capacity. The
chief problem, in Buddy’s excuse, was not the shoddy science but rather outsiders who
overstated RAMP’s authoritative scope.
5.3.3 Quasi-public information
Senior government librarian B. Books offers reassurance that my difficulty in accessing
industry data is structural, no fault of my own. Most required regulatory disclosures
related to the oilsands, Buddy explains, are simultaneously published online upon
receipt by regulatory agencies, and then without viable indexing, vanish within days or
weeks depending on the frequency of other filings. As a result, law firms and the
industry are the only actors with sufficient resources to construct their own
comprehensive database of filings. Moreover, when the province does offer online
access, there is no index of available information while search results are often
incomplete (Timoney and Lee 2013); which my own experience confirms.
5.3.4 Red carpet treatment softens some criticism
Media exposés of Fort McMurray irritate local residents. Two specific exposes are
denounced repeatedly. In 2006, Chatelaine magazine investigated Fort McMurray,
including its notorious bars (Preville 2006). In response to my prompt about this, B. Mac
scoffs: ‘Of course, they found prostitutes and maybe drugs.’ Second, the oilsands
industry fetes National Geographic magazine when it visits in 2009. Nevertheless, the
famous magazine’s cover story, “Scraping Bottom,” featuring its famous photography
aimed at the mining devastation (Kunzig 2009). B. Sharp, who describes this experience
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unprompted, feels betrayed: ‘We showed National Geographic around for three days
and they did us wrong.’
Despite these instances, there is no question that oilsands mining personnel,
along with Fort McMurray officials, through demonstrations of their dedication to
“softening the blow” of operations, achieve some success in charming high-profile
critics. Federal Opposition Leader Thomas Mulcair had been committed to using the
derogatory term “tar sands” on the campaign trail over the months leading up to a
daylong briefing and site tour of the oilsands. At the end of the long day, Mulcair’s tune
changes in departing remarks expressing the need for measured approaches to the
challenges of the “bituminous sands” (Gerson 2012).
5.4 Workers Relations under Environmental Regulation
5.4.1 Following the law
A senior environmental officer onsite asserts their firm operates scrupulously, always
within the letter of the law:
We have a 75-page Environmental Protection Enhancement Act approval
that details what we can do for construction, air monitor, ground water
and surface water monitor, how we do reclamation, how to report, what
do with waste material, how we treat our potable water, how we dispose
of sewage. Everything is wrapped up in this big long approval. So, there
are requirements on how we have to do things and why we have to do
things…. Those are the law. (B. Bear)
With respect to tailings pond seepage specifically, Buddy emphasizes well-over 100
AENV-approved wells monitor groundwater onsite. Monthly, quarterly, and biannual
‘groundwater response plans’ set change parameters and confidence intervals to track
naphthenic acids and chlorides. A five-step process guides response actions – from
resampling for confirmation all the way to drilling collection wells to capture and
manage process-affected water.
Despite the letter of these protocols, expert hydrogeologist B. Supper expresses
skepticism over their implementation. Given what we know about the challenges of
contamination management in well-understood settings, it is implausible to believe
everything is under control in the very new oilsands. It has been historically easy to
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comply with Alberta environmental strictures, yet skirt accountability: ‘A coal mine
could get away for a long time with three or four closely placed wells before Alberta
Environment caught up. Slow moving plumes in the tar sands might not yet be at the
wells.’ Moreover, grievous study results alone do not activate remediation
interventions: ‘When we find a leak it’s not like we rush in to fix the problem; it
continues to leak. It’s not the movies.’ And in very recent confirmation, after decades of
indications, the international Commission for Environmental Cooperation (2020)
establishes incontrovertibly that the oilsands industry tailings ponds seep beyond
containment structures and no one knows how to abate it.
5.4.2 General disdain for environmental activism
The oilsands activist community, conclude Haluza-DeLay and Carter (2016), fails to
connect with the hegemonic mindset in Alberta. Fieldwork provides substantial
confirmation. ‘Fuck Greenpeace,’ snaps more than one Newfoundlander in the oilsands,
who impugns its principles for fundraising off the traditional Newfoundland seal hunt on
the one hand, while on the other, ignoring requests to help save Newfoundland’s noncharismatic cod fishery, both of which hastened labor migration to Alberta. A rebuke
from an Illinois church sent to one firm castigating its environmental practices flashes
into the memory of a regulatory compliance officer at that company. Buddy Stern’s jaw
clenches and eyes flash disdain at the presumptive interference, quickly sublimated by
closed eyes and a practiced deep breath. Subsequently, a legalistic scoff: ‘They have no
standing,’ ends the discussion.
It is not that the industry workforce does not care about the environment, but
rather that they are ‘sick and tired of hearing about it’ in the words of B. Lumber. Much
higher priorities for equipment operators in the mine are amount of job hours, safety,
inconsistent foremen, sex and drugs, and the next purchase they will make. To a person
they bristle at the topic of downstream impacts (B. Chicken). When pushed in social chat
at the recreation center, party, or bar, one person counsels old pipelines are riskier than
the new one they are currently constructing; quite a few workers argue natural bitumen
seeps have impacted the environment for millennia. Itinerant laborers compare the
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oilsands to previously worked extraction zones, such as the Australian who recalls
Victoria’s ‘far dirtier’ lignite mines, or the Canadian who ‘moved here eight years ago
from Ontario and everybody told me “It’s so dirty up there,” but I breathe better here
than I ever did where I lived northeast of Toronto.’25 Others locate the region’s historical
“staples economy” of uranium mining, logging, trapping, pulp mills, and today’s oilsands
mining as pillars of economic production within global resource extraction networks.
Laborers recognize basic industry never operates without impacts – ‘it’s not rainbows
and unicorns,’ explains one. However, given their daily efforts both in direct
environmental abatement and remediation and in labor compliant with environmental
licenses, they feel unfairly singled out by critics.
Greenpeace occupies a Suncor plant
‘I was [at Suncor] when Greenpeace came on site,’ offers B. Deer (2011), who
agrees to elaborate on the September 2009 incident. Buddy explains the firm and
industry were on high alert as Greenpeace activists had lodged for a week in a Fort
McMurray hotel and already had staged an action in the Shell oilsands mine. The Suncor
operation spans both sides of the Athabasca River without shoreline fence. From the
bridge, security monitored approaching canoes and notified managers, who assembled
shoulder-to-shoulder to block the activists’ advance beyond shore. However, top
management had ordered strict avoidance of physical engagement with the intruders,
who simply squeezed through the human wall and proceeded to the central production
facility.
Activists climbed the steep conveyors that run raw crushed ore up into the
primary separation plant. Controllers shut down all plant conveyors to forestall injury
while tradesmen who had seen the drama unfold blocked the openings where the
conveyors entered into the plant itself. (The upgraders are supplied by tanks of bitumen
inventory, thus, were not affected):
They chained themselves, it was about nine in the morning, they chained
themselves to the conveyer structure. Apparently, they were fully
25

Others recorded: Oilsands are cleaner and less corrupt than foreign sources; the industry is simply
cleaning up the oil spill left by nature; and, wind turbines and buildings kill countless more birds.
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prepared, they had survival suits on, “Depends” adult diapers, they were
ready to stay for a while…. One had a satellite phone on a laptop and he
was blogging live about the protest that was occurring and whatnot. (B.
Deer)
Local police and Royal Canadian Mounted Police flooded the area. Video was set
up to capture the scene. One protestor miscalculated the traverse to a second
conveyer, rappelled to the ground, and submitted to arrest. Most striking was
the virulent response of laborers in the separation plant:
I was surprised at the animosity that came out of the trades guys. They
were angry. Very angry, that people would come in and disturb their
workplace like this. And endanger themselves, endanger their workplace,
to do this. It really frustrated them. And there were all sorts of
suggestions about, let’s offer them some coffee with “ex-lax” in it, why
don’t we spray the firehose on them about every ten minutes, let them
cool off and spray them a little more, there was a real animosity towards
these guys. (B. Deer)
Buddy appreciates, but does not share this anger, although Greenpeace’s action
seems ‘sort of dumb’ and cheapens its reputation. ‘So, my respect for
Greenpeace has fallen, let’s just say that. I don’t agree with their methods and I
don’t agree with their methodology, so, they’re not my kind of not-for-profit
charity.’
In reference to Greenpeace more generally, B. Curling, who as a young
adult had been involved with the group, applauds the urgent matters it brings to
light, yet rejects its one-sided lack of recognition of the industry’s ecological
modernization. Comparable in sentiment, B. Boots says in one breath that
environmental watchdogs are valuable; and in the next, ‘I don’t have any time
for Greenpeace.’ Greenpeace has garnered tens of thousands of views of its tar
sands actions; the sort of consciousness-raising actions Davidson and Gismondi
(2011), among others, urge to build global coalitions to shut down the tar sands.
Yet, relations fray with the likes of B. Boots, B. Curling, and B. Deer in line with
concerns of Haluza-DeLay and Carter (2016).
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Notably, however, not all laborers agree on these attitudes. Thirty-plus year
veteran B. Cousin says we need activists like Greenpeace to offset the ineffective
regulation of a government in bed with the industry. Without that pressure, in Buddy’s
mind, the companies would run out of control.
5.4.3 Environment of work in the mine pit
Removal of overburden and groundwater to establish the mine obliterates labor’s
relation with the lost boreal habitat. After mining begins, ‘There’s no difference
between day and night. It’s all twenty-four-hour a day operation, everything’s the same’
(B. Doggy). Throughout the mine, berm-lined cantered roads direct runoff into onsite
impoundments (B. Chicken, B. Hobby). High-voltage power lines are strung between
eighty-foot utility poles, tall enough to give clearance for haul trucks, yet insufficiently
tall for electricians working on them to escape truck’s trailing dust plumes. Master
electrician B. Hockey locates adult-onset allergies to the years engaged on those lines.
On the question of wider environmental concern among site workers, a person
familiar with Newfoundlanders in the industry reports, ‘I wouldn’t be surprised if many
of them thought nothing at all of it’ (B. Black). However, some do pause to think. Haul
truck driver B. Drum confesses, ‘Sometimes I feel guilty about it. I’m at the top and look
down and think, “What have we done?”, but then I think if I didn’t do it, someone
would.’
Wistful thirty-year veteran B. Doggy bemoans ‘little respect for animals’ in the
mine. For instance, Buddy explains, newly-opened mine faces tear into dens of
overwintering bears. If not killed outright, the hibernators are shooed away to fend for
themselves. Other workers also share affection toward animals in the mine. Haul truck
driver B. Sauna2 recognizes coyotes, but reports more foxes and once being upbraided
by a grader operator for stopping on a mine road to let one pass: ‘He wanted me to
keep going, but I couldn’t do that. They’re like dogs; I don’t feed them, but wouldn’t
hurt one.’ More informants described habituated coyotes, including the prohibition
against feeding them, which is ignored enough to encourage canid begging around the
shovels where traffic comes to a temporary stop. Coyotes in one den situated in the
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heart of 24-hour mining operations appear inured to the din, yet also wary enough to
disappear when wildlife personnel arrive with rifles to exterminate them (B. Union).
Hyper-mitigation
Fluid spills comprise one of several categories of hyper-mitigation. Spills of any
fluids inside the vast mines, previously overlooked, today receive immediate scrutiny,
and frequently, demand excavation for relocation into contaminant impoundments (B.
Boots, B. Union). One firm outfits its 120-ton capacity Bucyrus mine shovels with
‘diapers’ in the words of B. Bucky to contain blow-outs of hydraulic lines. ‘I think it’s a
bit extreme,’ says Buddy in a clear effort to be polite; however, given the downtime cost
of contaminant spills, diapers likely pay off in productivity. Practical limits appear.
Consultant B. Iron scrupulously complies with a client’s stated procedures; so, when
fluid spills during an ore crusher setup, Buddy immediately informs the firm’s
environmental office. However, after the response team arrives and jumps to remediate
an old stain rather than the new smaller mishap, Buddy gains the impression of having
wasted their time. This level of concern stands in stark contrast with the once common
practice of burying damaged and obsolete heavy equipment in the mine pits (B.
Chicken); at the same time, it does little practically to mitigate the industry’s ravages.
5.4.4 Environment of work in the separation plant and upgrader
As B. Drum and other informants inside the mine suggest, laborers’ decision-making
influence on the environment is limited once the choice has been made to participate as
a worker. Outside of wildlife encounters and mine road mishaps, relentless structured
labor pushes ore towards the unquenchable upgrader. ‘You gotta feed the beast,’ B.
Chicken (2011) puts it.
Refer to the Chapter 4 explanation of the production process that yields
synthetic crude oil as well as copious volumes of waste in the form of liquid tailings,
solid coke and sulfur, and toxic gases. Laborers who work in the separation and
upgrader plants experience continual exposures to these perilous substances: ‘Now, if
you’re inside the plant next to the coker, you’re exposed to all sorts of stuff,’
emphasizes B. Mouse (2012). Most of this risky material results from highly-structured
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production activity. Indeed, even manual emergency flaring of partially processed coker
gas, for example, reflects rules-based logical controls executed by panel operators.
These elite blue-collar workers feel bad about such emergency releases, due both to
direct concern for the environment, and also because management initiatives make it a
point of emphasis to reduce such events, which often trigger incident reports to
provincial environmental authorities (B. Rabbit). Or, in the words of plant engineer B.
Show, ‘When the smoke from that stack turns black, we have to file an incident.’ Beyond
emergencies alone, day to day operations flare continually; and in one example of this
maintenance, continuous flaring was projected to last over two weeks (Timoney and Lee
2013, 145).
5.5 Unregulated Environmental Hazards
5.5.1 Dangerous gases
Like all frigid lakes every spring, tailings pondwater undergoes a thermal turnover, which
in their peculiar case belches massive plumes of poisonous hydrogen sulfide lasting days
on end – a million cubic meters released on one site alone (B. Curling). At such times,
and throughout the year, the companies host regulators to take spot samples of such
tailings ponds emissions (Siddique et al. 2008, Small et al. 2015). This methodology
troubles one company insider: ‘How can you really quantify what comes off your tailings
pond? Okay so you stick this thing floating around on the surface to capture for that
particular day at that particular time….’ (B. Boots). The necessity of environmental
monitors conceded, Buddy suggests pond studies serve institutional goals without
repercussions to operations:
So, it’s better than doing nothing, but what is it really telling you? I mean,
we’ve done all kinds of tests and studies and things like that, and it tells
you something, either tells you you’re really bad or not sure (laughs). Or,
I think we’re really great, but, really? I don’t know. You have to do it to
satisfy people. (B. Boots)
Regardless of vaporization data, in other words, everyone understands the ponds are
long-term fixtures.
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Other sources of volatilization are tank facilities without vapor recovery units
and running vapor recovery units above capacity (B. Deer), as well as the expansive coke
dump where for a period of time B. Chicken both drives a haul truck to remove waste
from the Suncor batch cokers and water truck to suppress its dust. Syncrude also dumps
coke, yet more discreetly (Timoney and Lee 2013, 45). Suncor management urges
equipment operators to keep their windows rolled up as the cab climate was
maintained by HEPA-filtration and the discarded coke smoldered for a week.
Nevertheless, due to poor maintenance, ‘Even with the windows rolled up I’d come
home at the end of the day covered in black soot.’ Presumably, says Buddy, these
conditions are what lead Suncor to ban pregnant women from work in the coke dump.
In addition to volatilization, malevolent gases spew from the upgraders. Buddy
Sauna keeps an eye on the exhaust of dozens of short stacks, which typically appears
white, but turns gray or yellow due to, respectively, excessive arsenic or sulfur in the
process. With engineering experience in the chemical industry, both B. Calgary and B.
Show decry such leaks, which in their eyes indicates poor process control and plant
maintenance. These sorts of toxic gases with associated heavy metals, along with 400
tons of fine particulates 2.5 microns and less (PM2.5), were discharged from these short
stacks in 2010 at Syncrude and Suncor (MacDonald 2013). ‘There have been people who
have stood up in meetings and said, “the gas falls like anvils and it’s killing us.” They
don’t last long,’ deadpans Buddy Scofflaw, who adds it does pay to know the upgrader’s
sheltered locations: ‘You learn where to stand.’ Buddies Millwright and Boom sustain
constant vigilance over wind direction should they need to escape poisonous plumes.
On a related note, B. Bus a senior bus driver who ferries onsite executives in a
reserved passenger coach, parks it in a far corner of the leasehold during the workday
and opens its windows in order to provide fresh air to patrons on their commute back to
Fort McMurray.
The material danger is real in the eyes of B. Mouse who places high probability
on sulfur compounds shooting out of short stacks or billowing from flares to become
readily acidified by humid atmosphere; and if so, wreak havoc on lung tissue. Former
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Suncor executive-turned-consultant Harold Page (1972, 20-1) emphasizes this concern
increases in the ‘ice fog’ of winter months. This question eludes investigation by the
Wood Buffalo Environmental Association (WBEA), the nongovernmental organization
that serves as the region’s de facto air quality monitor.
5.5.2 Fine particulates and associated compounds
‘There’s stuff in that dust,’ asserts Alberta regulator B. Reg3 in a personal belief that
appears to garner no institutional urgency. To the contrary, B. Curling had participated
in a study (that also involved WBEA) in which onsite laborers wore sampling “badges” to
capture ambient particulates. Results held nothing of interest. Buddy Mouse classifies
road and dike dust in the coarse category, larger than PM 2.5, thus, less likely to lodge in
lung tissue. Sand dust is not a “toxin” and therefore not studied. Environmental impact
studies filed by oilsands mine applicants do contain sections dedicated to Human
Exposure; however, these fail to include airborne particulates (Alberta Energy and
Utilities Board [AEUB] 1997).
More recent research, however, isolates five key sources of PM2.5: haul truck
road dust, equipment emissions, and the upgrader, as well as soil disturbance and
regional forest fire smoke, which combine organic and mineral compounds as well as
heavy metals (Phillips-Smith et al. 2017). In concurrence, Landis et al. (2019) also
demonstrate these fine particles bind with hazardous polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAH). A key source of PAHs is coke dust, left over from upgrading and both stored and
burned as fuel (Xu 2018, Zhang et al. 2016). Note, these particulate studies are
undertaken at already-installed WBEA monitoring towers proximate to – yet, not in the
hearts of – the oilsands firms’ operations.
Anecdotal evidence of something going on
Chatting in the coed sauna at the community recreation center, B. Sauna says,
‘It’s good to sweat out Fort McMurray. Now if I could only do the same for my lungs,’
and continues: ‘I have respiratory problems. Doctors in Edmonton tell me they’re
surprised by how many young [buddies] they’re seeing with emphysema.’ Buddy Driver
recalls driving a haul truck for years with the window down, ‘but one day I finished my
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shift coughing and having trouble breathing. That lasted for two days. Now, if the air
conditioner doesn’t work, I don’t drive the truck.’ Individual experiences, not managerial
commands, lead to such decisions. ‘I tell my guys to roll up windows and keep their cabs
clean,’ explains B. Union before conceding, ‘Yeah, what can you do?’ As a contract
laborer specialized in immense outdoor scaffolds, B. Carpenter had been instructed,
nevertheless, not to work outside more than four hours a day, ‘to cover Suncor’s ass,’ in
Buddy’s words.
B. Curling concedes these onsite environmental hazards, and adds they are
exacerbated yet adds cigarettes, fast food, and sleeplessness as additional key lifestyle
factors. In addition, research shows volatile organic compounds and PAHs measured in
gas flare emissions are also present indoors – originating from indoor sources and
almost always at higher concentrations than outdoors (Kindzierski 2000).
5.6 Brief Case: Protected Birds Disrupt a New Mine Launch
Legal compliance with environmental regulations is not so straightforward suggests the
following brief case, wherein production managers and attorneys scrutinize every path
to skirt bird protection rules, so as to avoid disruption to the commissioning schedule of
their new mine.
The oilsands industry will, over its lifetime, kill up to 160 million migratory birds,
directly and through habitat loss (Wells et al. 2008). Ironically, B. Show winces, ‘Birds
love our pipes,’ as we walk the less-restricted edges of an upgrader. Songbirds flock
year-round to miles of bundled pipes in the upgrader for warmth and shelter.
Government-protected birds pose a nuisance onsite where environmental departments
devote substantial resources towards deterrence. Besides scarecrows, noise canons,
and even radar-activated alarms, firms deploy airboats to chase ducks off tailings ponds,
scoop out dead ones, ‘and if they’re still squirming to give their little neck a twist’ (B.
Doggy; also, B. Boots). Despite these efforts, nevertheless, the birds remain insistent
and it is difficult to keep them away. A report produced for AENV quantifies the low
performance of the AENV-regulated bird protection regime, and makes
recommendations to minimize mortality. The provincial agency stifles this public release
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until forced by freedom of information rulings (Riley 2021). Nevertheless, regulation
shapes activity. This brief case describes how a scheduled multibillion dollar mine startup runs smack up against protected birds.26
During fieldwork, all the firms – and AENV regulators – are on edge in the wake
of the 2010 “ducks” disaster, detailed in the next chapter, which sees a $3 million
penalty levied on Syncrude for its failure to deploy waterfowl abatement measures
consistent with its regulatory permit, and the resultant deaths of 1,601 ducks that
mistake a toxic industrial tailings impoundment for a freshwater pond. To be clear,
oilsands tailings ponds kill plenty of waterfowl, between 450 and 5,000 annually,
calculate Timoney and Ronconi (2010). The Syncrude penalty is not for the deaths per
se, rather specifically, its failure to exercise preventative due-diligence.
Easy to denounce, oilsands tailings ponds nevertheless incorporate substantive
engineered structures to direct seepage flows in predictable channels where they can
be intercepted and returned. At the same time, I cannot overemphasize how this
engineering has undergirded rationalizations of tailings production. Only very recently
has the failure of this mitigation alone become incontrovertible (Commission for
Environmental Cooperation 2020). Under construction at the time, the new mine’s
tailings pond would extend over 6 square miles upon completion. One day in the
intensive closing days of this build-out, an environmental worker discovers a nest with
waterfowl eggs protected under provincial and federal law. As a result, the entire area
had to be vacated to wait for the eggs to hatch and the birds to fledge. But that is only
the beginning. Apparently attracted by the successfully nesting pair, other waterfowl
descend on the area to set up a colony. Workers scramble to interrupt avian nature, but
with mixed results. Despite best efforts, these waterfowl force a comprehensive
recalculation of the critical path of the tailings pond construction and imperil the mine
launch.
Buddy has seen careers made and broken based on abilities to meet demanding
progress timetables to open the new mine; and at this point, it is only months from its
26
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catchall, “Buddy.” Even so, details remain murky due to informants’ equivocations.
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launch. The firm’s executive leadership has not planned for such delays and shows no
wherewithal to adjust the timetable. With the mine opening imminent, the countdown
remains on track to flood the waterfowl-occupied area with hot toxic tailings – a prima
facia violation of environmental strictures in the eyes of a few outspoken project
leaders. Fully cognizant of the very real risk, senior management resolves, nevertheless,
to press on with the launch schedule. Pressure is high to sign-off on benefit-cost
analyses that concede the risk of environmental rule violation, yet calculate that is
outweighed by the benefit of on-time plant commissioning. Under regulatory scrutiny
redoubled by the recent Syncrude “ducks” case, the firm’s legal office scours potential
pathways forward within the letter of the law. However, none is found. Only at the
midnight hour does risk-averse sensibility prevail, and concede to a postponement. In
Buddy’s words: ‘The right thing was done at the end. But we came that close. To
violating. Our principles.’
In addition to these unwelcome waterfowl, suddenly it comes to light there are
nearly 200 cliff swallow nests on the walls of the separation plant’s outdoor treatment
cells. Like the nesting ducks, these migratory birds are protected, which means the plant
cannot be commissioned so long as their nests obstruct its operations. In urgent
response, the firm retains a wildlife biologist who deploys a flexible scope to peer into
each nest and monitor its eggs, chicks, and fledglings. Once young birds fledge, nests are
scraped off the walls without ceremony. Then, after weeks of progress and to the
chagrin of all involved, new eggs are discovered. Capital and management exasperation
reaches its breaking point and the plant is commissioned without fully-resolving the
situation. A firm employee files a complaint prompting a site visit by a regulatory
investigator. Several senior leaders including the general manager are informed they
should retain attorneys as any situation with wildlife is potentially fraught with legal
jeopardy. In the end, however, regulators agree the firm has pursued adequate duediligence and the matter is dropped. This close call shapes Buddy’s industry view: ‘I’ve
put a lot of this stuff out of my mind, but I look back at some of the stuff that happened
and… there are unethical people that work in our organization.’
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This case demonstrates how environmental regulation, the unpredictable
environment, and individual workers’ actions and decisions shape company behavior. A
vast oilsands mine is about to launch with associated environmental outcomes; at the
same time, two small groups of protected birds in separate areas of the mine grind
petro-capital’s schedules to a temporary halt.
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CHAPTER 6. THE FINE CRISIS
We can, indeed we must, recognize the fact that capitalism produces
nature, but we must simultaneously recognize the materiality – and
consequentiality – of the particular natures capitalism produces. (Castree
1995, 21)
You cannot make tailings ponds go away, you go to any mine on the
planet and there will be a tailings pond. (B. Miner)
6.1 The Ducks
In Spring 2008, a cold snap and late-season snowfall drove thousands of ducks toward
an ice-free pond at the facilities of Syncrude, the largest operator in the Alberta,
Canada, oilsands mining industry. Unfortunately, the birds’ perceived refuge was not an
open lake at all, but rather a two square mile wastewater containment facility kept
partially unfrozen by the continuous addition of warm sludgy waste produced by the
oilsands extraction process – a tailings pond. The pond appeared as freshwater to the
exhausted waterfowl, but in fact the surface was blanketed by a floating mat of
unrecovered bitumen, and soon after landing the misfortunate ducks either became
engulfed and drowned or died of toxicity and exposure.
In response to this calamity the Province of Alberta and federal government filed
an environmental lawsuit against the firm, ultimately prevailing in a 2010 decision.
Rather than punish Syncrude for the deaths of 1,601 migratory waterfowl per se, this $3
million judgment stemmed from the firm’s failure to deploy standard safeguards (i.e.,
scarecrows, canons, etc.) that discourage – but never prevent – wildlife from falling prey
to tailings ponds (R v Syncrude 2010; see also, Timoney and Ronconi (2010) for annual
waterfowl mortality in the oilsands tailings ponds).
Despite this guilty verdict, in many eyes the evidence of industry culpability still
is not so straightforward. Countless Albertans flare with indignation when prompted,
‘tell me about the ducks.’ They remain skeptical about the Syncrude verdict, reasoning
human error should be excused and herculean attempts were made to save the stricken
birds. Others believe the magnitude of avian fatalities was inconsequential compared
with mortality caused by windows, wind turbines, and hunters.
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The Ducks provide an entry into this chapter’s analysis of the tailings ponds of
the oilsands mining industry — the crucial feature of the materiality and
consequentiality of the particular nature that capitalism produces in the oilsands mines,
as well as the particular capitalism that oilsands nature produces. The Syncrude verdict
is superficially punitive; more crucially however, it affirms that the industry’s production
of nearly 30 square miles of open tailings water – 40 square miles today – is not prima
facie violation of provincial and federal laws that prohibit environmental desecration
(Fluker 2011). Using these legalized oilsands tailings ponds as a lens, this chapter locates
the relations between the oilsands industry, the state, and the material idiosyncrasies of
bituminous sands in constituting a regulated waste-heavy economy by: 1) producing
oilsands tailings in the first place; 2) impounding tailings in diked ponds, which produces
water crises related to non-settling, water balance, and seepage; 3) attempting to
mediate and abate the crisis of impounded recalcitrant “mature fine tailings” (MFT);
and, 4) regulating tailings pond remediation, including rollout of “command-andcontrol” strictures typically claimed to be obsolete in the neoliberal era.
6.2 Waste-Heavy Economy: Producing Tailings
Although raw oilsands ore contains little use value and less in exchange, earlier chapters
detail how generations of technological perseverance worked to make it a resource.27
Chapter 4 sketches the contemporary process of oilsands commoditization, where
readers will recall, the first crucial challenge is to separate and isolate bitumen. Most
mining firms accomplish this via variants of the Clark flotation process, the basics of
which can be appreciated in twice daily tabletop demonstrations in Fort McMurray’s Oil
Sands Discovery Centre wherein the addition of hot water stirred into pulped ore in a
large beaker yields three distinct layers consisting of floating bitumen, sinking sand, and
in between, a larger cloudy fraction of “middlings” water. This primary extraction
recovers only about two-thirds of the available bitumen. As such, at industrial scale,
oilsands firms subject their middlings to secondary and tertiary treatments, which raise
total bitumen yields from the raw ore to 95 percent and higher.
27
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The chief waste byproduct of the Clark process is a siliceous slurry of consisting
of added water, raising it from 30 to 50 percent of total volume, plus stony sand to clay
fines, naphthenic acid, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, metals, and unrecovered bitumen,
collectively known as “fluid tailings.” Indeed, the Clark process produces more tailings
waste than bitumen – 1.5 barrels of fluid tailings for each barrel of synthetic crude oil
(Mikula 2012). Thus, beyond the challenge of bitumen separation, the second basic
industry challenge is handling this resultant waste stream of the Clark process, which –
due to the combination of nonstop operations and input ore that process-water swells
to 40 percent greater waste volume (Camp 1976) – makes the oilsands mines the
world’s largest producers of mine tailings (Masliyah et al. 2004).
Whereas earlier generations of oilsands entrepreneurs dumped these tailings
directly on the ground or into the same rivers they sourced for raw production water,
regulation of the sheer volume of the contemporary industry makes that impracticable.
Empirical data analyzed within this chapter addresses the vast network of ponds
constructed to impound this tailings waste and the attempts to manage this network.
Beyond the quantity of tailings and their cocktail of toxic substances, the core challenge
of tailings is the confounding property of clay “fines.” Smaller than 45 microns, these
fines exist throughout the raw oilsands ore and are necessary to some degree in
effecting bitumen separation via the Clark process; yet also, problematically they defy
efforts to completely eliminate them from the tailings pond water column where they
accumulate.
6.3 Waste-Heavy Economy: Impounding Tailings
By the late 1950s, as oil companies seek regulatory approval for larger scale oilsands
ventures, a solution needs to be found to the incredible volume of tailings waste
produced by the Clark process, which will pose a navigation hazard if dumped into the
Athabasca River. In addition, the issue of tailings toxicity lingers. The workaround
emerges in the form of the diked impoundments known as tailings ponds to store the
firms’ postproduction wastewater. After a half century, this “zero discharge” rubric
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continues to mitigate the release of contaminated tailings water into the ambient
environment, shaping both ecological impacts and provincial regulation.
It is important to understand parameters of zero discharge are not fully specified
at the outset; rather they emerge over the 1960s and 1970s during the opening decades
of the oilsands industry. This coalescence becomes clear through analysis of the earliest
approval applications and provincial responses pertaining to the Suncor and Syncrude
start-ups. The province’s Oil and Gas Conservation Board (1960) retains experts to
review Great Canadian Oil Sands’ (Suncor’s) initial proposal in which the one planned
mitigation is a low dike to prevent direct drainage into the river outfitted with a trench
to capture clarified tailings drainage, and with ambitious plans to transport dried tailings
sand back to mined out areas within three years. The Board expresses repeated
misgivings about the firm’s plans, which amount to little more than dumping tailings on
the delta of an Athabasca tributary just to the south of the extraction plant and
upgrader: ‘The Board is of the opinion that the problem of initial sand tailings disposal
has been given a minimum of study by the applicant’ (50). Specific shortcomings include
lack of provision for cold weather, lack of understanding the challenge of transporting
sluiced tailings, and unrealistic expectations about the stability of stacked dry tailings.
Similarly, the Cities Service consortium proposal to the Oil and Gas Conservation Board
(1962) offers optimistic expectations of returning clarified postproduction wastewater
to the Athabasca River with the vague acknowledgement that excess bitumen and solids
will pose difficulties in need of resolution. A few years later, Suncor offers little
additional evidence that tailings will settle in ponds as claimed, according to the Oil and
Gas Conservation Board (1964). Despite this crucial shortfall, however, its greater
attention to dike integrity in the dump area is enough to win provincial approval.
Using the coarsest tailings sand and clay as the primary construction materials,
engineers raise dike walls ahead of rising tailings contents to heights of 200-300 feet,
which can extend over 10 miles in length to encircle many square miles of surface area,
ranking them among the world’s largest diked impoundments (Morgenstern and Scott
1997). As observed in Chapter 5, environmental regulator B. Reg is particularly
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impressed with the agency’s standards and enforcement with respect to dike structures
around tailings ponds, which aim to prevent failures that models predict would inundate
the Athabasca valley upstream to flood Fort McMurray. Suncor’s original tailings pond
had been under-engineered from the outset, but subsequently underwent significant
interventions to enhance its stability (Morgenstern 1976). Here is one area in which
Syncrude does appear to implement the lessons of Suncor. Prior to completing
construction of its first mine and upgrader, the firm empanels an outside geotechnical
review board with particular emphasis on mine wall and tailings dike integrity (McKenna
1998). Syncrude’s first tailings pond features strategically placed drains that capture
seepage at the toe of the dike for return to the pond in addition to sustained attention
to the integrity of the dike (List and Lord 1997, McKenna 1998). In this regard,
geotechnical surveyor B. Transit confirms that Syncrude monitors dike wall
perturbations within tolerances of less than one centimeter.
Contemporary Alberta approvals and licenses have evolved to require that the
oilsands companies institute: strict dike-construction practices and monitoring to reduce
the possibility of catastrophic dike failure caused by foundation slippage or liquefaction;
drains at downstream toes of dikes that capture seepage for return to the tailings pond;
monitoring procedures to report quantities and locations of seepage emanating from
the tailings ponds, including remedial intervention if indicated; and, wildlife mitigation
practices. The latter includes vegetation clearance, booms to prevent the formation of
bitumen ‘mats’ on pond surfaces, randomized noise canons, and animated falcon
effigies. Some firms are testing the efficacy of radar-triggered wildlife aversions
intended to reduce the problem of habituation – activity that picks up after the Ducks
verdict, according to B. Radar, a manufacturer’s representative with a display at an
oilsands trade conference.
These practices of impounding tailings spawn decades of crises, my research
reveals, including the three detailed immediately below, which – even the firms and
province concede – remain only partially resolved.
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6.3.1 Tailings pond crisis #1: Non-clarifying water
A sprawling problem emerges within a year of Suncor’s 1967 launch when it becomes
obvious that the tailings impoundment process does not work as planned. Heavier
coarse tailings solids do settle rapidly to the bottom of the company’s Pond 1; however,
the finest clay particles in the tailings remain locked within cloudy middlings and a toxic
yogurt-like suspension of approximately thirty percent solids that is extremely resistant
to further dewatering. The resistance of oilsands fine tailings to settling stems from
molecular scale interactions of bitumen, water, sand, and clay. During the Clark process,
more complete dispersion of oil particles away from other constituents of the saturated
ore matrix enhances the recovery of economic bitumen; yet also as a direct
consequence, this dispersion exacerbates the molecular challenge of forcing the leftover
material back into solids that settle out of postproduction water. This confounding
challenge is known as dewatering or producing non-segregating tailing. Clay plays the
central role in this formula. Some proportion of clay is essential during bitumen
separation, as it enhances the conversion of bitumen droplets into surfactants, which
enables extraction efficiencies well above 90 percent (Schramm et al. 2000; see also,
Clark and Pasternack 1949). But at the same time, higher proportions of clay in the input
feed increase volumes of clay particles that remain separated in a cloudy suspension
rather than settling out of the tailings waste along with coarser particles (Mikula et al.
1996).
The technical literature largely excuses Suncor for this contingency. Typical is the
determination of Morgenstern and Scott (1997) that ‘[t]he characteristics of segregating
tailings… and the resulting large storage requirements were not understood by the
initial designers of the Suncor operation’ (105). Less charitable criticism points to midcentury discovery of properties of clay fines in oilsands extraction and the peculiarities
of associated tailings wastewater that Clark and Pasternack (1949) describe.
Comparable to Suncor’s initial lackadaisical approach to tailings pond construction, the
firm’s plan to easily recover clarified water from tailings relies more upon asserted
desire rather than experimental evidence. Putting aside culpability, the material
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challenge is profoundly pressing as within the first year of operation this ‘unanticipated’
tailings accumulation rapidly fills Suncor Pond 1 at a rate of 20 percent of the volume of
material processed in the separation plants (FTFC 1995, Liu 1993). By the early 1970s,
Suncor invests millions to dry out its problem ‘sludge,’ yet a decade later it is no closer
to dewatering what has become known widely as “mature fine tailings” (MFT) (Oliver
1977). Researchers later concede that without mitigation it will take ‘thousands of years’
for MFT to settle into eighty percent solids, which is the ratio necessary to support the
weight of earthmoving equipment and reclamation (Mikula et al. 1996, added
emphasis). As an emergency stopgap, Suncor petitions Alberta for regulatory permission
to dump Pond 1 overflow into a neighboring lake (Page 1972). This emergency action is
narrowly averted only by the construction of several new tailings ponds, and also by
increasing the height of the retention dike of Pond 1 faster than anticipated, which in its
service life vaults to 320 ft. – over half again higher than the original planned top of 200
ft. (Morgenstern and Scott 1997).
The experience of Suncor’s Pond 1 could have served as a valuable lesson in the
logistical challenges of impounding industrial volumes of oilsands tailings. It is not clear
then why Syncrude so underinvests in its waste facilities, setting up its own tailings
crisis. Syncrude plans that 50 percent of its water needs will be met by recycled water
drawn from its initial tailings pond. Immediately, however, excessive fine particles in the
tailings effluent inhibit settling, and thus prevent the reuse of water for production. At
the same time, the residual toxic bitumen found in the pondwater makes it impossible
to dump it into the Athabasca watershed without breeching regulations. As Suncor’s
decade-old MFT crisis continues unabated, Syncrude begins operations in 1978 with an
acute shortage of infrastructure to store tailings and MFT. Despite enlisting scientists
from the University of Alberta to devise and test potential solutions, resolution of this
crisis remains elusive (Caughill, Morgenstern and Scott 1993). Without any other
options, Syncrude fills its original tailings pond with MFT decades before its forecasts
had projected (List and Lord 1997).
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Echoing these early under-investments in tailings facilities uncovered in my
archival research, the contemporary oilsands industry’s environmental disclosures
continue to understate the rate and accumulation of fine tailings production (Houlihan
and Mian 2008). In 2016, a few years after primary fieldwork is complete, the total wet
surface area of the industry’s tailings ponds is almost 40 square miles, within 99 square
miles of dedicated tailings management facilities28 in which the total volume of fine
tailings is over 6 billion barrels.29
6.3.2 Tailings pond crisis #2: Difficulty of water balance
Most accounts of oilsands production, including this dissertation for the most part,
emphasize material flows in terms of the transformation of raw ore into commodities
and waste. Yet, a subset of design and operating engineers understand the enterprise as
a problem of water flow, which is involved in sluiced transport of raw ore and waste,
bitumen separation, steam heating, amine and sulfur recovery, and comprises 70
percent of MFT. Despite the significant challenge of MFT, B. Rabbit explains, tailings
ponds long have been key features of the continuously operating industrial operations,
as a destination for new waste to be sure, but also as a crucial source of recycled settled
water from the surface layer of the ponds. Recycling water requires substantial capital
and operational funding as it depends on massive water treatment facilities, engineered
to handle high volumes with added redundancy including support and ancillary
equipment. In one example, Syncrude currently obtains 85 percent of its water needs
via recycling (Syncrude 2009).
Despite this high rate of recycling, however, what is known as “water balance” in
the firms’ systems exists under increasing stress, due to the accumulation of MFT,
bitumen, and ionized calcium from consolidated tailings (CT) technologies explained
below. To put it simply, the repeated re-use of tailings ponds water for steam and other
operational applications leaves even the clarified water degraded by ionization and
contamination. In response, despite the firms’ and provincial assurances of zero
discharge, Syncrude, Suncor, and provincial regulators for decades have been
28
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investigating the political and material implications of the overt release of
postproduction water (Oil Sands Water Release Technical Working Group 1996, Rogers
et al. 1996, Rogers et al. 1998). Pushing for some degree of postproduction water
discharge to reset the ponds’ water balances, Buddy Prof assures me that researchers
have sent samples of candidate release water to federal agents for assay, which has
determined this water to be less turbid and toxic than routine industrial effluent
released into the Great Lakes, an irksome double standard in Buddy’s eyes, who sees no
achievable alternative to release. This political pressure to allow the release of tailings
pond water into the Athabasca has only strengthened, so that current expectations
anticipate in 2023 such water releases will commence (French 2020).
6.3.3 Tailings pond crisis #3: Seepage
Oilsands mining firms issue sustainability reports that routinely tout their compliance
with zero discharge policies, intended as palliative assurances that toxic waste is fully
contained (Suncor 2009, Syncrude 2009). Of crucial importance, however, is that these
specious public relations reports pointedly fail to disclose the copious seepage of
materials from the unlined bases of the tailings ponds. This long indisputable topic
codified in the firms’ operating permits (e.g., Hodgson 1978) sanctions the release of
significant volumes of tailings pond seepage – currently over 25 million barrels annually
for the industry (Price 2008), an equivalent volume to more than 90 Exxon-Valdez spills
every year. The companies are required to monitor this seepage and report results to
Alberta according to the ten-year terms of their operating permits; however, the results
are not made public. After years of provincial rebuffs of NGO requests for seepage data,
the federal government has recently snuffed out a comparable petition by the
environmental watchdog under the North American Free Trade Agreement (Sutherland
2015). To estimate seepage given this empirical data embargo, Price (2008) uses
modeled seepage estimates disclosed in the environmental impact assessments of
company’s approval applications as stand-ins for minimal seepage in practice. My
informants inside firms are emphatic about aiming to comply with the minimal
standards set by Alberta-issued licenses and approvals – ‘we follow the law’ (B. Bear).
135

Firms’ silence on seepage stands in notable contrast to the tendency of the industry’s
public relations to disclose information selectively to paint the best picture, which
makes it reasonable to conclude the situation is not appreciably better, and possibly
worse than Price (2008) projects.
Due to the dearth of publicly available data, little more can be concluded for
certain about current levels of pond seepage. Archival research into Suncor’s first
tailings pond during its first decade of operations (Pond 1) reveals actual seepage rates
at that time: over 4 million barrels of seepage discharge annually (Bouthillier 1976), a
volume that diminishes only marginally two decades later when Pond 1 annual seepage
volume remains at 3.7 million barrels (Alberta Energy and Utilities Board 1997).
Importantly, these seepage statistics account for only 55–70 percent of total Pond 1
seepage, which also seeps undetectable quantities flowing through the base of the pond
(Gallup 1976). This seepage is highly toxic to fish, although the dilution by freshwater of
the Athabasca River may attenuate the immediate impacts (Hrudey 1975, Mackay
1976). Regardless, the detrimental effects of long-term sub-lethal exposure continue to
be the most pressing health concern for both human and wildlife populations (Greenhill
1976).
6.4 Waste-Heavy Economy: Mitigating, Abating, and Remediating Tailings
Finally acknowledging the volumetric challenges of tailings, in the 1980s statesponsored research and development pivots away from the generational question of
bitumen separation to face up to the industry’s ballooning inventory of MFT. The Fine
Tailings Fundamentals Consortium organized in 1989 is particularly notable for bringing
together government and university researchers and company engineers to encourage
development of technology to try to tackle the twin volumetric problems of
continuously produced new fine tailings and remediation of stockpiled MFT into
trafficable solids. From its start, the FTFC collective dismisses alternatives to the Clark
process as mere curiosities, leading it to pursue mitigation at the end-of-pipe tailings
stream. During this same period, environmental regulations continued to evolve. The
province now demands more exhaustive environmental impact disclosures, seen
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between the first Syncrude approval application (1973) versus its later submission
seeking expansion (1984), although both are primitive by contemporary comparison.
During this time also, with increasing provincial encouragement, multilateral
nongovernmental organizations raise concerns over Fort McMurray regional air quality,
Athabasca River monitoring, and the industry’s cumulative impacts on the environment.
The FTFC investigates physical and chemical technologies to subjugate fine
tailings, striving to scale-up promising lab technology to handle voluminous everyday
oilsands operations. The FTFC’s key innovation, known as composite or consolidated
tailings (CT), is a technique that mixes gypsum or lime with MFT, which is then injected
with carbon dioxide into the fresh tailings stream. This enhances fine particles’ ability to
settle out from suspension with larger grains and not contribute to future MFT. A
marginal but significant advance in MFT remediation, CT reduces the dewatering times
of new tailings from a millennium or more to perhaps fewer than 100 years (FTFC 1995,
Liu 1993).
Two chief problems of CT stem from the calcium content of gypsum. Calcium rich
recycled water scales the insides of extensive steam piping that encircles upgraders to
sustain heat, which increases maintenance costs and downtime, and heightens the risk
of catastrophic failure. Also, calcium ionized water is unusable in the Clark hot water
process, which requires deionized conditions achieved by sodium hydroxide treatment.
Recall from the discussion of water balance above, the growing concentration of calcium
in the system water balance pressures allowance of some level of discharge. The newest
hardware technologies such as hydro cyclones and centrifuges offer some degree of
relief to these tensions as they enable admirable fines removal without added calcium,
thus increasing quantities of clarified postproduction water available to recycle back
into the extraction process, and simultaneously lessening reliance on the problematic CT
approach.
6.3.4 Second generation MFT remediation: Flocculants
During fieldwork, engineers and laborers, including many informants, were scaling-up a
pilot operation at Suncor that promised the first breakthroughs in MFT remediation
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since the development of CT. By 2010, the company had trademarked this flocculentbased Tailings Reduction Operation (TRO), which it intended to license to competing
firms (Bugg 2010). Earlier proving out of the method had contributed in part to
remediating the company’s notorious Pond 1. To this end Suncor evacuated its MFT to a
newer pond complex, in the process converting some via TRO. Rather than dismantling
the over 300-foot Pond 1 dike, the removed pond contents were replaced with sandy
tailings waste to refill the diked enclosure. This area was then topped with soil,
landscaped to mimic dry and wetland features, and planted sporadically with grass. In
accordance with the long-term plans in oilsands leases, Suncor returned the area to
provincial authority with great fanfare.
Currently, this site – designated Wapisiw Lookout after the early-eighteenth
century Cree who purportedly shared oilsands ore with the Hudson’s Bay Company –
plays a prominent role in Suncor’s choreographed onsite bus tour, which foregrounds
environmental stewardship against a backdrop of industrial triumph. Tourists ride on a
road that encircles the area, and are directed to observe utility poles stuck into the soft
surface to give raptors hunting perches in hopes they will control pesky vole
populations. A glass and steel multilevel viewing facility with interpretive signage
overlooks this site, which is one of only two locations on the tour where visitors are
allowed off the bus and encouraged to appreciate the vista. Although Pond 1 was never
a mine site, it is presented as crowning evidence of fulfilled social obligation, even
noblesse oblige, implies an effusive guide: ‘We remove everything from the surface, take
away the oil spill that Mother Nature left us, and then we replace everything through
reclamation.’ This experience takes up approximately one-third of the entire tour.
Newer facilities that implement TRO do not dump tailings into ponds directly,
but rather first treat them with flocculent, and then spread them across gently graded
expanses of multiple square miles to encourage the settlement of fine particles, as
water flows into a central deep pond that holds the resulting clarified water in its
uppermost layers. This clear water is subsequently transported to diked ponds to
undergo additional clarification and settling of MFT. In a familiar pattern to engineering
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fixes in the oilsands, Suncor’s initial success with TRO has produced brand new sets of
problems. With TRO, as B. Calgary2 explains, the surprising problem now is too much
success. Sand and clay solids drop out of the tailing so copiously with TRO that the firm
is overwhelming its sand recovery facilities. Remediation is challenging due to the mass
and bulk of sand, which cannot be pumped in pipes.
6.4 Waste-Heavy Economy: Regulating Tailings and MFT
6.4.1 Provincial “conservation” requirements exacerbate MFT crisis
The entanglements of Alberta regulatory policy, oil extraction, and the biophysical
properties of the oilsands suggest the MFT crisis has been driven by a vicious set of
interactions between the state and raw materiality. In addition to its marginal regulation
of environmental impacts, Alberta maintains a financial interest in the oilsands
industry’s production output, from which it extracts a stream of royalty payments. The
contradictions of the state play out in the tailings ponds where provincial regulations to
promote environmental protection run into other regulations to promote
environmental conservation.
In its efforts to maximize royalties, Alberta insists that firms not skim just the
richest ore deposits from the lower depths of mines. Rather, they are compelled to
“conserve” the resource, which in practice means to process lower grades of bitumen
(containing higher proportions of fine clays) than the firms otherwise would, which are
obtained from the mines’ upper reaches. The result is production of more obdurate MFT
waste. For instance, in issuing the first approval for the Suncor Steepbank mine, the
province insists that the firm processes ore with as little as 6 percent bitumen, despite
acknowledging that introducing ore with less than 8 percent bitumen will depress
recovery efficiency, increase the volume and toxicity of tailings, and drive-up energy
usage (AEUB 1997).
6.4.2 Lack of historical hydrogeological research
Stresses on groundwater have intensified across Canada due to population growth,
agriculture, and petroleum development, whereas systematic study and planning has
lagged. This situation prompts the Council of Canadian Academies to convene an Expert
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Panel on Groundwater to research the problem; its final report contains a chapter
dedicated to the Alberta oilsands that finds ‘sustainable groundwater management is
unsustainable to date’ Council of Canadian Academies 2009, 142). The Expert Panel
identifies two conspiring factors in the oilsands. First, the regional hydrogeological
model is incomplete due to lack of data. Second, even when firms collect
hydrogeological information in the course of meeting regulatory requirements, it is not
obtained consistently, and, therefore is of limited use in scientific analysis.
Calls for groundwater research in the oilsands have gone unheeded at least since
the original Syncrude development began in the early 1970s. This longstanding gap in
knowledge – not least related to the firms’ tailings ponds – is documented in selected
boxes30 of records in the Provincial Archives of Alberta among the several dozen boxes
indexed “Albert Environment,” “Great Canadian Oil Sands,” or “Syncrude” that I draw on
throughout the dissertation. Overall, these contents show how small budgets, resistant
firms, and contradictory provincial agendas weighted towards development all conspire
to doom meaningful groundwater research. Specifically, in two separate provincial
environmental research initiatives of the early 1970s, the province downplays and
sidesteps investigation into the threats to groundwater posed by the Syncrude facility
under construction at the time. These apparent episodes of ‘willful blindness,’ to borrow
a phrase from environmental regulator B. Reg3, corroborate the argument that
Alberta’s 1975 equity investment in Syncrude is inimical to provincial environmental
stewardship (cf. Longley 2021).
6.4.3 Newest regulation over tailings and MFT
The most recent major development in the relations of the Alberta government and
oilsands tailings is its 2009 issuance of Directive 074 (Energy Resources Conservation
Board 2009) (superseded by Directive 085 in 2016) that requires all of the oilsands
mining firms to accelerate the implementation of unproven tailings remediation
strategies, such as Suncor’s TRO, in seeming defiance of fifty years’ evidence regarding
the intransigence of the tailings problem. Put in place abruptly by Alberta’s conservation
30
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regulator, this mandate reflects very little coordination with the provincial
environmental regulator according to B. Reg. Some aspects of Directive 074 appear
tough – draconian even – but cooperative rather than contentious enforcement is
always likely based upon the firm-state relationship described in Chapter 5. Notably for
instance, the regulator appears unfazed by the paradox of approving noncompliant
plans in which each firm determines its own course of action for remediation and the
firms are falling far behind of achieving the lower targets they negotiated with provincial
regulators (Grant and Flanagan 2013). Problematically, the resulting company filings are
incommensurable because each relies on its own terminology (Simieritsch et al. 2009).
Moreover, firms estimate they will capture only fifty percent of fine tailings and MFT,
resulting in rising MFT inventories. On top of that these projections fail both to fully
translate mining plans into waste calculations and make room for contingency and
variation (Kalantari et al. 2013).
Thus, technologies and regulations are both being crafted in response to crises.
Buddy Job emphasizes that Alberta and the national government look to Suncor and
Syncrude for guidance in crafting the technical requirements of regulations, including
Directive 074, based on the firms’ advanced technological capabilities. Not even the
experts fully appreciate the properties and implications of tailings, Buddy explains.
Due to the smallish footprint of its leases, Suncor particularly faces opportunity
costs arising in the volume of waste overburden and post-production tailings sand and
sludge that must be stored on otherwise “good tar sand.” The firm speaks of this
problem in terms of resource ‘sterilization’ (Bugg 2010; cf. Bridge 2000, Zalik 2015). It is
crucial to understand this crisis of sterilization is experienced with similar urgency within
the provincial government, which stands to lose royalty revenue should good tar sand
not be mined. The promulgation of Directives 074 and 085 by the provincial
conservation regulator indicates such monetary concerns – not the environment – are
the primary motivation. Archival documents indicate this has been a longstanding point
of interest. For instance, the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (1997) provisional
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approval of Suncor’s Steepbank mine observes favorably that overburden and
interburden dumps ‘will not sterilize recoverable reserves’ (6).
This includes Suncor’s technology, which is a work in progress. Suncor had
envisioned licensing its TRO process to its competitors; however, that opportunity
closed in the rapid emergence of oligopolistic cooperation among firms scrambling to
respond, seen in the new Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA) and the Oil
Sands Tailings Consortium (OSTC), which combined with provincial funding of research
and development, recall historical FTFC initiatives of the 1990s to optimize consolidated
tailings (CT) technologies. Buddy Calgary2 concurs, albeit more colorfully:
Nobody had to tell us. The government didn’t have to legislate anything.
You know if these guys want to keep making money and have a good
return for their investor, they’re going to figure out a way that it’s not
gonna cost them as much to maintain these ponds and to protect the
environment, to make sure the ducks don’t land!
Thinking through a decade of technical implementations in the oilsands, B. Calgary2
comes to a realization during our conversation that every single project on which they
have worked has involved tailings in one way or another. Many of my informants are
wrapped up in this tailings dilemma, whether piloting solutions, constructing tailings
pond components, or interacting with provincial regulations.
Directive 074 and developments by individual firms garner favorable press
coverage that extolls new breakthroughs as the long-sought technological resolution of
the mature fines tailings crisis (e.g., Christian 2010). At least one exuberant executive
goes on record to predict in two short decades MFT will be eliminated altogether
(Christian 2011). In practice, however, Directive 074 is no panacea. It is yet another
episode in the continuing efforts of state and industry to normalize MFT production and
its outcome, which will persist long after oilsands mining winds down sometime after
2050. At that time, according to Directive 074 projections, over 7 billion barrels of MFT
would be transferred to massive permanent end-pit lakes (ERCB 2013). This volume is
the equivalent of 26,000 Exxon-Valdez spills, 1,400 BP Deepwater Horizon catastrophes,
or 16 times the volume of toxic wastewater and oil infamously dumped by
Texaco/Chevron into the Ecuadoran Amazon basin.
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However, even these voluminous projections turn out to be overly optimistic. In
late 2014 the regulator announces, abruptly, its intention to redraft Directive 074
performance targets due to the difficulty industry finds in achieving them (McDermott
2014), which anticipates superseding Directive 085. Despite short-lived fanfare, these
remain formative mediations in the enduring MFT crisis.
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CONCLUSION
The dissertation begins to fill two lacunae in the literature pertaining to Alberta oilsands
geography: lack of attention to the co-constitutional relations of materiality in the
problem of oilsands mining, and, absent ground-level views inside the “black box” of
regulated commodity and waste production. Three research questions guided the
inquiry and organize this conclusion: 1) How does oilsands materiality contribute to an
understanding of socionatural resources? 2) How do oilsands production workers’ shiftto-shift activities manifest their socionatural relations? 3) How do environmental
regulation and firms’ imperatives mediate workers’ socionatural relations? Answering
these questions necessitated the use of iterative multiple methods that put
geographical literatures and petroleum historiography in conversation with archival
sources and the partial stories of laborers, tradespeople, equipment operators,
engineers, managers, and regulators gleaned through multiple seasons of participant
observation and relationship-building necessary to overcome reticence among
prospective study informants.
These answers, I hasten to emphasize, inform each other. Insistent materiality,
environmental regulation, production imperatives, and workers’ activities interplay on
the ground in the theoretical implications of historically situated, regulated commodity
and waste production, and its reproduction. These findings unfold in the processes of
socionatural régulation wherein federal and provincial environmental regulation is only
one facet of the contradictory multifold state – especially apparent in crucial provincial
research and development and favorable lease and royalty terms as well as equity
investment in the industry. This conclusion closes with a discussion of the dissertation’s
limitations and suggestions for future research.
Unconventionality and the difficulty of commoditization
My research clearly shows the Alberta oilsands exemplifies Erich Zimmermann’s
famous dictum that, ‘resources are not, they become’ (1951, 15, original italics), as well
as newer precepts of socionatural and petroleum geography that focus on capitalism
and co-constitutive materiality. The label “unconventional” often applied to the oilsands
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is more of an historical fluke arising in the challenges of bitumen separation and mining
volumes than an intrinsic material distinction. In Alberta specifically, geological
exploration commences in oilsands in the nineteenth century after liquid petroleum has
already triumphed commercially over the solid raw materials of coal oil. After four
decades of investigation, government agents finally conclude that the bituminous sand
is the potential resource, not a sticky barrier concealing an underlying pool of liquid
petroleum. It requires four more decades to develop an economical technique to
separate commodifiable yields of bitumen from its obdurate ore matrix, during which
time the objective of commoditization shifts from road surfacing to automobile fuel.
Yet, despite that proof of concept, it still takes two additional decades until 1967 to
launch the first plant remaining in operation today. Undeniably, the oilsands do not
easily “become” a petroleum resource, yet the contemporary mining industry achieves
acceptable returns. Moreover, compared with fickle liquid petroleum reserves, it is
important to appreciate the relative ease with which oilsands mining yields can be
calculated over 50-year spans. Had bitumen separation been more readily achieved in
the ventures of the 1920-40s and followed by more rapid oilsands mining expansion,
today the resource would be called simply “oil.”
Natural Limits
Critical geography identifies the structural tendency toward “overproduction” of
petroleum worldwide; in North America, strategies and tactics of both petro-capitalists
and states strive to constrain this tendency. These dynamics play out in competition
over reserves, state conservation initiatives, and even militarized intervention. Contrary
to neoclassical theory and popular perception, in other words, oil prices reflect not
conditions of material limits, but rather, the conditions of market control. Since the
1859 Drake well, social anxiety episodically flares over perceived natural limits of
petroleum resources.
My research shows how these tensions play out in the oilsands, beginning in the
1950s launch of onsite pilot tests by multinational petroleum companies panicked by
the Mossadegh-led Iranian revolution and Suez crisis. American oil strategists urge rapid
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development of the oilsands in the wake of the 1973 oil shock, despite – as critical
geography makes clear – its political rather than material impetus. Contrary to these
urgent calls for expansion, however, I show how the province drags out the approval for
the region’s second oilsands mine in order to monitor the market effects of the newlyopened Alaska oilfields. This contradiction echoes a pattern I uncover that pits provincedriven oilsands development, on the one hand, against liquid petroleum interests on the
other. Historically, the province shelters the latter from competition by stalling oilsands
commercialization.
The majority of my fieldwork unfolded during an extended production boom,
when contemporaneous proponents of “peak oil” began to conflate oilsands materiality
with “scraping the bottom of the barrel” of global petroleum reserves. The oilsands is
undeniably challenging to exploit economically; however, in line with the literature, I
make clear this cost is a matter of value accumulation independent of natural limits.
Comparable to my critique of the oilsands framed as “unconventional,” had this
bituminous material “become” an economic resource for mining earlier, its immense
predictable output would have been a stabilizing bulwark against the notion of “peak
oil” as opposed to seeming evidence in its support.
The nature that environmentally regulated oilsands mining produces
My review of the critical literature shows how the theoretical frame of
régulation and the environment often narrows in case studies to the mechanisms of
regulation on the ground, whether promulgated by the restructuring state or in tandem
with supranational initiatives. Turning this narrower case study framework upon the
oilsands, I find a central tension is the contradiction between the mining industry’s
colossal environmental degradation and its thoroughly regulated environmental
relations. Despite firm’s chronic exceedances, environmental impacts are held under
some control by provincial and federal environmental agents, further attenuated by
firms’ voluntary compliance with global standards, plus alarms raised by whistleblowers.
These regulatory accomplishments are tenuous to say the least. My investigation
brings to light occurrences when business pressures nearly provoke deliberate violations
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of environmental rules. In addition, I confirm previous research findings of provincial
regulators’ practical collegiality with the firms that curtails aggressive enforcement. The
preponderance of environmental violations are forgiven as long as they are reported.
This current state of affairs is an outgrowth of historical practices, I show. Both
provincial and federal regulators have fostered what one environmental regulator dubs,
‘willful blindness.’ This approach is perhaps most obvious in the still incomplete
fragments of groundwater mapping that result from decades of postponing
comprehensive studies, combined with ongoing secrecy about quantities of seepage
from tailings ponds into groundwater.
The waste output of the industry in general, and perhaps the tailings most of all,
demonstrates the urgency of Castree’s (1995) call for understanding the nature that
capitalism produces. The raw resource is obdurate – so is the waste. Molecularly, after
warm water flotation pries apart the ore matrix to separate bitumen, it proves a wicked
challenge to force the post-process and slurry water back out of the remaining solid
material. My archival inquiry makes clear that firms and the province deceived
themselves and the public in their historic understatement of the challenges of waste
mediation. Despite published findings of provincial research scientists, early mine
approvals allowed notoriously optimistic claims of tailings settling. In the opening year
of the first contemporary oilsands mine, crises emerged due to the resistant tailings;
yet, despite this unresolved calamity, the second contemporary oilsands mine was
allowed to open with a patently impossible projection of tailings settling in five years.
Only decades later do published papers from sources inside the firms concede the real
timeframe for untreated tailings to settle is one thousand years or more, while still
excusing plant designers for tailings’ “surprising” obduracy.
A widely repeated conceptualization holds that waste is an unintended
byproduct of production (cf. Benton 1989, Bridge 2008b, Bridge and Le Billon 2013,
Dicken 2011, Smith 1984). Quite to the contrary however, my project demonstrates
oilsands tailings are the highly engineered outcome of bitumen separation. Not only
that, the province exacerbates the waste problem, according to documents I uncover in
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the archive, by insisting firms process low grade ore with high clay content which
produces higher volumes of the most obdurate tailings. Provincial environmental
regulators never held authority to insist the tailing conundrum be solved before oilsands
mining commenced; and to this day, a range of informants explains, regulators look to
the firms to slowly invent their way out of the crises they produce. Unfortunately, I learn
that behind glowing press releases celebrating breakthroughs, at industrial scales these
breakthroughs repeatedly create new problems. One indication is that despite decades
of “zero discharge” fanfare, firms may be close to achieving a decades-long initiative to
release tailings water directly into the watershed.
Informants’ socionatural relations
Socionatural relations of many informants lie at the intersection of production
imperatives, environment, and personal safety. Extended strings of 12-hour shifts with
few days off demand hyper-vigilance in the relentless 24/7/365 operations of the
world’s largest surface mines scorched by boreal summer days and frozen in winter to
the point of extinguished flames. Death, disfigurement, and chronic debilitation are
continuous threats for thousands of workers each shift due to falls, crushing blows, toxic
gases, equipment failures, vehicle collisions, and human error, plus some instances of
recklessness. Ever edgy about potential exposure to poisonous gases, veteran workers
constantly monitor wind direction and escape routes. Some workers relocate to leave
behind the industry and its conditions. Others take pause over the magnitude of
environmental disturbance, but continue as a practical matter of wage work: ‘If I didn’t
do it, someone else would.’ Still others hold the attitude that they are producing vital
materials for contemporary society while at the same time holding up their end of the
wage labor bargain. Engineers and technical workers, in particular, widely express
confidence that their work contributes to the safest and cleanest production possible of
much-needed oil.
Oilsands mine workers are frustrated with being castigated for the
environmental impacts of oilsands mining. I confirm previous findings about workers’
antipathy toward environmental activism in general – especially Greenpeace actions –
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which fosters a siege mentality aligning workers with industry, comparable to the
pattern identified by Burawoy (1979). I also show the analytical value in understanding
these workers’ perspectives. Informants demonstrate normative regard for the
environment, including several who express wonderment over wildlife they encounter
and some who express grief and remorse for the impacts they produce. Many are
itinerant workers in resource extraction and claim the oilsands mines are far cleaner
than anywhere else they have worked. Critics may denounce this view as naïve;
however, many of these laborers view themselves as realists. They are impressed by
their firms’ environmental and reclamation commitments and see the impacts as the
necessary trade-off for the society we live in. These informants understand that surface
mining always entails substantial impacts. Landscape alteration and waste production
are inevitable. Several explicitly argue that giving a humane twist of the neck to a
stricken duck is certainly no more monstrous than hunting. Damage to habitat,
disturbing hibernating bears, and the like are facets of production labor that workers
rationalize.
Workers’ shift-to-shift activities demand scrupulous adherence to management
rules that encompass environmental compliance. Workers operationalize firms’
non/compliance with provincial environmental rules. Yet for most informants,
environmental rules are invisible as only specialists maintain contact with provincial
regulators. That said, everyone understands that environmental incidents must be
reported. However, the obsessive drive for production is the basic motive force in the
oilsands mines and upgraders. My informants share rafts of examples of shortcuts
demanded by supervisors – more to the point – imperatives passed down from their
supervisors’ managers. While I document extensive gaming of labor systems, my study
was not able to establish the degree of gaming in the environmental compliance side of
the business. The one extended example I obtained – related to protected birds in the
way of facility start-up plans – provides some indication, as does an environmental
regulator who explains the importance of whistleblowers in keeping eyes on the firms.
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Limitations of the study and avenues for future research
High living costs in Fort McMurray combined with extremely limited access to
plant sites, narrow the scope of my research in terms of length of fieldwork and contact
with informants. When I was able to interview, who, and where, and what these
informants remembered and chose to share, are all constrained by the limitations of
participant observation and interviews of a guarded industry. In the final tally I
assembled 57 interviewees – including 9 key informants – during seven months of
fieldwork largely in the summer. It is likely that a continuous presence over a full
calendar year could have raised additional opportunities for developing key informants,
and also opened new channels of informants and data collection. Notably, such a
continuous presence would have provided the opportunity to conduct fieldwork during
the materially distinct winter months.
Degrees in science and business management prepared me to attain some
understanding from the background technical literature, which when put in iterative
conversation with interview data, helped stitch together a reasonable explanation of
workers’ material relations across the regulated enterprise from mine to commodity
production to waste discharge and impoundment – particularly through the worker-eye
view. No doubt, any area specialist might suggest any number of revisions – a prospect I
would welcome in line with my method. The project achieves its objective to crack open
black box of production, but it is surely a rudimentary beginning rather than the last
word. One more crucial limitation is that in an effort to focus on laborers as a group –
and to protect confidentiality in an industry I confirm blacklists – I aimed to hide
identifiers that mark age, gender, race, ethnicity, and national or provincial origin.
Therefore, I did not engage these potentially important avenues for understanding
workers’ environmental relations.
While the present study considers the implication of environmental regulation
for workers’ environmental relations, it would be interesting if future research along
these lines also investigated potentially overlapping implications of labor safety
regulation. Given that my findings corroborate the rift between oilsands workers and
150

environmental activism, additional research with oilsands workers about their daily
experiences at the intersection of production, environment, and personal safety could
be useful, including for instance, what avenues are available for activists to engage with
workers in mutual perspective-sharing research. Here, specific consideration of
identities that remain hidden in the current study might prove beneficial – if that can be
done while securing informants’ confidentiality, particularly in the instances of noncisgender white males. Several of my informants were both First Nations members as
well as seasoned oilsands workers, and I believe it would be fruitful to investigate these
positionalities explicitly – especially as most of the literature conflates indigeneity with
resistance to the industry.
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APPENDIX I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AENV
AER
AESRD
b/d
bbl
Barrel
CAPP
CENV
COSIA
CT
CUC
CUC
Dilbit
ERCB
FOIPP
Fracking
FTFC
GCOS
GSC
Integ
MFT
OPEC
OSMA
OSTC
PAH
RAMP
RCA
REDA
RMWB
SCO
TRO
WBEA

Alberta Environment
Alberta Energy Resources
Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development
Barrels per Day
Barrel
42 US Gallons
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
Environment Canada
Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance
Composite or Consolidated Tailings
Alberta Department of Environment Conservation and Utilization Committee
Conservation and Utilization Committee (Alberta Department of
Environment)
Diluted Bitumen
Energy Resources Conservation Board
Freedom of Information and Privacy Protection (Act)
Hydraulic Fracturing
Fine Tailings Fundamentals Consortium
Great Canadian Oil Sands (Predecessor to Suncor Energy)
Geological Survey of Canada
Intercontinental Engineering
Mature Fine Tailings
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Oil Sands Mineable Area
Oil Sands Tailings Consortium
Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon
Regional Aquatic Monitoring Program
Research Council of Alberta
Responsible Energy Development Act
Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, Alberta
Synthetic Crude Oil
Tailings Reduction Operations (Suncor)
Wood Buffalo Environmental Association
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APPENDIX IV. INFORMANTS
Buddy
Bang
Bear
Black
Books
Boom
Boots

Carpenter
Catwalk
Chicken

Occupation
Equipment Operator
Compliance Officer
Community Media
Librarian
Equipment Operator
Environmental
compliance manager
Carpenter
Shovel Operator
Passenger Bus Driver
Senior Process Engineer
Senior Instrumentation
Engineer
Carpenter
Laborer
Equipment Operator

Children
Circle
Cousin
Curling
Deer

Librarian
Educator
Millwright
Safety Specialist
Engineer

Doggy
Dream
Driver
Drum
Engo
Hobby

Equipment Operator
Laborer
Equipment Operator
Haul Truck Driver
NGO Staff
Engineer

Hockey
Iron

Electrician
Capital Equipment
Vendor
Engineer
Boilermaker
Laborer/Musician

Boston
Bucky
Bus
Calgary
Calgary2

Job
Lighter
Lumber

Interaction Type
Opportunity Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Opportunity & Semi-structured
Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Opportunity & Semi-structured
Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity & Semi-structured
Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Opportunity & Semi-structured
Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity & Semi-structured
Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Opportunity Interview

Year(s)
2011-12
2012
2011-12
2012
2011
2012

Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview

2011
2012
2012
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2012
2012
2012
2011
2012
2012
2012
2011-12
2011
2011-12
2011
2012
2010-11
2011
2011
2011
2012
2012
2011
2012
2012

Mac
Millwright
Miner
Mouse
Panel
Pickup
Pool
Prof
Rabbit

Municipal Employee
Millwright
Senior Mining Engineer
Toxins Researcher
Plant Operator
Entrepreneur
Haul Truck Driver
Engineering Professor
Senior Process Engineer

Radar

Manufacturer’s
Representative
Alberta Regulator
Alberta Regulator
Alberta Regulator
Maintenance Engineer
Haul Truck Driver
Haul Truck Driver
Haul Truck Driver
Sheetmetal Worker
Electrician
Trainer
Engineer

Reg
Reg2
Reg3
Retiree
Sailor
Sauna
Sauna2
Sauna3
Scofflaw
Sharp
Show
Shower
Shred
Stern
Supper
Transit
Union

Engineer
Engineer
Environmental
Compliance Officer
Contaminant
Hydrogeologist
Geotechnical Surveyor
Haul Truck Driver

Opportunity Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity & Semi-structured
Interview
Opportunity Interview

2011
2011
2011
2011-12
2012
2012
2012
2010
2011-12

Opportunity Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Semi-structured Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity & Semi-structured
Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview

2011
2012
2012
2010
2012
2011
2012
2012
2012
2011
2010-11

Opportunity Interview

2012

Opportunity Interview
Opportunity Interview

2012
2012
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2012
2011
2011
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